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I. INTRODUCTION
Following replacement of Dr. Francois "Papa Doc"
Duvalier by his son, Jean-Claude "Little Doc" Duvalier, as
President of the Republic of Haiti in 1971, the previously
strained relations between Haiti and the United States eased
somewhat. Although the United States did not wish to resume
direct arms sales to Haiti, it did encourage private armament
sales by American firms. Thereafter, Aerotrade, Inc., a
Florida corporation, entered into a procurement contract with
Haiti agreeing to sell it an assortment of military equipment.
Later a dispute arose between the parties over the contract's
terms. After negotiations failed, Aerotrade filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York to enforce its contract rights by attaching funds of
the Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti, as alter ego
of the Republic of Haiti, on deposit with First National City
Bank. Aerotrade claimed damages for lost profits on orders
that Haiti failed to place and $867,000 for goods sold and de-
livered to Haiti for which payment was never received.
The government of the Republic of Haiti may have be-
lieved that it acted properly in its dealings with Aerotrade.
Like all defendants, however, it believed its chances of suc-
cess In the litigation would be enhanced If the merits were
never reached. In order to avoid the merits, Haiti retained
Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld of New York University School
of Law to obtain a dismissal of the suit.'
Professor Lowenfeld first Instructed Haiti's Ambassa-
dor to the United States to send a note to the Secretary of
State requesting him to recognize and allow Haiti's claim of
sovereign immunity.2 While a decision on the note was pend-
ing, however, Professor Lowenfeld discovered that high-rank-
ing State Department officials had given testimony before a
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee indicating
that the note would not be acted upon favorably. He there-
upon instructed the Haitian Ambassador to withdraw his note
and made the claim of immunity directly to the court. The
court, following authority in the Second Circuit, held that
Haiti was immune from suit because the transaction sued upon
Editor's Note: Due to the length of the article, footnotes
will be found at the end of the text.
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was one "concerning the armed forces" and dismissed the suit. 3
Aerotrade's attempt to assert a cause of action against
the Republic of Haiti illustrates some of the inadequacies of
the doctrine of foreign state immunity as it has been applied
in the United States. First, individual determinations of
claims to immunity have been somewhat unpredictable. Second,
the extent of immunity recognized in the United States has
been broader than either international law or sound policy re-
quires. Third, marginal differences in diplomatic and judi-
cial policy have encouraged forum-shopping that embarrasses
the nation and makes individual outcomes even less predictable.
In addition to these inadequacies, the manner in which foreign
state immunity claims have been decided has been injurious to
American foreign relations.
Most of the inadequacies of the doctrine of foreign
state immunity as it has been applied in the United States
have been direct results of the State Department's role in
the process. Unpredictability of decisions has been caused
by the Department's failure to promulgate a description of
the standards it applies that is more detailed than the single
sentence contained in its initial pronouncement on the sub-
ject--the Tate letter;3a its institutional inferiority in ap-
plying those standards to factual situations; and by the
courts' deference to State Department policy and decisions.
Unnecessary generosity in granting immunity has resulted from
the Department's institutional bias in favor of preserving
friendly relations with the parties who can help it to achieve
its institutional goals. Competing standards of decision have
been the product of the foreign state defendant's ability to
invoke State Department action to overrule judicial precedent
in the matter at hand. And injury to American foreign rela-
tions has been caused by the Department's willingness to use
immunity as a means of placating foreign states showing hos-
tile designs, feigned or otherwise, in some unrelated area of
our relations with them.
Congress has recently acted to remedy most of these in-
adequacies by enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976. This statute empowers the federal and state courts to
decide claims to foreign state immunity from their process,
codifies the conditions upon which immunity shall be granted,
and withdraws the State Department's authority both to pre-
scribe and to apply rival standards of immunity. In doing so,
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 will greatly im-
prove the manner in which the international law doctrine of
the 'foreign state immunity is implemented in the United States.
Enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 is not the only recent development of note with regard to
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the Immunity of foreign states from judicial process in the
United States. On May 24, 1976, the Supreme Court decided
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. The Republic of Cuba,4 a an
"act of state"hb case. Although that case was technically de-
cided on grounds that no "act of state" had taken place, four
justices expressed the opinion that the "act of state doc-
trine" should be applied only to those actions in which sov-
ereign immunity would be required under the "restrictive the-
ory" adopted by the United States, and Justice Stevens re-
served decision on this issue. Thus, while in the past a'
private plaintiff attempting to take a foreign sovereign to
court in the United States had two hurdles to pass--the "act
of state doctrine" and the "sovereign Immunity doctrine"--in
the near future sovereign immunity law may be the sole obsta-
cle,4c
In this context, this article will examine the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, the case law and State De-
partment precedent which itsupplants or codifies, and the in-
ternational law standards which establish the minimum degree
of immunity permitted.5 The article has three objectives In do-
ing so: it will seek to add definition to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 by outlining judicial and diplomatic
precedent In areas in which the legislation leaves existing
State Department policy untouched; it will try to reveal the
codification's consistency with the minimum requirements of
International law and the extent to which it grants immunity
without compulsion from International law standards; and it
will attempt an analysis of the legislation's achievements by
comparing it to prior law and to alternatives which were with-
in Congress' power.
II. THE CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS
A. The World Constitutive Process
In the international arena, governments, corporations
and other organizations have always acted to maximize things
they value--be it the well-being of their subjects or the
wealth of their shareholders--by manipulation of the resources
at their command. As interactions between these participants
In the international order increased and pursuit of their in-
dividual goals brought them more and more into conflict, the
world community developed a process by which rationalizations
of these pursuits could be made by the whole in the interests
of the whole. This process, which has been called the 'world
19761
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constitutive process of authoritative decision,"16 creates and
enforces standards that control the behavior of these parti-
cipants in transactions with substantial international conse-
quences. It channels the demands of the participants into
certain arenas, favors certain forms of exerting the demands
over others, and establishes and enforces accepted substantive
rules of behavior, called international law. The world does so
in the interests of stability in expectation, believing that
all participants in the world arena have a better chance of
satisfying their demands on the world's resources if their in-
teractions are brought under some common control in a predict-
able way.
To determine whether the world community has, in fact,
created international law with respect to a particular transac-
tion, it is necessary to discover whether the effective elites
of the world community--leaders of governments, corporations
and other associations--have a common expectation that the
community as a whole has prescribed certain conduct and will
enforce its prescription with sanctions.7 Sometimes these ex-
pectations of effective authority are created by multilateral
conventions and treaties. Other times they are created by an
extended practice of uniform behavior among the participants,
called "customary international law." Jurists, statesmen, and
other officials, in searching for customary international law,
usually make reference to "certain past uniformities in be-
havior [of the participants], such uniformities allegedly of-
fering good evidence of community expectation because of their
having occurred in accordance with perspectives of the parti-
cipants that such behavior was required."18 But the proper in-
quiry must always be whether the participants presently have
shared expectations that they are required by the community
to act in certain ways.
It is commonly accepted that customary international
law limits the power of one state to subject a foreign state
to judicial process in its domestic courts. The precise in-
ternational requirement will be described more fully in the
next section. In brief, it protects foreign states from
suits based on their "public," noncommercial acts, and their
public use property from execution to satisfy a judgment, with-
out the sovereign's consent. This standard is the outcome of
an attempt to stabilize the interaction of pressures exerted
by each of the relevant participants, primarily by diplomatic
and economic means, in the courts, foreign offices and market-
place, in an attempt by each to maximize the things it values.
The world participants with special Interests in sov-
ereign immunity include governments and corporations with
varying interests. State trading nations desire immunity from
judicial process in order to maximize their wealth for the
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benefit of their subjects by gaining an advantage over their
privately organized competitors.9 Capital importing nations
with thoughts of either nationalizing foreign investments or
of attracting investments made by other governments also de-
sire immunity, especially from execution in the latter case,
in order to promote the well-being of their subjects. 10 Capi-
tal exporting nations, on the other hand, desire that govern-
ments of recipient nations be subject to judicial compulsion
in municipal courts in order to prevent confiscation. of their
subjects' investments. Private international trading corpora-
tions and international investors, especially those in the ex-
tractive industries, also desire that governments be account-
able in municipal courts. The trading corporations wish to be
able to compete with state traders and to enforce contracts
with foreign sovereigns in order to maximize the wealth of
their shareholders. The investors wish to be able to protect
their investments from confiscation and to enforce the debts
of government borrowers for the same purpose. However, domes-
tic corporations who may be the beneficiaries of investments
by foreign sovereigns favor immunity from execution to en-
courage foreign government investments and reduce their firm's
cost of capital.
The participants exert their demands for or against an
international standard requiring sovereign immunity primarily
in two arenas: the marketplace and the domestic governmental
institution--foreign office or court--charged with determin-
ing claims to sovereign immunity. Because the private parti-
cipants' power base is their control of wealth, international
trading and investment corporations exert their demands pri-
marily in the marketplace. The trading corporations contract-
ing with foreign governments and governmental instrumentali-
ties can extract waivers of immunity in return for adjustments
in the price of goods traded.l] The investors can negotiate
waivers of immunity in the debt instruments or concession
agreements issued by foreign governments. 12 Foreign govern-
ment investors also exert pressures in this arena by threaten-
ing to withhold capital from foreign capital markets without
assurance of immunity from execution. The strategies employed
in this arena are basically economic, but by alerting govern-
ments to the interests of their subjects in the immunity ques-
tion, the participants can make these economic strategies the
basis of political demands made by their governments before
courts and foreign offices.
The more common arena in which the participants exert
their influence to affect international sovereign immunity law
is the government institution--foreign office or courts--to
which the national constitutive process gives authority to de-
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cide claims to immunity. 13 If the courts are given such author-
ity, private litigants, foreign sovereigns and the forum gov-
ernment attempt to influence the decision by making known to
the court what international repercussions are likely to re-
sult from a rule establishing or denying immunity. If the for-
eign office makes the authoritative decision, foreign sover-
eigns exert economic and political pressures on it through
diplomatic channels, while the private participants employ
domestic political networks, including other governmental of-
fices concerned with economic matters, to influence Its deci-
sion.
B. The National Constitutive Process
Within the structure of each national government some
institution must be given authority to control the nation's
participation in the world constitutive process. In the area
of foreign state immunity, this participation involves two
basic functions. First, the nation must decide how to exert
its influence in the prescription of international law by choos-
ing standards for determination of sovereign Immunity claims In
Its national courts. At the same time, it must decide whether,
as a matter of national policy, some circumstances require that
Immunity be granted though not required by international law.
Second, the nation must apply the international law outcome of
the prescriptive process, or higher national standards, to In-
dividual cases before its courts. The relevant questions for
the national constitutive process, then, are: What domestic
institution should formally prescribe the standards by which
claims to immunity from suit in domestic courts are determined?
What domestic institution should apply these standards of de-
cision to the facts of an individual case?
The answers provided by the American law of foreign
state immunity before the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 were confused. According to judicial theory, the State
Department was supposed to prescribe the national standards
against which claims were judged, but in practice each Circuit
had a body of law which differed In detail from the State De-
partment's prescriptions and which might be applied In the ab-
sence of a definitive State Department determination.14 The
sovereign chose the forum--State Department or courts--in
which to make its claim, and its choice determined which stan-
dards were applied.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 makes
basic changes in this constitutive structure. It replaces
State Department and judicial standards with a Congressional
prescription of the standards by which sovereign Immunity
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claims before American courts are to be decided. And under
the codification the courts alone will apply that standard to
individual claims to immunity. 15
1. Prescription of National Standards
The historic source of American sovereign immunity law
is The Schooner Exchange v. MHFadden..16 During the Napoleonic
Wars, the "Balaou," a French vessel of war, was damaged by
storm in the North Atlantic and entered the port of Philadel-
phia to make repairs. While there, American citizens libeled
the vessel in the federal district-court, claiming i~t was the
"Exchange," a commercial schooner owned by them, and that it
was seized by Napoleon in violation of international law and
outfitted as a vessel of war. The United States Attorney, on
orders from the Executive Department, appeared before the
court and filed a suggestion that the vessel was immune from
suit. The district court approved the suggestion and dis-
solved the attachment. On appeal from a reversal of that de-
cision by the Circuit Court, the Supreme Court held the ship
immune from suit and ordered the attachment dissolved.
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court,
began with the proposition that the jurisdiction of the courts,
as part of the national sovereignty, is unlimited within the
national territory unless the American sovereign consents to im-
munity. He found, however, that in order to promote the inclu-
sive goal of improving world intercourse, all sovereigns had
by custom consented to a partial relaxation of jurisdiction.
Marshall found that the immunity of public warships from the
jurisdiction of the courts was one which the American sover-
eign must be presumed to have granted.
[A] public armed ship . . . constitutes a
part of the military force of her nation;,
acts under the immediate and direct command
of the sovereign; is employed by him in
national objects. He has many and power-
ful motives for preventing those objects
from being defeated by the interference
of a foreign state. Such interference
cannot take place without affecting his
power and his dignity. The implied li-
cense therefore under which such vessel
enters a friendly port, may reasonably be
construed, and it seems to the Court, ought
to be construed, as containing an exemption
from the jurisdiction of the sovereign,
1976]
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within whose territory she claims the
rites of hospitality.17
Marshall never portrayed this immunity as absolute or incap-
able of repeal, however. He expressly stated that the Amer-
ican sovereign (apparently meaning the executive and legisla-
tive branches) could legitimately revoke the immunity it
otherwise would be presumed to have granted by announcing its
intention to do so.l5 The Schooner Exchange, therefore, not
only established the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Amer-
ican case law; it also recognized that the executive and
legislative branches of government are the proper institu-
tions to determine when immunity should be granted.
The plenary power of the political branches to pre-
scribe national standards against which claims to immunity
would be judged did not become firmly settled until the 1940's,
though. In that decade the Supreme Court's decisions in Ex
parte Republic of Peru 19 and Republic of Mexico v. HoffmanZO
established that the courts were bound by State Department de-
cisions, or in their absence by State Department guidelines, In
responding to claimsof immunity.
Ex parte Peru came to the Supreme Court directly from
the district court, which had refused to dismiss a libel filed
by a Cuban corporation against the Ucayali, a state-owned
Peruvian vessel, alleging breach of a charter party. The
United States Attorney had filed a'suggestion with the court
stating that the State Department "recognizes and allows the
claim of immunity" made by the Peruvian Ambassador. The dis-
trict court, however, determined that Peru had already waived
its immunity from suit by requesting an extension of time and
by taking the deposition of the ship's master. On petition for
a writ of prohibition, the Supreme Court held that Peru's ac-
tions did not constitute a waiver and, after extensive remarks
on the need for the judiciary to follow the executive's lead
in questions of this nature,2l that the State Department's
recognition and allowance of the claim must be given binding
effect.
The Department has allowed the claim of
immunity and caused its action to be certi-
fied to the district court through the ap-
propriate channels. The certification and
the request that the vessel be declared im-
mune must be accepted by the courts as a
conclusive determination by the political
arm of the Government that the continued
retention of the vessel interferes with
the proper conduct of our forefign relations.
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Upon the submission of this certifica-
tion to the district court, it became
the court's duty, in conformity to es-
tablished principles, to release the ves-
sel and to proceed no further in the
cause.22
Because the courts have never questioned the State Depart-
ment's reasons for granting immunity,23 Ex parte Peru in ef-
fect established that the State Department in its discretion
could prescribe the conditions under which immunity is granted
by informing the courts of its determination in individual
cases.
Republic pf Mexico v. Hoffman, decided two years later,
held that courts must apply State Department prescriptions in
resolving claims to immunity even in the absence of State De-
partment action on a particular claim. The case arose out of
the libel in the Southern District of California of a Mexican
tug, the "Baja California," by the owner of a fishing vessel
whose boat allegedly had been struck by the tug's tow. The
Republic of Mexico owned the tug, but had leased it to a pri-
vate corporation, which possessed it when the accident and ar-
rest occurred. The Mexican Ambassador presented a suggestion
of immunity to the court and requested the State Department to
recognize and allow the tug's immunity from arrest. However,
at the State Department's request, the United States Attorney
for the district only relayed the Mexican claim to the court
without taking a clear position with respect to whether the
claim should be upheld.24 The district court denied the claim;
the Court of Appeals affirmed. On review the Supreme Court up-
held the lower court's denial of immunity. Although the Court
noted that the majority of circuit courts had denied immunity
to a vessel not in the possession and service of the foreign
government itself, it rested its decision on other grounds.
More important, and we think controlling
in the present circumstances, is the fact
that, despite numerous opportunities like
the present to recognize immunity from suit
of a vessel owned and not possessed by a
foreign government, this government has
failed to do so. We can only conclude that
it is the national policy not to extend the
immunity in the manner now suggested, and
that it is the duty of the courts, in a mat-
ter so intimately associated with our foreign
policy and which may profoundly affect it,
not to enlarge an immunity to an extent which
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the government, although often asked,
has not seen fit to recognize.2 5
Republic of Mexico, then, established that even in the absence
of a specific State Department determination, the courts would
apply general State Department policy in ruling on claims to
foreign state immunity.
The Supreme Court's abdication of the national prescrip-
tive function in favor of the State Department remained in ef-
fect for the most part, but it was never complete.
First, the Supreme Court itself did not feel bound by
its decision in Republic of Mexico. In the only case since de-
cided by the Supreme Court on the issue of foreign sovereign
immunity, the Court granted immunity where there was no State
Department authority for doing so. The issue in National City
Bank v. Republic of China2 6 was whether a foreign sovereign
plaintiff could be immune from a counterclaim and setoff in
which the defendant alleged default on obligations of the for-
eign government. Without explicitly retracting from the de-
cision in Republic of Mexico, the majority opinion observed
that "[tihe freedom of a foreign sovereign from being hauled
into court as a defendant has . . . become part of the fabric
of our law . . . solely through adjudications of this Court."'2 7
While the Court noted that the subject matter of the counter-
claim was one for which the State Department had recognized
immunity in a recently published letter, and could point to no
expression of State Department policy limiting that immunity
in the case of a sovereign plaintiff, the Court concluded that
"the consideration of fair dealing" required a holding that a
foreign sovereign plaintiff waives its immunity to a counter-
claim to the extent of the recovery on its cause of action.2 8
Mr. Justice Reed, joined by Justices Burton and Clark, in dis-
sent pointed out that the court was usurping the prescriptive
function it had assigned to the State Department a decade be-
fore.29
Second, in making prescriptive interpretations of gen-
eral State Department standards, not all lower courts have
been diligent in attempting to discover and follow the latest
State Department interpretations. The State Department did
not publish interpretive changes in its general sovereign im-
munity standards. They appeared only when the State Depart-
ment responded to requests for immunity in individual cases
made to it directly. When the State Department was by-passed
by a sovereign and the claim to immunity was made directly to
the court, the decision often turned on an outdated circuit
court interpretation of the State Department's general pol-
icy. 30
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The result of the Supreme Court's inconsistency and
the lower courts' lack of initiative is that there has ex-
isted really two bodies of law--current State Department pol-
icy and judicial precedent--which could be applied to a claim
to sovereign immunity.3 1 The defendant foreign sovereign chose
which body of law would apply by choosing the forum in which to
make its claim.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 exercises
Congress' power to remove the prescribing function from the
executive and judicial branches and substitutesa permanent •
statutory prescription of standards.3 2 The judiciary, un-
doubtedly with the aid of amicus briefs from the executive
branch, will still make some prescriptive interpretations of
the legislation. In addition, the President may still be free
to exercise his inherent foreign policy powers in extraordi-
nary circumstances to prevent judicial antagonism of foreign
states. 32a But any major change in policy now requires Con-
gressional action to amend the United States Code.
2. Application of National Standards
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Compania Espanola
de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar,3 t was well-
established that a foreign state defendant could assert its
claim of immunity from proceedings in American courts in either
of two ways: (1) the state's representative could file a sug-
gestion of immunity and motion for dismissal in court, or
(2) the state's ambassador could request that the State Depart-
ment relay to the court its recognition and allowance of the
state's immunity.3 4 Until Ex parte Republic of Peru 35 and
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,3b these were simply alternative
means of presenting the claim for the court's consideration.
After those decisions, the foreign state defendant could de-
termine which branch of the government--the State.Department
or the court--would make the determinative application of law
to its claim. While the plaintiff could forum-shop among fed-
eral circuits or state jurisdictions with favorable case law
interpretations of sovereign immunity law, the foreign state
defendant could forum-shop between the State Department and
the courts.
The procedure by which a foreign state presented its
claim of immunity to the State Department had been routinized
in the last decade. The state's ambassador3 7 would address a
note to the Secretary of State or State Department, setting
forth the name of the case and the extent of immunity re-
quested. Usually the note was accompanied by a memorandum of
facts and supporting argument. The State Department then noti-
fied the plaintiff of the request and sent him a copy of the
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foreign state's memorandum. The plaintiff was permitted to
make a written presentation of his own. On the request of
either party, an informal public hearing was held, usually
lasting no more than two hours, before a panel composed of the
Legal Adviser or Deputy Legal Adviser and two Assistant Legal
Advisers. At the hearing, only oral presentations by the
parties' representatives were permitted; no witness testimony
was allowed. Some time after the hearing, the Legal Adviser
made a decision and sent it to the parties. If the decision
was to recognize and allow the claim to immunity, the sub-
stance of the decision was relayed to the Attorney General with
a request that he order the United States Attorney for the dis-
trict in which the action was filed to submit a suggestion of
immunity to the court.38 There was no appeal from the deci-
sion of the Legal Adviser.39 Often no statement of reasons
accompanied the decision.
When the State Department decided to recognize and al-
lbw the claim to immunity and that decision was communicated
to the court, the Department had made the final application of
its standards of decision to the circumstances of the case.
Upon receiving notification of the State Department's decision
from the United States Attorney, the court automatically dis-
missed the suit. The State Department's decision to grant im-
munity was binding, 40 although (1) the foreign sovereign had
earlier waived its immunity, 1 (2) the State pepartment might
have been mistaken in its factual conclusions2 or might have
based them on untrustworthy evidence,43 or (3) the court after
applying State Department standards would have decided differ-
ently.44
The effect of a State Department determination that im-
munity should not be granted was often less clear, although the
reasoning of Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman45 seems to require
that a negative determination be equally binding on the courts.
Several lower courts so held. 4 6 Others, however, stated that
the State Department's refusal to grant Immunity is entitled
only to great weight, 47 sometimes requiring further evidence
on the part of the plaintiff to survive the foreign state's mo-
tion to dismiss. 4 8 One court went so far as to disagree with
the Department's application. 49
The State Department at times took only partial action
or refused to make any decision at all. For example, It has
relayed requests for immunity to the courts without decision,
except to consider as true the factual allegations of a peti-
tioning Ambassador.50 In such cases, the factual allegations
have usually been taken to be irrefutably established.51 More
often the Department has relayed the request without comment 52
or informed the parties that it would take no action on the re-
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quest.53 Though in some cases the courts found "significant"
the State Department's failure.to act54 or felt assured that
denial of immunity would not prejudice U.S. foreign rela-
tlons,55non-action by the Department usually has had no effect
other than to require the court to make an independent deter-
mination of the claim to immunity.5 6
Even under former law, in the absence of a definitive
State Department determination, the court decided whether the
foreign state was entitled to immunity.5 7 If the State Depart-
ment had not forwarded the foreign state's diplomatic claim-;°
or if the state chose not to make a presentation to the State
Department, the issue was raised before the court by a special
appearance of the foreign state or "its accredited and recog-
nized-representative." 59 Before granting dismissal, the court
had to be satisfied that sovereign immunity was warranted.
The sovereign had the burden of proving'the requisite facts.
60
If the issue could not be disposed of on pleadings, a fact-
finding hearing was conducted.61 Once the facts were estab-
lished, the court applied the State Department's prescriptions
and ruled on the claim.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 eliminates
the choice of forums in which to assert claims to immunity.
The declaration of Congressional purpose indicates that one of
the objectives of the legislation is to vest in the courts ex-
clusively the power to decide claims of immunity. 62 Indeed,
this change was a part of the State Department's motive for
proposing the legislation.63 Presumably, then, under the new
legislation the State Department will no longer make sugges-
tions of immunity to the courts, or, if it does, the courts
will ignore them under usual circumstances. Thus, the new
legislation effectively makes the judiciary the sole forum for
making sovereign immunity determinations.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 does not
expressly allocate the burden of proving a claim of immunity
or state which parties have the capacity to bring such a claim
to the court's attention. Resolution of these issues will de-
pend on whether the action at hand arises in the federal court
on some basis of jurisdiction (such as federal question juris-
diction63a) other than the foreign public character of the de-
fendant or in the state courts. If the action does so arise,
the courts may apply pre-codification case law to require that
the claim to immunity be presented by a proper representative
of the sovereign, and may assign to the sovereign the burden
of proving facts supporting its claim, but their authority to
do either is unclear. The legislation is structured to pro-
vide for immunity in all cases unless the case fits within a
specific exception to immunity.64 Indeed, State Department
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comments accompanying an earlier draft of the legislation
stated that the legislation carries with it an "assumption" of
immunity,65 implying that private plaintiffs would have the
burden of proving that no immunity is warranted. Yet the
House Report accompanying the legislation as enacted states
that sovereign immunity will remain an affirmative defense,
which must be proven by the sovereign asserting it.65-1 With-
out express provision to the contrary, the legislation per-
mits the courts to allocate the burden of proof, as they have
in the past, to the foreign state defendant, as the moving
party and on the theory that it has better access to relevant
evidence. On the other hand, if the action at hand is In fed-
eral court and its sole jurisdictional basis is the foreign
public character of the defendant,6 5a the plaintiff must plead
and prove an absence of immunity6 5b and the court may find Im-
munity and dismiss on its own motion,65c since the existence
of immunity will be a jurisdictional question.
III. THE LAW OF FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY
As of January 19, 1977, the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 19 7665d will control the resolution of claims to
foreign state immunity made in federal or state courts. In
determining claims to immunity presented by foreign states,
the courts will look closely to the terms of the new legisla-
tion. It seems likely that they will also look to prior State
Department and judicial precedent for aid in interpreting the
new legislation, since much of the act merely codifies exist-
ing policy. However, the statute departs from prior law in
leaving no role for international law in the process by which
claims to foreign-state immunity are decided in the United
States.
Under prior law, while State Department policy and
judicial precedent were the positive law controlling resolu-
tion of claims to foreign statb immunity, international law
constantly limited and influenced the standards of decision
applied. The State Department, in establishing its own pol-
icy with respect to the immunity of foreign states, was care-
ful to assure the minimum immunity prescribed by international
law.6 6 The courts were required to observe the minimum in-
ternational standard, because customary international law is
part of the body of law that both federal and state courts
must apply. 67 The importance of international law in the de-
cision-making process was obscured, however, because the stan-
dards prescribed by the State Department and accepted by the
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courts went well beyond the minimum immunities required by
international law.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 appears
to leave no room for the impact of international law on the
standards of decision by which claims to foreign state im-
munity within the United States are to be decided. Immunity
is to be extended except from those actions enumerated in
the act, even though international law at some future date
should no longer require that immunity be extended, unless a
future treaty or other act of Congress limits the new legis-
lation's scope. Immunity is to be denied from those actions
enumerated in the act, though international law requires that
it be extended, unless some existing international agreement
to which the United States is now a party provides other-
wise.67a Although an earlier State Department draft of the
new act declared that the courts should abide by principles of
international law codified by the act "and other principles of
international law,"6 8 the legislation as enacted requires that
claims be decided in conformity with the act alone. 9
This section surveys three bodies of law that are rele-
vant to the immunity of foreign states from judicial process
in the United States. Prior State Department policy 79 and its
judicial variations are examined because they are the historic
precedent against which the new statute will be construed and
on which it seeks to improve. The Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976 is examined because it Is now the positive
law in the area. Finally, international' law standards are ex-
amined to show the new legislation's compliance with these
standards and to reveal the unnecessary generosity with which
it grants immunity in the United States.
A. Commercial Activities
Since 195271 the State Department purported to adhere
to the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity. The crux
of the restrictive theory is that foreign states are not im-
mune for their commercial acts. The Department announced
adoption of the restrictive theory in a letter dated May 19,
1952, from Acting Legal Adviser Jack B. Tate to the Acting
Attorney General--the 'Tate letter."72 The letter devoted
only one sentence to a description of the new policy: "Ac-
cording to the newer or restrictive theory of sovereign im-
munity, the immunity of the sovereign Is recognized with re-
gard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state,
but not with respect to private acts-jure gestionis)." 7 3
Since issuance of the Tate letter, the Department added to
that enigmatic sentence only one interpretation of general ap-
plication. In determining whether the acts in question are
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public or private, the Department announced it would look to
the "nature" of the activity and not the foreign state's
"purpose" for undertaking the activity or the "character" of
the instrumentality performing the activity.74
The record of individual State Department determinations
has not been especially helpful in clarifying the distinction
between public and private acts. The Department has ruled that
conduct of a state shipping industry is a private act not en-
titled to immunity. 75 It has also ruled that activities car-
ried on as lessee or owner of consular or embassy premises are
private acts.7 6 The activities of state banks have been held
to be private acts, 7 7 though the activities in issue were per-
formed to promote some governmental policy,78 or because of
monetary controls imposed by the state,79 or as part of a gen-
eral nationalization of property. 80 The Department has been
inconsistent, however, in classifying acts relating to an ex-
traordinary commercial relationship with a private party en-
tered into to satisfy some urgent public need.8 1 Like the
classic case proposed by commentators--a contract to sell boots
to the army82--these activities could easily be classified as
either public or private acts under the restrictive theory. 83
Since Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes,64 it has been well-established
that courts would apply the restrictive theory of immunity even
in the absence of a State Department determination.85 The re-
strictive theory applied by the courts, however, was not al-
ways identical to the one applied by the Department. In adopt-
ing State Department policy, the court in Victory Transport
made its own interpretation of the restrictive theory. The
court interpreted it to mean that immunity would be denied un-
less the act in question clearly came
within one of the categories of strictly
political or public acts about which
sovereigns have traditionally been quite
sensitive. Such acts are generally limited
to the following categories:
(I) internal administrative acts, such
as expulsion of an alien
(2) legislative acts, such as nation-
alization
(3) acts concerning the armed forces
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity
(5) public loans.
We do not think that the restrictive theory
adopted by the State Department requires sac-
rificing the interests of private litigants
to international comity in other than these
limited categories.86
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Some courts have simply applied these criteria and have not
sought to determine current State Department policy, as the
reasoning in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman 87 requires. 83
Ad hoc interpretations of the restrictive theory by
the courts have for the most part been like those of the State
Department, but occasional differences have occurred which
made forum shopping by the foreign sovereign profitable in
some cases. The courts have ruled that activities by state
banks, 89 commercial shipping contracts,9 0 contracts of sale,91
and the operation of a passenger airline9 2 are private acts.
The courts have also ruled that the succession of a state to
its deceased king's property9 3 and nationalization of private
property34 are public acts. Like the State Department, the
courts have been inconsistent in classifying occasional acts
of a commercial nature undertaken for some clearly public pur-
pose.9 5 But the courts have shown a greater inclination than
the State Department to be moved by the purpose, rather than
the nature, of activities for which immunity is sought.
In addition, the United States has entered into a series
of bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
with various countries by which the signatories have agreed
that no immunity shall be extended to state "enterprises' en-
gaged in commercial activities.9 6 When a state commercial en-
terprise of a signatory is impleaded in American courts, these
treaties seemed to require denial of immunity regardless of
current State Department of judicial policy.9 7 The initiation
of process against a state-owned commercial vessel in the ter-
ritorial sea may similarly have been controlled by interna-
tional agreement.9 8
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 substan-
tially reproduces the latest State Department Interpretation
of the restrictive theory, while preserving the force of those
international agreements to which the United States is a sig-
natory dealing with foreign state immunity.9 9 Newly enacted
28 U.S.C. § 1605 generally implements the restrictive theory:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from
the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case--
(2) in which the action is based upon
a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state;
or upon an act performed i-n the United
States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere;
or upon an act outside the territory of
the United States in connection with a
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commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States;99a
Newly enacted 28 U.S.C. §'1603 codifies the State Department
policy of looking to the nature, as opposed to the purpose,
of an activity to determine whether it is a private or pub-
lic act:
For the purposes of this chapter--
(d) A "commercial activity" means either
a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act.
The commercial character of an activity shall
be determined by reference to the nature of
the course of conduct or particular transac-
tion or act, rather than by reference to Its
purpose. 100
Taken as a whole, in the absence of a treaty of international
agreement to the contrary, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 denies immunity for acts commercial in "nature"
which, aside from questions of immunity, American courts have
jurisdiction to adjudicate.10 1
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 embodies
and is consonant with international requirements of immunity.
International law in the nineteenth century required that
foreign states be given immunity from the jurisdiction of
municipal courts except in matters concerning immovable proper-
ty or succession to decedents' estates. It recognized no ex-
ception to this rule for commercial activities undertaken by
the state in part because few states extensively engaged In
commerce. 102 In this century, however, increases in the com-
mercial activities undertaken by states and greater demands
for state responsibility have caused the absolute rule of im-
munity to dissolve. Today, state judicial practice, bilateral
treaties and multilateral conventions, and the opinions of
commentators1 0 3 make clear that customary international law
no longer prescribes sovereign immunity from judicial process
in municipal courts in matters that are "private," "commer-
cial," or jure gestionis in character. International law does
require immunity in actions based on "governmental," "sover-
eign," or jure imperil acts, however.
State practice in the field of state immunity is in dis-
array. Of the thirty-one states with reported positions,
twelve--Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Egypt, Eire, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands,
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Switzerland, and the United States] 0 4--do not extend immunity
in cases grounded on nongovernmental or commercial acts. Nine
states--Australia, Burma, Canada India, Poland, Rumania, the
U.S.S.R., and the United KingdomIO5--appear to follow the ab-
solute rule of immunity, in some cases conditioned on recipro-
city. The position of the remaining ten states--Brazil, Chile;
Denmark, Japan, Jordan, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Norway, Sweden,
and TurkeylO6--is unclear. The fact that so many commercially
significant nations now follow the restrictive view of immunity
without retaliation is strong evidence that international ] w
does not require the absolute rule of immunity.
A significant number of international conventions and
bilateral agreements implement the restrictive theory of im-
munity in special areas. The first convention to do so was
the Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels.10 7 It sub-
jected signatory states and their commercial vessels and -cargo
to judicial process for matters involving the operation of
such vessels to the same extent as private persons. The Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,lO8 a
more recent convention, limits the immunity of state-owned
commercial vessels operating within the forum state's terri-
torial waters. Immunity for state vessels used for commer-
cial purposes is also denied by the International Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. 10 9 In view of
these conventions, there can be no expectation among effective
elites that the world community requires immunity for state
vessels in commercial use. The European Convention on State
Immunity,llO a convention of more general applicability among
the signatory members of the Council of Europe, also adopts a
form of the restrictive theory of immunity. It denies signa-
tory states immunity from suit on certain contracts, for activ-
ities related to a state industrial, commercial or financial
agency established within the forum state, and in certain
patent matters.11 ]
A number of nations have entered into bilateral agree-
ments restricting the extent of their immunity from judicial
process.l1 2 In various bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation entered into by the United States, for
example, each sovereign has disclaimed any immunity from judi-
cial process, including execution, for an "enterprise" of the
sovereign engaged in commercial activity. 113 The later
treaties add language to explicitly include within the term
"enterprise" a corporation, association and government agency
or instrumentality.1 1 4 Similarly, the 1972 US-USSR Trade
Agreement provided that Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations
would not claim or enjoy in the United States "immunities from
suit or execution of judgment with respect to commercial trans-
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actions."115 Although the Soviet Union favors the absolute
rule of immunity, it has entered into a number of such agree-
ments restricting the immunity of its trade delegations from
suits relating to commercial transactions. 1 16 Moreover, a num-
ber of states, including the United States, have refused to re-
quest immunity in cases involving commercial activities.' 17
Both the resolutions of learned societies and the writ-
ings of individual commentators generally support the restric-
tive view of immunity. The Harvard Research in International
Law, 118 resolutions of the International Law Association,1 19
Institut de Droit International, 12 0 and Inter-American Bar
Association,121 and reports of the Inter-American Judicial
Committee 12 2 and Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee 12 3
would all restrict immunity to cases based upon.non-commercial
activities of the foreign state. A small number of scholars,
while recognizing state practice to the contrary, continue to
adhere to the absolute rule of immunity. 124 However, the
greater number believe that international law permits the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over foreign states for their commer-
cial acts, either because international custom is too confused
to enforce any rule of law on the subject12 5 or because the
restrictive theory has been adopted by custom.12 6
State practice, in the form of municipal decisions and
international agreements, and scholarly opinion thus make
clear that international law does not require sovereign Im-
munity in matters related tonon-governmental activities. 12 7
International law is less clear about the criteria by which a
state activity is to be characterized as commercial or non-
commercial. Emerging state practice permits the forum state
to apply its own standards in characterizing the activity. In-
creasingly, the "nature" test adopted by the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, and the State Department and American
courts before it, has been used.12 8 While that test is not
strongly supported by treaty practice,129 commentators gener-
ally agree that a nation is free to apply its own standards,
including the "nature" test, in characterizing a state activ-
ity so long as it extends immunity for certain hard core gov-
ernmental activities.1 30 Thus, in denying immunity from ac-
tions based on a foreign state's commercial acts, the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 embodies and is consonant with
international law standards of immunity. 13 1
B. Execution
Before its recommendation of the bill which was even-
tually enacted as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
the State Department's long-held view had been that the proper-
ty of a foreign sovereign is in all caset immune from execution
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to satisfy a judgment or other debt against the sovereign.
[Tihe Department has always recognized a
distinction between "immunity from juris-
diction" and "immunity from execution."
The Department has maintained the view
that in accordance with international law
property of a foreign sovereign is immune
from execution to satisfy a judgment ob-
tained in an action against a foreign sov-
ereign where there is no immunity from
suit.132
The Department's policy forbade execution, although (1) the
property had already been attached to obtain jurisdiction, 133
(2) it is u~ed for commercial purposes, or (3) it is real
property. 134
The courts have also consistently held that the proper-
ty of a foreign sovereign is immune from execution. 135 The
only cases in which immunity from execution has not been recoq-
nized by a court have been where the immunity had been waivedy36
or where the immunity was asserted after the execution sale had
taken place.137
The immunity from execution enjoyed by foreign states
under prior American law was applicable to attempts to enforce
international arbitral awards, as well. Congress' implementa-
tion of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States138 left intact the
Immunity of foreign sovereigns from execution.139 Thus, absent
a foreign state's waiver of immunity from enforcement of an
award, the enforcement provisions of the Convention were com-
pletely emasculated in the United States.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 retreats
substantially from the absolute immunity from execution pre-
viously recognized by the State Department and the courts.
Newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1611 establishes certain categories
of assets of foreign states, their political subdivisions, or
agencies or instrumentalities thereof that are immune from
execution in all cases. Absolute immunity is extended if:
(1) the property is that of a foreign
central bank or monetary authority held
for its own account, unless such bank or
authority, or its parent foreign govern-
ment, has explicitly waived its immunity
from attachment in aid of execution, or
from execution, notwithstanding any with-
drawal of the waiver which the bank,
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authority or government may purport to
effect except in accordance with the terms
of the waiver; or
(2) the property is, or is intended to
be, used in connection with a military
activity and
(A) is of a military character, or
(B) is under the control of a mili-
tary authority or defense agency.1 4 1
Unless otherwise provided by treaties and other international
agreements to which the United States is a signatory, other
assets are immune unless they fall within categories estab-
lished by newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1610.142
Newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1610 withdraws immunity from
execution only in carefully limited circumstances. Para-
graph (a) of that section withdraws the Immunity of assets
of a foreign state or of its political subdivisions, agencies,
and instrumentalities used for commercial activities with the
United States from execution of judgments entered after the
effective date of the act, but only if the foreign state has
had a "reasonable period of time" to voluntarily satisfy the
judgment142a and one of the following conditions is met:
(1) the judgment being executed is based on the same commer-
cial activity for which the assets are or were being used;
(2) the judgment being executed establishes rights in proper-
ty taken in violation of international law or property ex-
changed for such property, or property acquired by succes-
sion or gift, or real property not diplomatically immune;
(3) the foreign entity has waived its immunity from execution;
or (4) the property being executed against is proceeds or the
right to proceeds of a policy of casualty or liability insur-
ance coyering the claim merged into the judgment being exe-
cuted.1 3 Paragraph (b) of newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1610
withdraws the immunity from execution of assets of agencies
or instrumentalities of foreign states engaged in commercial
activities within the United States, whether or not those as-
sets are used in a commercial activity, if the agency or in-
strumentality has had a reasonable time to satisfy the judg-
ment voluntarily and if the agency or instrumentality has
waived its immunity or the judgment being executed relates
to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality is not im-
mune by virtue of subparagraphs (2), (3) or (5) of newly
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) or by virtue of newly enacted
28 U.S.C. § 1605(b).1 4 4
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 appears
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not only to be consonant with but also to go beyond the mini-
mum immunity from execution required by international law.
International law seems to permit execution of validly ob-
tained judgments against a foreign state's real property or
property in commercial use. Authority for this observation
is not as persuasive as that supporting the restrictive view
of immunity from suit. But state practice is sufficiently
disparate to prevent expectations that an absolute rule of
immunity from execution is required. Although some states
that follow the restrictive rule in regard to suits neverthe-
less recognize absolute immunity from execution, 14 6 eight
states--Austria, Belgium, pre-WW II Czechoslovakia, Egypt,
Italy, the Netherlands, Singapore, and Switzerland--have per-
mitted execution against a foreign state's immovable property
or property not devoted to public use, without its consent.147
These states have not created exceptions for the funds of
state banks, property unrelated to the judgment being executed,
or nondiplomatic real property not in commercial use. More-
over, it does not appear that states whose commercial property
has been executed against have protested the executions as
contrary to international law.1 4 8
A number of international conventions and bilateral
treaties and agreements permit execution of judgments against
the commercially-used property of foreign state signatories.
The Brussels Convention1 49 permits execution against state-
owned commercial vessels of judgments based on commercial
activities of the vessels. The Geneva Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Seal50 limits the immunity from execution of state-
owned commercial vessels operating withia the forum state's
territorial waters. The European Convention on State Im-
munity, 151 on the other hand, is somewhat less restrictive
of immunity from execution. It permits execution of a validly
obtained judgment against the assets of a political subdivi-
sion, agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, but pro-
hibits execution against the central government's assets, re-
gardless of their character, unless both the foreign state and
the forum state have signed declarations of their intention to
apply a more restrictive rule of immunity. 15 2 In addition to
the conventions, a number of nations have entered into bi-
lateral agreements restricting their immunity from execution. 153
In various bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navi-
gation entered into by the United States, for example, each
state has disclaimed immunity from execution against its cor-
porations, associations, agencies and instrumentalities en-
gaged in commercial activities within the forum state. 154 The
Soviet Union has also entered into a number of trade agreements,
Including one with the United States in 1972, in which it has
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waived immunity from execution for property held by its trade
delegations. 155
Resolutions of several learned societies and the opin-
ions of a few influential commentators support the restrictive
view of immunity from execution. The Harvard Research In In-
ternational Law1 56 and resolutions of the Institut de Droit
International1 5 7 and the Council of the International Bar
Association15 8 would permit execution against a foreign state's
immovable or commercial property. The works of Lauterpacht,
Lalive, Garcia-Mora, S~rensen, Sucharitkul, Sweeny, and Monroe
Leigh, the current Legal Adviser, support this position. 159 On
the other hand, a report of the Asian-African Legal Consulta-
tive Committee as well as works by other commentators support
the absolute rule of immunity.lG0
State practice, in the form of international agreements
and judicial decisions, and the views of commentators are too
divided on the question of immunity from execution to create
expectations that International responsibility would follow
execution against commercially-used or real property of a for-
eign state. Practice and opinion support the conclusion of a
study prepared for the State Department in 1963:
Taken as a whole, the sources of inter-
national law indicate that there is no rule
of absolute immunity for the property of a
foreign state. The common core of the ab-
solute and restrictive concepts of immunity
of property is immunity of property connected
with public acts of the state. As to property
connected with commercial and other private
acts of the state, immunity is not required;
such property may be attached and executed
upon.161
Moreover, international law has not created exceptions from
the restrictive rule of immunity for the assets of state banks,
property unconnected with the Judgment being executed, or non-
diplomatic real property not in commercial use. Thus, In the
area of executions against the property of foreign states, the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 appears to be more
generous--and prior American practice has been substantially
more generous--to foreign states than is required by interna-
tional law.
C. Attachment to Acquire Jurisdiction
Prior to its recommendation of the bill which was even-
tually enacted as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
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the State Department's policy was that the property of a for-
eign sovereign used in cormercial activities could be attached
for purposes of acquiring in rem or quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
if the sovereign were not immune from the suit sought to be
brought. For the first few years after adoption of the re-
strictive theory announced in the Tate letter,162 it was De-
partment policy that, regardless of that theory, "under inter-
national law property of a foreign government is immune from
attachment and seizure."1 63 Because in personam jurisdiction
was so difficult to acquire over foreign states, this policy
diminished the effectiveness of the restrictive theory. In
1959, therefore, the Department announced a reversal of its
policy. A letter from the Legal Adviser, Loftus Becker,
stated the Department's new view to be that, '"where under
international law a foreign government is not immune from suit,
attachment of its property for the purpose of obtaining juris-
diction is not prohibited."164
Judicial precedent has mirrored State Department policy.
Before 1959 the courts generally held that even the commer-
cially engaged property of a foreign sovereign is immune from
attachment. 165 After 1959, the courts adopted the new State
Department position. 166 There remained, however, a body of
case law that could be applied to permit attachment of prop-
erty, regardless of its character, that is not owned and pos-
sessed by the sovereign. 167
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 retreats
from the earlier State Department position and makes assets
of a foreign state or political subdivision, or their agencies
and instrumentalities, absolutely immune from pre-judgment
attachment except for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction
in the case where the sovereign has waived its immunity.l68
At the same time, however, foreign states are made subject to
in personam jurisdiction by service of process on the minister
of foreign affairs by mail or through the State Department by
note in the absence of other means provided by an arrangement
with the sovereign or an international convention. 169 Because
such means of acquiring jurisdiction are thought less disrup-
tive of a foreign state's governmental activities than attach-
ment of property,169-l they would be made the exclusive means
of acquiring jurisdiction.
No nation except the United States seems to make a dis-
tinction in its practice between granting immunity from execu-
tion of foreign state property and immunity from attachment.
Nor do the conventions, treaties, or commentators make such a
distinction. 170 Therefore, since the world community permits
a forum state to execute against the commercial property of a
foreign state but forbids it to execute against publicly used
property, it a fortiori permits attachment of state property
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to the same extent. As a result, the prior American practice,
which permitted prejudgment attachment of commercial assets,
was in substantial compliance with international law. The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 is more restrictive
of private rights than international law requires it to be,
though the importance of the restriction is offset to some ex-
tent by liberalized means of obtaining jurisdiction.171
D. Political Subdivisions, Agencies and Corporations
Prior to its recommendation of the bill which was even-
tually enacted as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
the State Department seems to have extended to all the politi-
cal subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of a state
the same immunity from judicial process enjoyed by the state
itself.172
The courts have been somewhat less liberal in granting
immunity to subdivisions and instrumentalities of the foreign
sovereign. The immunity of political subdivisions 17 3 and or-
ganic arms of the central government1 7 4 had been firmly es-
tablished, but the courts split on whether an independent cor-
porate entity, owned, organized or controlled by a foreign
sovereign to achieve some public or commercial purpose, should
share the same immunity as the sovereign. 17 5
Both the State Department and the courts have stated
that immunity should be granted to the defendant in an action
which in substance adjudicates a foreign state's rights, though
not nominally against the state itself. 176
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 extends to
Ia political subdivision," an !lagency" or an "instrumentality"
of a foreign state substantially the same immunities enjoyed
by the state itself. 17 7 Two distinctions are made between
states and their subdivisions, on the one hand, and their
agencies and instrumentalities on the other. First, the agen-
cies and instrumentalities may be served with process by some-
what different means.17 8 Second, all the non-exempt assets of
a commercially engaged agency or instrumentality within the
United States--not just those related to the claim being en-
forced, and not merely particular types of or particularly
used property--may be subject to execution under defined cir-
cumstances. 179 Otherwise foreign governmental agencies and
instrumentalities enjoy the same immunity as their state.
With the exception of decisions in the United States
and India, state practice seems uniformly to deny sovereign
immunity to the political subdivisions--constituent states and
municipalities--of a foreign state.182 In the area of suits
against state agencies or corporations substantially owned by
a foreign state, state practice is less decisive. A survey of
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case law made in 1963 found that civil law countries denied
immunity to agencies and corporations that were distinct legal
entities, while common law countries granted immunity to such
bodies when their relationship to the state make them in fact
part of the government.183 The conclusion about civil law
practice seems to have been based on the practice of Egypt,
Italy and France, however. Subsequent decisions indicate that
Belgium and the Netherlands now support the common law rule.l184
Moreover, even the civil law nations have permitted immunity on
an agency theory when the separate agency or corporation has
acted on behalf of the central government. 185 In view of the
emergence of the restrictive rule of immunity,-state judicial
practice can therefore be said to extend sovereign immunity to
agencies and state corporations performing governmental, non-
commercial acts and to deny immunity to political subdivisions
and to agencies and corporations In all other circumstances.
The European Convention on State Immunityl 8 6 substan-
tially follows state judicial practice in regard to the im-
munity of separate state agencies and corporations. Proceed-
ings against such bodies are permitted unless they are based
on acts exercising a "sovereign authority (acta jure imperii)."1 87
However, constituent states of a federation are permitted immun-
ity in the same circumstances and may enjoy the full immunity
of the federal state itself if a declaration to that effect is
made. 188 Other treaties make specific provision only for sep-
arate enterprises engaged in commercial activities.
Finally, the commentators are in agreement that inter-
national law requires only the immunities recognized by the
state judicial practice described above.189 As a result, the
immunity granted to political subdivisions by the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 is not required by interna-
tional law, while the act's treatment of agencies and state
corporations substantially embodies the international law
standard.
E. Waiver
Prior to its recommendation that Congress enact the bill
which became the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, the
State Department had made no statement of policy on the effect
of a sovereign's prior waiver of immunity. The Department had
denied on grounds of waiver a claim to immunity from a counter-
claim 190 and had made clear that a prior contractual waiver of
immunity should be enforced.190a But, although it seemed like-
ly that it was ordinary State Department policy to give effect
to a prior waiver of immunity, actual Department determina-
tions did not form a perfectly consistent pattern.191
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The courts have held that a foreign state may waive its
immunity to suit, attachment or execution and that subsequent
claims to immunity are then ineffective.132 However, if the
State Department recognized and allowed the claim to immunity
notwithstanding a prior waiver, the courts gave effect to the
Department's decision. 19 3 A waiver was accomplished by mak-
ing, without reserving the right to later assert a claim to
immunity, any appearance in the action except a special ap-
pearance to raise the question of jurisdiction. Thus, taking
depositions,19 4 moving for a postponement of the return
date,1 95 and entrance of a general appearance19 6 have been
held to be waivers of sovereign immunity. The waiver was ef-
fective though the foreign state's legal representative is not
specifically authorized to make it.197 When a foreign state
itself filed an action, it waived immunity on a counterclaim,
even one based on a different subject matter, to the extent
of its affirmative judgment.19 8 A foreign state might also
contractually waive its immunity before the cause of action
arose. 199
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 codifies
without change existing American policy on waivers of im-
munity by foreign states and makes clear that a later re-
traction of the waiver is ineffective unless the waiver re-
served the state's right to retract it.200 A waiver can be
accomplished in one of three ways under the legislation.
First, it can be done "explicitly"--by agreement with the
plaintiff or by treaty. 20 1 Second, a waiver can be done
"implicitly"--presumably by making the type of court appear-
ance held to constitute a waiver under prior law. 20 2 Third,
a waiver may result from the foreign state's Invocation of
judicial process in the United States. Newly enacted 28
U.S.C. § 1607 would make initiation of or intervention in an
action a waiver of immunity from a counterclaim--
(a) for which a foreign state would not
be entitled to immunity under section 1605
of this chapter had such claim been brought
in a separate action against the foreign
state; or
(b) arising out of the transaction or oc-
currence that is the subject matter of the
claim of the foreign state; or
(c) to the extent that the counterclaim
does not seek relief exceeding in amount
or differing in kind from that sought by
the foreign state.204
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The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, in the
manner in which it gives effect to waivers of immunity by
foreign states, is consonant with international law re-
quirements. International law proscribes only uncon-
sented exercises of judicial power in certain cases. It
therefore recognizes that a foreign state which has waived
its immunity may be subjected to judicial process. Waiver
may take the form of an express agreement or conduct which
clearly implies that the foreign state will not assert its
immunity. Thus, state practice has been to deny immunity'
where the foreign state has by treaty, contract, or tacit
agreement indicated its intention not to claim immunity. 20 5
Waiver may also take the form of conduct which the forum
state has made clear will result in a loss of immunity.
Thus, initiation of, intervention in, or making a defense on
the merits to judicial proceedings may constitute a waiver
of immunity from the proceeding itself, set-offs, related
counterclaims in excess of the foreign state's recovery, and
sometimes execution of an unfavorable judgment.206 Waiver
has also been used as a rationale for denying immunity for
the commercial acts of foreign states. 20 7 Even commentators
who oppose restrictions of immunity in other areas would
give effect to a waiver of immunity.208
F. Public Debt
Before enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, American policy regarding the immunity of for-
eign sovereigns from actions to enforce their public debt
was unclear. Existing judicial precedent extended immunity
from such actions to political subdivisions as well as the
central governments themselves,208a but it was established
before the State Department's "restrictive theory" was an-
nounced in the Tate letter.20 8b State Department policy be-
fore the Tate letter was unclear,208c and the Tate letter did
not clarify it. Unfortunately, the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976 does nothing to improve the situation.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, as
enacted, is ambiguous with regard to whether a foreign state
is immune from judicial process to enforce its public debts.
In the form first recommended by the administration, the
codification extended to a foreign state absolute immunity,
absent a waiver, from suits to collect on its public debt,
but absolutely denied immunity from such suits to the state's
political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. 20 9
No immunity for actions under federal securities laws was
provided, however.2O9 a In the form in which it was intro-
duced in the House of Representatives in the Ninety-Fourth
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Congress, the language concerning the debt of agencies and
instrumentalities of foreign states disappeared.2 10 Before
enactment, the section dealing with public debt was deleted
altogether. Therefore, whether foreign sovereigns will be
immune from suits to enforce their public debt under the
codification will depend upon whether issuance of their
bonds is interpreted to be "a particular commercial trans-
action or act," according to its "nature," affecting the
United States. 2l1
International law until recently seemed to require the
immunity of foreign states from actions to collect on their
public obligations. 2 12 Only Switzerland had permitted actions
on public debt of the foreign state itself.2l3 Actions on the
obligations of political subdivisions were more common.214
The European Convention on State Immunity, 2 15 however, has
created substantial support for the Swiss practice. The Con-
vention permits actions on public debts of signatory states
which have payment obligations that must be met in the forum
state.2 16 Since issuers usually provide for payment the
principle of and interest on their bonds by a paying agent lo-
cated within the sales market, the Convention in effect per-
mits actions on public issues of debt in the courts of states
in which they are initially sold. A second source of recent
support for the Swiss practice has been the Increasing will-
ingness of foreign states to waive their immunity from such
actions. Private lenders usually require foreign state bor-
rowers to waive their immunity from suits to enforce their ob-
ligations on the loan.2 17 Waivers have also typically been
included in state bonds issued In the European market and,
more recently, In the American market.218 In Eurobonds the
state often waives Immunity from execution, as well. 2 19. More-
over, the commentators and cases that have reduced the inter-
national law requirements of Immunity to a core of protected
activities have not Included the Issue of public debt on their
lists.220
Developing state practice reveals that states do not
consider immunity from suits on their public obligations to be
as important as the interest reduction they presumably re-
ceive by waiving immunity. Since a municipal rule denying
immunity from judicial proceedings on the public debt of a
foreign state would accomplish the same result, and since vol-
untary waivers are so common, it Is unlikely that a forum
state would incur international responsibility by entertaining
unconsented suits on the public debt of a foreign state. It
therefore cannot be said that international law proscribes
such exercises of jurisdiction.
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G. International Law Violations, Real and Gifted
Property, and Physical Injuries
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides
for three additional categories of circumstances in which a
foreign state is not immune from suit.
Newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) provides that a
foreign state is not immune from suit in any case
in which rights in property taken in vio-
lation of international law are in issue
and that property or any property exchanged
for such property is present in the United
States in connection with a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by
the foreign state; or that property or any
property exchanged for such property is
owned or operated by an agency or instru-
mentality of the foreign state and that
agency or instrumentality is engaged in a
commercial activity in the United States. 22 1
The effect of this section is to deny immunity from any action
to which the Sabbatino Amendment2 2 2 prevents application of
the "act of state doctrine."2 23 This section together with
the sections on immunity from execution224 permits a plain-
tiff whose property had been expropriated by a foreign state
and turned over to its petroleum production instrumentality do-
ing business in the United States, for example, to bring suit
against the instrumentality and levy against its assets in the
United States. The foreign state could be sued only if it re-
tained possession of the property and brought it, or consider-
ation received for it, to the United States pursuant to a com-
mercial activity, however. This section is without precedent
in prior publicly revealed State Department policy and is in-
consistently supported by old precedent in case law. 2 2 5
It seems clear enough that exercise of jurisdiction to
enforce international law is not itself a violation of inter-
national law. This principle is surprisingly difficult to
document, however. A number of municipal decisions have per-
mitted adjudications of acts of state alleged to be in viola-
tion of international law, but these actions have been between
private parties or have been initiated by the foreign state it-
self.22 6 This practice, together with the opinion of commen-
tators, is sufficient to establish that international law does
not require an "act of state doctrine" in the face of such an
allegation.2 27 But it does not establish that an allegation
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in an action against a foreign state that its public act
was in violation of international law creates an exception
to the sovereign immunity which the foreign state would other-
wise enjoy. On the other hand, there is no clear authority
to the effect that foreign state immunity survives in such a
case.2 27a Therefore, the answer must be found elsewhere.
The conclusion that international law does not require
foreign state immunity in the face of a claim that the state
has violated international law rests on two considerations
of public policy. First, it is more important to the world
community to enforce its "law" against its members than to
protect the immunity of its members from suit. Sovereign
immunity has developed in international law because it adds
stability to the process by which members of the world com-
munity interact. Public order can best be maintained if the
territorial sovereign alone prescribes and enforces legal
standards for the way in which it rules its subjects within
its territory. But a requirement more important to the
preservation of world public order is that the territorial
sovereign must confine its acts to those permitted by inter-
national law where such acts have transnational effects, as
when they affect foreign citizens. Often international law
is enforced with more consistency and less friction through
municipal courts than by political sanctions. Therefore,
since the world community needs municipal courts to enforce
its prescriptions, it would not limit their jurisdiction when
international law is at stake. Second, a system of law which
protects the title of parties who have taken property with-
out the compensation required by international law, and in-
validates the title of those who have purchased from them for
value is commercially unworkable and patently objectionable.
As a result, enforcement of international law by judicial
action against purchasers from foreign states is not an ade-
quate solution. For these reasons, it is unlikely that any
nation would expect to incur international responsibility for
exercising jurisdiction to apply international law against a
foreign state. Therefore, international law cannot be said
to proscribe newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).228
Newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)( 4) provides that a
foreign state is not immune from suit in any case
in which rights in property in the United
States acquired by succession or gift or
rights in immovable property situated in
the United States are in issue. 22 9
This section codifies a passage in the Tate letter which
stated that "sovereign immunity should n6t be claimed or
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grantea in actions with respect to real property (diplomatic
and perhaps consular property excepted) or with respect to
the disposition of the property of a deceased person even
though a foreign sovereign is the beneficiary." 230 No State
Department or judicial denial of immunity appears to have been
expressly based on such grounds, however.2 31
It is well settled in international law that foreign
state immunity need not be extended in cases dealing with
rights to interests in real property 2 32 or interests in local-
ly administered decedents' estates.2 3 3 The immunity of diplo-
matic property from "search, requisition, attachment or execu-
tion," established by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Re-
lations23 4 and customary international law235 is preserved by
other sections of the codification.236 Therefore newly enacted
28 U.S.C. § 1605(4) is consistent with international law.
Newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1605(5) provides that a for-
eign state is not immune from any suit
in which money damages are sought against
a foreign state for personal injury or
death, or damage to or loss of property,
occurring in the United States and caused
by the tortious act or omission of that
foreign state or of any official or employee
of that foreign state while acting within
the scope of his office or employment
unless the claim is based on a discretionary act or arises out
of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights. 2 3 7 The effect of this section is to allow actions for
physical injuries to person or property against a foreign
state even though the activities which gave rise to the injury
were not commercial and within 28 U.S.C. § 1605(2).238 For-
eign states will not be liable for punitive damages in such
actions;2 3 8a nor will they be subjected to a jury trial unless
the action is brought in state court or arises on some basis
of jurisdiction other than the foreign public character of the
defendant.238b There is no precedent for this section in
prior State Department or judicial policy.
The principal object of newly enacted 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(5) is to permit tort victims in automobile accidents
with foreign state agents performing acta jure imperii to re-
cover damages from the foreign state.2'International law
does not prohibit such actions. Although state practice, both
before and after the Second World War, has been to grant im-
munity in cases arising out of accidents involving military
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vehicles,2 40 the more recent tendency has been to permit ac-
tions arising out of collisions with diplomatic vehicles,
usually rationalized by contorted interpretations of acta
jure gestionis or the principle of waiver.24i In addition,
the European Convention on State Immunity2 42 contains a pro-
vision substantially identical to proposed § 1605(5).243
Moreover, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963
expressly abolished the immunity of consulate officials from
claims for "damage arising from an accident in the receiving
State caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft." In fact, in-
ternational law in general has become increasingly concerned
with the protection of human ri ghts,2 45 a goal the newly
enacted section would promote.2 4 In view of these recent de-
velopments, it is unlikely that the United States would incur
international sanctions for permitting a suit in circum-
stances described by 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
H. Political Considerations
When the State Department was the organ which estab-
lished and applied standards of foreign state immunity, there
was an unspoken component of the standards applied by the State
Department that could outweigh all other considerations com-
bined. It was the extent of political repercussions that
would result from subjecting the foreign state to suit.246a
Though application of the objective criteria discussed earlier
in this article dictated that a foreign state should not be
entitled to immunity in a particular case, it was State De-
partment policy nonetheless to recognize and allow the state's
claim to immunity if United States'foreign policy objectives
would be significantly promoted thereby. Although the State
Department never expressly admitted this policy, several of
its responses to requests for immunity left no doubt as to its
existence. 247
The courts not only speculated that the State Depart-
ment took political considerations into account in making sov-
ereign immunity determinations, they urged the Department to
do so and held such considerations to be proper ingredients of
the decision. The Supreme Court's abdication to the State De-
partment in Ex parte Republic of Peru24 8 was motivated by a
belief that the Department could take such considerations into
account more effectively than the courts. Similar reasoning
has prevented the courts from reviewing thq State Department's
decisions. The court in Spacil v. Crowe,249 for example, re-
fused to review State Department recognition and allowance of
the defendant's claim to immunity because
the degree to which granting br denying a
claim of immunity may be important to for-
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eign policy is a question on which the
judiciary is peculiarly ill-equipped to
second-guess the executive. The execu-
tive's institutional resources and ex-
pertise in foreign affairs far outstrip
those of the judiciary. . . . Perhaps more
importantly, in the chess game that is
diplomacy only the executive has the view
of the entire board and has an understand-
ing of the relationship between isolated
moves. Will-granting immunity serve as a
bargaining counter in complex diplomatic
negotiations? . . Will it preclude a
significant diplomatic advance; perhaps a
detente between this country and one with
whom we are not on the best speaking terms?
These are questions for the executive, not
the judiciary. 2 5 0
Other courts have made similar observations.2 51
Although it has been observed that political consider-
ations influenced State Department determinations of immunity
claims much less than is believed,2 5 2 some determinations are
explicable only as political decisions. Spacil v. Crowe2 5 3
is an example. In that case two Chilean corporations at-
tached in the Canal Zone the M/V Imias, a vessel owned by a
Cuban corporation whose vessels had failed to fulfill a con-
tract to deliver sugar and left a Chilean harbor with un-
loading cranes belonging to one of the plaintiffs immediately
after Dr. Allende was deposed as President. The complaints
charged breach of contract and conversion. The latter of-
fense was a continuing one which took place in American terri-
tory as the ships passed through the canal. The Cuban cor-
poration's activities were clearly commercial. The State
Department's objective standards seemed to dictate that im-
munity be denied. Nonetheless, the Department recognized the
Cuban Government's claim to immunity, relayed by the Czecho-
slovakian ambassador. The determination is explicable only
as an attempt to placate United States-Cuban relations and
to facilitate negotiations with Panama over the canal at the
expense of private expectations.254
A second example is Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A.2 55
In that case the Bahia de Nipe, a commercial vessel owned by
the Government of Cuba, was libeled in the Eastern District
of Virginia by a longshoreman to satisfy a judgment against
Cuba, by Mayan Lines, S.A. to satisfy a consent judgment
against Cuba in connection with which Cuba stipulated to a
waiver of immunity from execution, by United Fruit Sugar
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Company to claim ownership of the cargo which it alleged had
been confiscated in violation of international law, and by
the master and crew for wages. The ship had been brought to
Hampton Roads by the barratry of the master and crew. The
State Department made assurances that the vessel would be re-
leased and issued a suggestion of immunity, though all the
circumstances--commercial activity, waiver, and a taking of
property present in the United States in violation of Inter-
national law--indicated that no immunity should be extended.
The State Department's decision was apparently an attempt to
bargain for Cuba's release of hijacked airplanes at the ex-
pense of the libellants.256 It was politically motivated.2 5 7
In the absence of a State Department determination, the
courts usually did not take political considerations into ac-
count in ruling on claims to immunity. Rather, the assumption
made was that the Department's failure to act indicated a lack
of political considerations in the case.25 8 However, there is
a body of earlier case law to the effect that immunity may be
extended only to "friendly" sovereigns, not states unrecog-
nized by or which have severed diplomatic relations with the
United States. 2 59 This precedent seemed directly contrary to
State Department practice, which was to extend immunity to
those countries whose relations with the United States were
most shaky.2
6 0
I. The Effect of Immunity'
The view of the courts has been that dismissal of an
action on sovereign immunity grounds does not bar the claim
of the private plaintiff; it merely relegates him to other
means of enforcing it. The courts often equated a decision
by the State Department to recognize a claim of immunity with
a decision by the Department to pursue the claim diplomatical-
ly, rather than through the courts. The Court in Ex parte
Republic of Peru,26l which established the binding nature of
State Department suggestions, took this view.2 62 One reason
courts were so willing to allow the State Department to bar a
claimant's access to the courts may have been because they ex-
pected the Department to assist him in satisfying his claim
by other means.
In practice, however, if the Department denies a
claimant's right to proceed against a foreign state in court,
it probably will not espouse his claim diplomatically. Even
if it does espouse the claim, there are several reasons for
believing the claim will not be fully satisfied. First, the
State Department will not espouse a claim unless the claim-
ant has had continuous United States nationality263 and un-
til he has exhausted local remedies or shown that they are
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unavailable.264 Second, unless a breach of international law
is involved, it is Department policy not to formally espouse
the claim in order to prevent the Department from becoming
an international "collecting agency."2 65 Third, the Depart-
ment purports to have unfettered, unreviewable discretion in
deciding whether to espouse a claim.26 6 Often political con-.
siderations prevent immediate espousal.2 67 Finally, once the
Department has decided to espouse a claim, it has complete
discretion and authority, not revocable by the claimant, to
settle the claim or even release it.2 68 Political consider-
ations are often influential in this decision as well.2 69
A foreign state which seeks immunity from suit in an
American court may often provide no remedy for the plaintiff
in its own territory. Therefore, when the courts dismiss a
private party's action against a foreign state, "[the private
party in most cases is not likely to have other remedies." 2 70
Dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds is in effect a denial
of the claim. The foreign state is not merely immune from
suit, attachment, or execution; it is altogether immune from
satisfying the individual's claim.
IV. A CRITIQUE
Criticism of prior sovereign immunity law which re-
sulted in enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 was directed more at the national constitutive process--
the institutional framework in which standards for immunity are
prescribed and applied--than at the substantive criteria which
that process produced. Both deserved criticism. The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 goes a long way toward elimi-
nating the criticized features of prior law, although like all
legislation it is somewhat short of perfect.
A. Procedural Criticism
Each nation must, within the limits of international
law, prescribe its own standards to determine in which circum-
stances its courts will exercise jurisdiction over foreign
states. These standards may provide for less sovereign im-
munity than is required by international law,2 71 subjecting
the forum state to international sanctions, or they may as a
matter of national palicy provide for immunities in excess of
international law requirements. Each nation must also apply
the standards it has prescribed to individual cases. As the
discussion in Part I of this article has shown, prior to enact-
ment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 the United
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States made the following allocation of these prescriptive
and applicative functions among its domestic institutions:
(1) The State Department prescribed the basic criteria by
which sovereign immunity claims were decided; both the State
Department and the courts made prescriptive, sometimes con-
flicting, interpretations of these criteria. (2) Either the
State Department or the courts made authoritative applications
of sovereign immunity prescriptions to individual cases, de-
pending upon the choice of the foreign state. This alloca-
tion was inadequate because the State Department is institu-
tionally incapable of efficiently performing either task and
because neither task can be effectively divided among inde-
pendent branches of government.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 makes pro-
found changes in the allocation of prescriptive and applica-
tive functions. It extends authority to determine claims to
immunity to the courts alone and commands them to apply the
standards prescribed by Congress. The act greatly improves
the existing process by removing the applicative function from
the State Department. However, by substituting a statute for
State Department and international law prescriptions, Congress
has made difficult the continuing adoption of American stan-
dards to the evolving standards of international law.
1. The Prescriptive Process
The State Department was a poor organ to prescribe the
standards of decision because it may be institutionally biased
in favor of extensive immunity. In order to determine whether,
as a matter of national policy, this country should recognize
more extensive immunity than is required by international law,
it Is necessary to balance the inconveniences to American na-
tionals and effects on the national economy resulting from an
extension of sovereign immunity against the effect on the na-
tion's diplomatic relations with other countries from an exer-
cise of jurisdiction. Grants of immunity prevent disturbances
in our foreign relations and may help in attaining some prized
foreign policy objective. Since the State Department, as an
institution, is judged by its ability to attain such objectives,
it may be institutionally biased in favor of prescribing a
greater degree of immunity than either international law or
national policy dictate.27I I
The process by which sovereign immunity law was pre-
scribed in the United States was inadequate, too, because It
failed to produce a single body of law against which all in-
dividual claims could be judged. Rather, as Part II of this
article has shown, it generated two bodies of law--State Depart-
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ment policy and judicial precedent--each different in de-
tail, either of which might be applied to a foreign state's
claim to immunity. As a result, the prescriptive process pro-
duced a degree of uncertainty which discouraged both private
traders and foreign states from dealing with each other.2 7la
Finally, while it had the authority to prescribe stan-
dards of decision, the State Department either failed to
adopt detailed standards or inadequately publicized them.2 7 1a -l
Not only did it fail to release a description of its standards
more detailed than the single sentence found in the Tate let-
ter, 27 2 it also failed to accompany its ad hoc decisions with
reasoned analysis of each case's controlling factors. 2 73 As
a result, State Department policy was a mystery to all but De-
partment insiders, leisured and interested students, and
corporations whose foreign dealings are extensive enough to
warrant thorough research by their attorneys. Others--foreign
states and private traders alike--lacked the detailed knowl-
edge required to adequately plan their transnational transac-
tions.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides
answers to these criticisms. By exercising Congress' author-
ity to prescribe standards of decision, it substitutes for the
State Department a prescriptive institution capable of weigh-
ing all considerations in the national interest. By exclud-
ing the State Department from any role In applying the Con-
gressional standards, the codification Insures that it will
generate only a single body of authoritative interpretations--
those of the federal courts. And by describing the standards
of decision in detail In a statute accessible to all, the
codification adequately publicizes them.
The chief fault of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 is that it freezes a body of American law motivated by
international law requirements at a time when those require-
ments are evolving in a way that demands an extension of im-
munity in fewer and fewer circumstances. In the last century,
international law demanded that foreign states be extended ab-
solute immunity from judicial process. Today, international
law requires immunity in fewer instances than does the codifi-
cation. Yet, if one or two decades hence, international law
requirements become even more--or less--restrictive of im-
munity, action by Congress--never an easily moved organ--will
be needed to take advantage of or conform to the change. Con-
gress might have been wiser if It had enacted legislation that
required the courts alone to resolve claims to immunity, but
directed the State Department to promulgate the standards of
decision by rulemaking. One would expect the State Department
to be more sensitive than Congress to the changing winds of
international law.27 4
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2. The Applicative Process
The most popular object of criticism in the national
constitutive process by which claims to sovereign immunity
were decided before enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976 was the State Department's role In au-
thoritatively applying the standards of decision.2 75 Be-
cause of the State Department's role, the applicative
process has injured American foreign relations, has been in-
consistent and unpredictable in its outcomes, may have been
occasionally mistaken in its application of law to fact, and
gave rise to forum-shopping by foreign states which embar-
rassed the executive and judiciary alike.
Both injury to our foreign relations 275a and incon-
sistencies in applications2 75b have resulted from the State
Department's willingness to be influenced by political con-
siderations in determining claims to immunity. It is clear
that the courts expected the State Department to take politi-
cal circumstances into consideration. It was also inevitable
that the State Department should do so. The State Department
as an institution is charged with the conduct of our foreign
affairs. Its success or failure, and the success or failure
of its officials, is judged by the extent to which American
foreign policy objectives are achieved. The State Department
has, therefore, an inevitable institutional bias in favor of
immunity decisions with favorable foreign affairs effects.
Added to this was the courts' constant exhortations for the
Department to be moved by foreign affairs considerations. The
result was that the possibility of improving relations with a
claimant or of obtaining a valued concession was an irresistably
enticing factor in the Department's determination of foreign
states' claims to Immunity.27 6
The supreme irony of American sovereign Immunity law was
that, while decision-making power was given to the State De-
partment to prevent disturbance of America's foreign relations,
the Department's exercise of that power had the opposite ef-
fect. Two factors were responsible for this irony. First,
State Department denial of immunity created the appearance to
a foreign state claimant that it was politically disfavored by
the United States, especially since the Department was supposed
to take forgign relations into account in making its deter-
mination.2 78 If the denial were made by the courts, the for-
eign state could more easily believe that it was based on non-
partisan application of objective standards. 279 Second, for-
eign states which realized that the Department's determinations
were influenced by political considerations sometimes politi-
cized the issue of immunity in order to avoid litigation.280
For this reason, it has been observed that judicial determina-
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tion of claims to sovereign immunity without regard to politi-
cal developments of the moment would be in the best interests
of American foreign policy. 2 8 1 It is significant that the
State Department itself has recently adopted this view.2 82
In addition, the State Department is more likely than
the courts to misapply applicable standards because it is in-
stitutionally inferior in performing the functions required
to make a sovereign immunity decision.283 To determine whe-
ther immunity is warranted, a decision-maker under the re-
strictive theory must first make a number of factual find-
ings--e.g., that the activity involved a contract to ship
commercial merchandise or that an agent of the sovereign was
in charge of its property--then apply legal principles to
those facts--e.g., that there is no immunity for an activity
commercial in nature or that a sovereign in possession of
property is immune. State Department hearings, unlike other
agencies' hearings, lacked mechanisms to generate the kind of
factual record on which an immunity decision must be made.28 4
No oral testimony was permitted. The Department had no power
to require oaths to be sworn. The private litigant lacked
power to subpoena the sovereign to discover facts to which
the sovereign had greater access. Submissions by the sov-
ereign were not open to cross-examination. Moreover, State
Department officials ruling on the claim--ultimately the Legal
Adviser and Secretary of State--lacked the experience of the
judiciary in applying complex legal principles to a factual
context.285 As a result, State Department determinations
were not only inconsistent because of the intrusion of politi-
cal considerations, but were also probably wrong an appre-
ciable number of times.
Finally, the ability of both the State Department and
courts to authoritatively determine claims to immunity, each
applying distinctive standards of decision, gave rise to forum-
shopping reminiscent of the days before Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins.2 86 The ability of foreign states to choose among
marginally different legal standards not only created added
uncertainty, it also was a source of embarrassment to the na-
tion.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 greatly
improves the process by which standards of decision are ap-
plied. The codification defines the circumstances in which
immunity will and will not be granted without reference to
ad hoc political considerations and makes no provision for
participation by the State Department in applying these stan-
dards. It is therefore unlikely that immunity decisions under
the statute would be politically influenced.2 7 Designation
of the courts alone as the institution before which immunity
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claims would be decided will also end forum-shopping and im-
prove the quality of individual decisions.
B. Substantive Criticism
The standards of sovereign immunity formerly prevail-
ing in the United States extended immunity to foreign states
in many circumstances in which immunity is not required by
international law. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 on the whole restricts immunity more than prior law, but
it too is in some instances more generous to foreign states
than international law requires. In order properly to evalu-
ate the codification and the law it supplants, it is first
necessary to isolate the instances in which they extend Im-
munity without compulsion by international law and to examine
the competing interests which have resulted in prescriptions
of immunity in these instances. It is then possible to crit-
icize the prescriptions in question for failing to achieve
the goals of prevailing participants or for their inconsis-
tency with values more basic to American government in gen-
eral.
1. Commercial Activities
In theory the restrictive theory permits actions be-
tween an alien and a foreign state whenever they are based
upon commercial activities and some basis'for jurisdiction ex-
ists. In practice, political considerations have been used to
recognize sovereign immunity in such actions, though immunity
might have been denied if an American national had initiated
the action.28 8 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
codifies this practice by granting immunity from actions which
lack a substantial relationship to the United States, though
other bases for jurisdiction exist.289 Thus, both prior prac-
tice and the new legislation place an extra burden on alien
plaintiffs. Needless to say, this burden is not required by
international law.29 0
The purposes of this national prescription are not en-
tirely clear. It may have been simply the result of a crude
attempt by State Department draftsmen to prevent an exercise
of jurisdiction for which there is no international law basis.
However, it is difficult to believe that the draftsmen were
unaware that an alien, consistent with international law,
could enforce against a foreign state an arbitral award based
on an activity unrelated to the United States, for example.2 9 1
It is more likely that the requirement of substantial contact
was introduced to anticipate the fears of the business com-
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munity in general that the United States would otherwise be-
come an international collection agency, to the injury of its
trade with foreign states. 29 2 Since such a-provision is op-
posed to the interests of alien traders only, it is an ir-
resistable prescription for a national constitutive process.
2. Execution
Without compulsion from international law, prior Amer-
Ican policy prohibited execution against the immovable or com-
mercial assets of a foreign state.2-93 The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 permits execution against commercial
property related to the activity which served as the basis of
the judgment being executed, but maintains the immunity of
unrelated commercial property. It also maintains the im-
munity of bank deposits made by foreign state banks, regard-
less of the purpose for which the deposits had been made or
their relation to the judgment sought to be enforced.294
The retention of these immunities seems to mark a vic-
tory of domestic businessesi over international traders and
investors. Domestic businesses realize that any restriction
of immunity from execution could have an inhibiting effect on
investment by foreign states in the American capital market,
especially by states which contemplate avoiding their obliga-
tions.2 9 5 It is likely, on the other hand, that international
traders and investors with potential claims against foreign-
states would like to be able to enforce those claims against
all the commercial assets of those states in the .United
States.296 The codification's solution is a carefully struc-
tured compromise. Assets especially important to the Amer-
ican economy--the deposits of foreign state banks--are given
absolute immunity.29/ Other assets can be levied against if
they are related to the claim being enforced, but not if they
are general investments of the foreign state defendant. Thus,
an American oil company with a contract dispute with a state
with which it has a concession agreement could recover oil
brought into the United States by that state, but could not
reach the state's investments in the stock of American cor-
porations to satisfy its claim. Because Petrodollars and
Eurodollars now play important roles in American finance, it
is likely that the Treasury Department, a new participant in
the process by which sovereign immunity standards are deter-
mined, has exerted its influence to limit restrictions on the
immunity of foreign state assets from execution.
From the international perspective, immunity of a
state's commercial property from execution has a number of
deleterious effects. To the extent that dispute resolution
by municipal courts or arbitral tribunals, rather than diplo-
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matic espousal, is more efficient and more consistent in com-
mercial circumstances because of its isolation from tangential
political considerations, an effective means of enforcing the
world community's ordering system upon foreign states Is
lost. 298 Diplomatic resolution of commercial disputes also
lacks the stability needed to reduce international traders'
perception of risk and therefore inhibits the overall level of
commercial interaction between state traders and other coun-
tries. 29 9 In addition, the lack of an effective means of en-
forcing state responsibility forces states which observe their
responsibilities to absorb part of the cost of obligation
avoidance by other states, since private traders in adjusting
price terms to reflect risk cannot accurately predict which
states will avoid their obligations in the future. Some of
these considerations may be responsible for the hostility of
commentators to immunity from execution.30 0
3. Attachment
Although prior law permitted pre-judgment attachment of
a foreign state's commercial assets, the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976 prohibits pre-judgment attachments for
the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction, substituting other
forms of process. 30 1 Immunity of commercial property from at-
tachment is not required by international law.
The forces responsible for the compromise on execution
immunity are probably responsible for the change In policy on
attachments, as well. It is reported that foreign states are
aggravated by prolonged arrest of their assets or the expense
of posting bond.30 2 Attachment has the same effect as execu-
tion upon property, except the deprivation is temporary, and
so may have the same effect as execution on the Investment
policies of foreign states. It is therefore opposed by domes-
tic businesses. At the same time, the ability to implead a
foreign state in personam has made attachment less important
to international traders and investors. Because the act per-
mits the execution only of commercial property related to the
claim being enforced, however, it Is likely that attachments
for the purpose of conserving assets for later execution, per-
mitted by newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d), will be widely
employed.
4. Political Subdivisions
Both prior American practice and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 extend to the political subdivisions,
agencies, and instrumentalities of a foreign state substan-
tially the same immunities extended to the foreign state it-
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self.303 International law, on the other hand, seems never
to require the immunity of political subdivisions from judi-
cial process. It is not clear whether any reason for the
more generous American policy exists other than the basic In-
congruity of distinguishing between levels of government in
granting immunity for public acts. 304
5. Waiver
Both prior American practice and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 give effect to waivers of immunity made
before or after the act upon which the plaintiff's claim is
based, notwithstanding purported revocations of the waiver
not contemplated by its original terms. 305 An earlier.draft
of the codification appeared to give effect to unexpected
revocations of waivers of immunity, however. But there is no
reason for permitting such a revocation. Clearly, nelther in-
ternatlonal traders and Investors nor foreign states are bene-
fited by the foreign state's ability to revoke a waiver. The
traders and investors are unable to contract for security and
may be unfairly surprised by revocation of a waiver for which
they have expressly contracted. At the same time, foreign
states will be prevented from contracting for an adjustment
in the price term or from attracting investment by waiving
immunity from suit and execution if private parties are aware
that the waiver is unenforceable. Fortunately, the codifica-
tion as enacted withdrew the power of a foreign state to re-
voke 'its waiver of immunity.
6. Public Debt
Early American law recognized the immunity of both for-
eign states and their political subdivisions from actions
based ,on their public debt, although the status of this prece-
dent after the Tate letter was unclear. The position of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 Is equally unclear,
though an earlier draft of the legislation extended immunity
from such actions.307 No immunity from suit to enforce the
debt of a foreign state seems required by international law.
The decision to provide for immunity from suits to en-
force a foreign state's debts In an earlier draft of the codi--
fication appears to have been motivated by the desire to pro-
tect the American securities industry by making American capi-
tal markets more attractive to foreign state borrowers. The
State Department observed that "[m]any national governments
are unwilling to issue their securities in a foreign country
which subjects .them to actions based on such securities."308
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Therefore the earlier draft preserved immunity from actions
to enforce a foreign state's debt "to facilitate the U.S.
role as one of the principal capital markets of the world,
which in some ways has dwindled during the past years." 309
However, it is not clear why a foreign state would not ad-
just to a withdrawal of immunity by including a choice of
forum clause in its debt instruments rather than withdrawing
from an otherwise attractive capital market. Such a pro-
vision would permit it, in effect, to contract for immunity,
just as private investors and underwriters now contract for
waivers. On the other hand, since the rule of immunity Is so
easily altered by contract in the case of foreign public debt,
preservation of some immunity in this area would seem to do
no harm.
7. International Law Violations
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 withdraws
immunity in cases to determine rights in certain property
taken in violation of international law. 3 10 There appears to
be no reason why international law would not permit an exer-
cise of jurisdiction over a foreign state in any case in
which a violation of international law is alleged and there
exists a basis of jurisdiction to adjudicate, regardless of-
whether the violation alleged was a deprivation of property
rights or a deprivation of human rights. It is not clear why
the more circumscribed rule has been adopted in the United
States. It may be based on a belief that the Act of State
doctrine would prevent adjudication of cases not within the
section anyway. However, the Act of State doctrine appears to
be rapidly disintegrating in the face of international law.3 1 1
The more restricted rule may also be based on the absence of
any international state practice supporting such an exception
from immunity. A more likely explanation, however, is that
only deprivations of property rights seem important enough to
American policy makers and the American business community to
warrant the strain such a suit would create in our relations
with the defendant state.
8. Political Considerations
Prior American law permitted the State Department to
impose immunity if the political ramifications from exercising
jurisdiction were serious enough to outweigh the benefits of
solving the dispute judicially. 3 12 This policy was clearly
nationally prescribed and not required by international law.
It is not continued by the terms of the Foreign Sovereign
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Immunities Act of 1976.
The commentators are in near unanimous agreement that
the State Department must be free to interfere with exercises
of jurisdiction over foreign states when extraordinary foreign
policy considerations dictate that immunity be granted.313
They differ primarily in the form such interference should
take and in who should pay the cost of the suit's dismissal.
Most scholars, while recognizing the need to return decision-
making authority to the courts, would have permitted the State
Department to issue a binding suggestion of immunity if and
only if required by foreign policy considerations.3 4 The de-
feated private claimant would bear the cost of improving Amer-
ican foreign relations if unable to otherwise satisfy his
claim. A minority of scholars would permit the State Depart-
ment to interfere with jurisdiction for political reasons only
if it compensated the plaintiff whose suit is dismissed.3 15
The Department could either issue a bond on behalf of the
favored foreign state and be subrogated to the private plain-
tiff's claim or it could issue a binding suggestion and pay
the plaintiff the fair value of his claim.
If immunity must be imposed in some cases because of
ad hoc foreign policy considerations, there are sound reasons
for requiring the nation to compensate the private party whose
claim is thereby defeated. First, compensation would erase
much of the risk of an unexpected imposition of sovereign im-
munity perceived by private traders and investors. It would
therefore remove one of the barriers to increased intercourse
with state traders and the less mature nations. Second, re-
quiring the State Department to compensate defeated plaintiffs
would force the decision-maker in an alleged national emer-
gency to take into account the true cost of improving rela-
tions with a sovereign defendant. It would provide strong in-
centive for the Department to choose more efficient means of
improving relations if they exist and to impose immunity only
when clearly required. Finally, compensation of private par-
ties whose claims are defeated in the interest of the nation
as a whole is required by the sense, if not the positive pre-
scriptions, of the Fifth Amendment.31 6 If immunity would bene-
fit American foreign policy in the interests of the entire na-
tion, the entire nation should bear its cost. Private traders
and investors should not be forced to play roulette to deter-
mine who will be taxed to support our.foreign policy.
Among the above instances in which the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 1976 extends immunity to foreign states
without compulsion of international law, only suits by aliens
and a wider degree of execution would clearly injure American
interests in the short run. In the long run, even standards
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of immunity which permitted suits by aliens and execution
against all of a foreign state's commercial property would
probably cause little damage to American interests. Suits by
aliens to enforce obligations of foreign states are feared
because the absence of similar remedies in the aliens' own
countries would make American courts attractive as interna-
tional collection agencies. Execution is feared because it
would give foreign states incentive to invest in markets in
which the immunity of their assets is recognized. If Amer-
ica's withdrawal of immunity in such cases accelerated the
trend by which sovereign immunity is being restricted in all
the nations of the world, however, as there is reason to be-
lieve it would, these fears would become groundless in the
long run. Aliens would not burden American courts more than
Americans would be initiating suits in foreign courts. For-
eign states would not be tempted to invest in other countries
because execution would be permitted there, too, though some
incentive would remain for foreign states to invest domes-
tically. Whether the United States should continue to grant
immunity unilaterally in such cases, then, depends upon its
willingness to absorb temporary and limited injury to the
American economy in the interests of building a world order in
which the commercial obligations of foreign states are en-
forced judicially, i.e., with more consistency and less fric-
tion than by means of intergovernmental espousals. To this
writer, the expense does not seem too great.
C. Conclusion
The process by which the law of foreign state Immunity
was prescribed and applied in the United States prior to enact-
ment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 had many
shortcomings. That law was authoritatively prescribed and ap-
plied by an institution which was inadequate to the task be-
cause it is institutionally biased, it lacks the expertise to
make factual applications of law, it failed to generate and
publicize detailed standards of decision, and It was incon-
sistent in its applications, being constantly Influenced by ad
hoc political considerations. Moreover, dividing the author-
ity to apply sovereign immunity law between the State Depart-
ment and the courts created further inconsistencies and re-
sulted in embarrassing forum-shopping.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 is not a
perfect substitute for the previously existing law. It
freezes this nation's codification of a doctrine of customary
international law at a time when that doctrine is In flux. It
also extends immunity in several instances in which it appears
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to be unwarranted. Despite its drawbacks, however, enactment
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, by limiting
immunity in cases in which it was previously granted, publi-
cizing detailed standards of decision, and removing the State
Department from the decision-making process, has greatly im-
proved prevailing law.
What can be expected from this improvement? From the
world's perspective, two results can be expected to follow.
A small, but not negligible, Improvement in the means by which
foreign states are made accountable for their acts will occur.
At the same time, a marginal, but not meaningless, increase
in intercourse among all governments and people can be ex-
pected. It might be hoped that that Intercourse will take the
form of an exchange of goods, services and ideas that will in-
crease the world's production of all preferred values, rather
than a trade in arms to Haiti and Its counterparts, described
at the beginning of this article, that will Increase the
world's capacity to destroy Itself.
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
* The author is deeply grateful to Professor Myres S.
McDougal for his invaluable supervision of the preparation of
this article, to Professor W. Michael Reisman for his helpful
comments on an earlier draft, to Ms. Susan A. Gabra for her
patient typing and editorial work, and to Mr. David A. Stern
for his improvements in style and general encouragement.
** B.A., Rice University (1970); J.D., Yale Law School
(1976); Admitted, State Bar of Texas; Associate with Fuibright
& Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. It is not known whether Professor Lowenfeld demanded
payment in advance for his services. Attorneys representing
foreign state clients should be alerted to the fact their
claims for fees, as well as the claims of their adversaries,
may be defeated by foreign state immunity. See Miller v.
Ferrocarrill Del Pacifico de Nicaragua, 137 Me. 251, 18 A.2d
688 (1941).
2. "Sovereign immunity" and "foreign state immunity"
will be used interchangeably throughout. "Sovereign Immunity"
as used in this paper refers to immunity of the foreign sov-
ereign only. It does not refer to the related but distinguish-
able immunity of the domestic sovereign. "Foreign state" as
used in this paper, unless the context indicates otherwise, In-
cludes any political subdivision, agency, or other instrumen-
tality of a foreign state which is entitled to the immunity
enjoyed by the state Itself.
3. Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp.
1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see generally Lowenfeld, "Litigating a
Sovereign Immunity Claim--The Haiti Case," 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
377 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld]. Aerotrade's ap-
plication to attach accounts of the Banque Nationale de la
Republique d'Haiti in an effort to bring a "back stop" action
directly against the bank was dismissed the same day on pro-
cedural and substantive grounds. Aerotrade, Inc. v. Banque
Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). Aerotrade was likewise unsuccessful In a later attempt
to mandamus the President to terminate foreign aid to Haiti or
to report to Congress that he refused to implement the sanc-
tions of the Hickenlooper Amendment. Aerotrade, Inc. v.
Agency for International Development, Department of State, 387
F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1974).
3a. 26 Dept. State Bull. 984 (1952). See text at note 72
infra.
4. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1332(a)(2), (3) and (4), 1391(f), 1410(d), 1602 et seq. (1976).
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 was an administra-
tion bill, drafted and recommended by the Departments of State
and Justice. It is the product of a decade of work by those
departments, which began a study of possible legislation and
first recommended a version of the act to the ninety-third
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Congress in 1973. See S. 566, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973);
H.R. 3496, 93rd Cong., st Sess. (1973). S. 566 and H.R. 3493
were each referred to the respective Judiciary Committee.
Hearings were held on H.R. 3493 on June 7, 1973. "Hearing on
H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Re-
lations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary," 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 10 (1973) [hereinafter cited as "Hearing"]. The
legislation was not reported out of either committee in the
Ninety-Third Congress. A modified version of the legislation
was submitted to the Ninety-Fourth Congress and introduced by
request in the fall of 1975 as H.R. 11315. Two days of hear-
ings were held before a subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee in June, 1976. As a result of the hearings, the
bill was reported to the floor in amended form. See H.R.Rep.
No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1-6 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Report]. The bill was passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives on September 9, 1976, 122 Cong. Rec. H. 11587
(daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976), passed by the Senate on October 1,
1976, 122 Cong. Rec. S. 17721 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976), and
approved by the President on October 21, 1976. The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 is effective January 19, 1977.
4a. U.S. , 96 S.Ct. , 48 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976).
4b. See note 223 infra.
4c. ITn-a footnote to its Report accompanying the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, the House Judiciary Com-
mittee interpreted Dunhill as an indication that the courts
will not apply the "act of state" doctrine to acts for which
a foreign state is entitled to no sovereign immunity under the
act and approved that Interpretation. Report, supra note 4,
at 20 n.l.
5. This article will consider neither the personal im-
munity from judicial process enjoyed by diplomatic personnel
and personal sovereigns nor the immunity of military forces
stationed in foreign countries, since these immunities seem
either well-regulated by international conventions and agree-
ments or of little relevance to contemporary American exper-
ience. Nor will the article treat immunities of foreign
states from prescriptions of the forum state, such as property
or income tax, traffic laws, and the like. Rather, the arti-
cle deals only with the immunity of foreign states and their
political subdivisions and instrumentalities from the power of
American courts to enforce prescriptions applicable to such
entities.
6. See McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman, "The World Con-
stitutive-Process of Authoritative Decision," 19 J. Legal Ed.
253, 403 (1967), for a more complete outline of the world con-
stitutive process than that presented by this author.
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7. To constitute international "law" as opposed to prac-
tice there need not be an expectation that the community's pre-
scriptions will be rigorously enforced by application of nega-
tive sanctions. The amount of control required varies ac-
cording to the context. Moreover, enforcement may take the
form of promised reciprocities in return for a participant's
observance of the standards prescribed, as well as retali-
ations for their infraction. Still, "a structure of legality
must go beyond words to expectations that are substantially
corroborated by deeds." See id., at 258.
8. McDougal, "The Impact of International Law upon Na-
tional Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective," 14 S. Dak. L. Rev.
25, 68 (1959) (hereinafter cited as McDougal].
9. Thus, Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
No. 526, enacting Principles of Civil Procedure of the Soviet
Union and the Union Republics, provides foreign sovereigns
with absolute immunity from suit or execution without their
consent, but permits the Council of Ministers or other auth-
orized body to withhold immunity from any foreign sovereign
that does not extend the Soviet Union reciprocal treatment.
6 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 563-64 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as WhitemanJ.
10. Thus, the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee,
in Its Third Session at Colombo, Ceylon, in 1960, reported
that
[ilt was recognized by all delegations
that a decree obtained against a for-
eign state could not be executed against
its public property. The property of a
state trading organization which has a
separate juristic entity may, however,
be available for execution.
The delegates believed states to be immune from suits based on
their public acts, but believed separately Incorporated state
trading entities enjoyed no immunity. See id. at 572-74.
11. See, e.g., Pacific Molasses Co. v. Comite de Ventas
de Mieles la Republica Dominicana, 30 Misc. 2d 560, 219
N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1020 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
12. It is common practice for foreign governments to
waive their Immunities in loan agreements with institutional
lenders and in public debt issues. See text accompanying
notes 217-219 infra.
13. Foreign--o fices have had formal authority to grant or
deny claims to sovereign immunity in no major nation except
the United States. See Report, supra note 4, at 7; "New De-
partures in the Law of Sovereign Immunity," [1969] Proc. Am.
Soc'y Int'l L. 182, 202 [hereinafter cited as "New Departures"];
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Comment, "Proposed Draft Legislation on the Sovereign Immunity
of Foreign Governments: An Attempt to Revest the Courts with
a Judicial Function," 69 Nw. U. L. Rev. 302, 316 (1974) [here-
Inafter cited as "Proposed Draft Legislation"]. However, for-
eign offices have varying degrees of influence on the deci-
sions of municipal courts, which they communicate through
certificates or other means. In nations where the courts are
especially deferential to the views of the foreign office, the
latter institution is the effective decision-maker.
14. To be complete, it should be noted that American
policy also influences the international law outcome outside
its domestic courts. Several conventions and numerous bilat-
eral treaties to which the United States has adhered require
their signatories to grant or refuse Immunity in narrowly de-
fined cases. See text accompanying notes 113-15, 154-55
infra. Of course, when America's influence on international
sovereign immunity law Is exerted through the creation of
treaties, Congress and the State Department share national
participation in the prescriptive function. The Justice De-
partment also plays a role in the prescription and invocation
of international law by claiming immunity or causing the
State Department to claim immunity in judicial proceedings
against the United States in foreign lands. See text accom-
panying note 117 infra; Tlmberg, "Sovereign Immunity, State
Trading, Socialism ad Self-Deception," 56 Nw. U. L. Rev. 109,
124 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Timberg]; cf. note 71 infra.
15. It is a matter of Indifference to the world com-
munity which domestic institution within a nation applies In-
ternational law so long as international law is observed.
From the perspective of world power
and social processes . . . there is indeed
no need for a state to adopt any special
principles or procedures for making cus-
tomary international law authority within
Its boundaries. The influence of inclu-
sively prescribed policies depends not so
much upon internal arrangements as upon
the impact of external variables in the
world power process--including all poten-
tial reciprocities and threatened retal-
latlons--which drive a decision-maker
toward conformity or non-conformity.
. . . The insistent pressures of the world
power process imposes certain sources and
content of authority, sustained by effec-
tive sanctions, upon internal decision-
makers If they are to maximize the values
of the national community with which they
identify.
McDougal, supra note 8, at 69,.
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16. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812). Two
earlier lower court decisions, Moitez v. The South Carolina,
F. Cas. No. 9,697 (Adm. Ct., Pa. 1781), and Moxon v. The
Fanny, F. Cas. No. 9,895 (D. Pa. 1793), had granted immunity
to foreign sovereign libelees. However, the opinion in The
South Carolina was so cryptic that It did not disclose whether
the libeled ship was owned by a foreign country or one of the
rebelling colonies. And the decision in The Fanny turned
more on a lack of standing to challenge the offense, a seizure
by an armed French schooner In American territorial waters,
than on immunity of the libeled ship.
17. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 144.
18. Without doubt, the sovereign of the place
is capable of destroying this implication.
He may claim and exercise jurisdiction
either by employing force, or by subjecting
vessels to the ordinary tribunals. But un-
til such power be exerted in a manner not
to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot
be considered as having imparted to the
ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction, which
it would be a breach of faith to exercise.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146.
19. 318 U.S. 578, 63 S.Ct. 793, 87 L.Ed. 1014 (1943)..
20. 324 U.S. 30, 65 S.Ct. 530, 89 L.Ed. 729 (1945).
21. .The case involves the dignity and rights
of a friendly foreign state; claims against
which are normally presented and settled in
the course of the conduct of foreign af-
fairs by the President and by the Depart-
ment of State. When the Secretary elects,
as he may and as he appears to have done
In this case, to settle claims against the
vessel by diplomatic negotiations between
the two countries rather than by continued
litigation in the courts, it is of public
importance that the action of the politi-
cal arm of the Government taken within Its
appropriate sphere be promptly recognized,
and that the delay and Inconvenience of a
prolonged litigation be avoided by prompt
termination of the proceedings in the dis-
trict court.
[T]he courts may not so exer-
cise their jurisdiction, by the seizure
and detention of the prope'rty of a friend-
ly foreign sovereign, as to embarrass the
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executive arm of the Government in con-
ducting foreign relations. "In such
cases, the judicial department of this
government follows the action of the
political branch, and will not embarrass
the latter by assuming an antagonistic
jurisdiction." United States v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196, 209. More specifically,
the judicial seizure of the vessel of a
friendly foreign state is so serious a
challenge to its dignity, and may so
affect our friendly relations with it,
that courts are required to accept and
follow the executive determination that
the vessel is immune. . . . Upon recog-
nition and allowance of the claim by the
State Department and certification of its
action presented to the court by the
Attorney General, it is the court's duty
to surrender the vessel and remit the
libelant to the relief available through
diplomatic negotiations... . This prac-
tice is founded upon the policy, recog-
nized both by the Department of State and
the courts, that our national Interest
will be better served in such cases if
the wrongs to the suitors, involving our
relations with a friendly foreign power,
are righted through diplomatic negoti-
ations rather than by the compulsions of
judicial proceedings.
318 U.S. at 586-89.
22. Id. at 589.
23. See text accompanying notes 40-44 infra.
24. R'Wublic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 143777 F '854, 855,
858-59 (9th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). The United
States Attorney's submission to the court did cite two prior
cases which could have been taken as authority for denial of
the claim to immunity.
25. 324 U.S. at 38.
26. 348 U.S. 356, 75 S.Ct. 423, 99 L.Ed. 389 (1955).
27. 348 U.S. at 358.
28. Id. at 365.
29. I-d. at 366-71. A related reason for doubting the
Supreme Cou'rt's sincerity in assigningrthe prescriptive func-
tion to the State Department is that the opinion in Republic
of Mexico failed to overrule an earlier decision, Berizzi
Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesard, 271 U.S. 562, 46 S.Ct. 611, 70
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L.Ed. 1088 (1926), in which the Court had granted immunity in
circumstances for which the State Department had recommended
that no immunity be granted. See notes 71 and 85 infra. The
majority in Republic of Mexico found Berizzi Brothers dis-
tinguishable and therefore declined to overrule it unnecessar-
ily. 324 U.S. at 35 n.l. Two concurring Justices recommended
that Berizzi Brothers be overruled and that the decision in
Republic of Mexico be based on the State Department's previous
recommendations that there be no Immunity for commercial activ-
ities. Id. at 39-42.
30. An example of reliance on circuit court interpreta-
tion is Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), discussed at text accompanying notes 1-3
supra. While the note of the Haitian Ambassador requesting Im-
munity was pending before the State Department, Professor
Lowenfeld discovered remarks made by the State Department's
Legal Adviser and the Chief of the Justice Department's For-
eign Litigation Unit before a subcommittee of the House Judi-
ciary Committee which indicated that the State Department would
consider a contract between a foreign government and a U.S.
company for guns for its armed forces an activity commercial
in nature and therefore not one for which the foreign govern-
ment would be immune from suit in American courts. See "Hear-
ing," supra note 4, at 19. See also the remarks of a Deputy
Legal Adviser in "New Departures," supra note 13, at 184. How-
ever, dicta in Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimlentos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2nd Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965), interpreted the State
Department's restrictive policy of immunity to include "acts
concerning the armed forces" within the category of govern-
mental activities immune from suit. Professor Lowenfeld there-
fore chose the district court as the forum in which to make
Haiti's claim. On the basis of-Victory Transport, the court
upheld the claim, ignorant of or unconcerned with the State De-
partment's latest pronouncement. See also Premier Steamship
Co. v. Embassy of Algeria, 336 F. Supp. 507, 509-10 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
On the other hand, If a court were informed of recent
State Department interpretations, it might have given effect
to those interpretations despite judicial precedent to the
contrary. An example is Renchard v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc.,
381 F. Supp. 382 (D.D.C. 1974), in which a plaintiff homeowner
sued the Republic of Brazil for damages to his home incurred
during construction on the Brazilian Embassy. The State De-
partment, which ruled that the activities involved were of a
nongovernmental nature, declined to recognize or allow the
Brazilian Ambassador's claim to immunity. Informed that since
1967 the State Department had looked to the "nature," rather
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than "purpose," of activities under suit in deciding whether
to grant immuni.ty, the court gave effect to the State De-
partment interpretation by denying Brazil's request for im-
munity.
31. Claims to immunity in state court proceedings, as
well, have been determined according to federal standards.
The state courts have for the most part accepted as binding
federal sovereign Immunity law. See, e.g., State ex rel.
National Institute of Agrarian Reform v. Dekle, 137 So. 2d
581, 582-83 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 146 So. 2d 753 (Fla:
1962); Republic of Cuba v7-7'xiePaint & Varnish Co., 104 Ga.
App. 854, 123 S.E.2d 198 (1961); French v. Banco Naclonal de
Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 51, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 439
(1968); Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of
Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
802 (1966). The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ex-
pressly controls the grant of foreign state immunity in state
court proceedings. Sec. 4(a), 90 Stat. 2891, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1604-05 and 1607-11 (1976). Prior to its enactment, whe-
ther a foreign sovereign was entitled to immunity from suit
In a state court may have been a federal question on the au-
thority of Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 88 S.Ct. 664,
19 L.Ed.2d 683 (1968), which invalidated a state statute
limiting the rights of certain nonresident aliens to inherit
property within the state because it interfered with the
federal government's conduct of foreign relations, and Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425, 84 S.Ct. 923,
11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964), in which the Court held application of
the act of state doctrine in a federal court action based on
diversity of citizenship to be a question of federal law,
reasoning that
• . . an issue concerned with a basic
choice regarding the competence and func-
tion of the Judiciary and the National
Executive in ordering our relationships
with other members of the International
community must be treated exclusively as
an aspect of federal law.
Compare Henkin, "The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal
Courts," 64 Colum. L. Rev. 805 (1964), and Jessup, 'The Doc-
trine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins ApplTe- to international
Law," 33 Am. J. Int'l L. 740 (1939), with Edwards, 'The Erie
Doctrine in Foreign Affairs Cases," 42-N.Y.U. L. Rev. 674
(1967).
32. Prior to its enactment, a superficial reading of ex-
isting Title 28 of the United States Code could have led one
to believe that Congress had given the district courts juris-
diction over foreign sovereigns regardless of their claims to
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immunity. Title 28 provided that the district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of civil actions, where the amount
in controversy exceeds $10,000, between
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign
states or citizens or subjects thereof; and
(3) citizens of different States and
in which foreign states or citizens or sub-
jects thereof are additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The courts have held that Congress In
passing such legislation did not intend to supersede the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, however. See Berizzi Brothers
Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 576, ZW-S.Ct. 611, 70 L.Ed.
1088 (1926); The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216, 218, 41 S.Ct. 308, 65
L.Ed. 529 (1921). Section 2, paragraph (b), of the Interna-
tional Organizations Immunity Act, 59 Stat. 669, 22 U.S.C.
§ 288a(b) (1945), supports this interpretation. It provides:
International organizations, their property
and their assets, wherever located, and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same im-
munity from suit and every form of judi-
cial process as is enjoyed by foreign gov-
ernments, except to the extent that such
organizations may expressly waive their
immunity for the purpose of any proceed-
ing or by the terms of any contract.
32a. See note 287 infra.
33. 303 U.S. 68, 5- -S.Ct. 432, 82 L.Ed. 667 (1938).
34. See Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
§ 71 (1965TThereinafter cited as Restatement (Second)J. In
Compania Espanola de Navigacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar,
303 U.S. 68, 74, 58 S.Ct. 432, 82 L.Ed. 667 (1938), the Court
held proper a suggestion made by the British Ambassador
directly to the district court. The Court said that the for-
eign sovereign may assert its claim "either through diplomatic
channels or, if it chooses, as a claimant In the courts of the
United States." An earlier Supreme Court case, Ex arte Muir,
254 U.S. 522, 532, 41 S.Ct. 187, 65 L.Ed. 383 (192,haiid re-
cited the same options, but had said that use of official State
Department channels was the correct procedure, and in a case
decided the same year, the Court reversed a dismissal on sov-
ereign immunity grounds, in part because the claim had not
been made through the State Department. The Pesaro, 255 U.S.
216, 219, 41 S.Ct. 308, 65 L.Ed. 529 (1921). Before The
Navemar, several confused lower courts required that th claim
be made through the State Department. E.g., The Sao Vicente,
295 F. 829, 832 (3rd Cir. 1924); The Secundus, 15 F.2d 711,
712 (E.D.N.Y. 1926). Recent precedent in the Second Circuit
required that claims to immunity be madd through the State De-
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partment after the court had acquired jurisdiction over proper-
ty in an in rem proceeding. Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom
of Greece, Ministry of Commerce, Purchase Directorate, 326
F.2d 117, 118 (2d Cir. 1964), modified per curiam en banc, 360
F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1966); Puente v. Spanish National State, 116
F.2d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 627 (1941).
Accord, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Steckel, 134 So.2d 23, 24
-(- a. App. 1961).
35. 318 U.S. 578, 63 S.Ct. 793, 87 L.Ed. 1014 (1943).
36. 324 U.S. 30, 65 S.Ct. 530, 89 L.Ed. 729 (1945)."
37. The State Department would make a determination only
at the request of an authorized representative of the sovereign
government. It would not respond to requests from private
parties to announce its position with respect to a claim to
immunity which the foreign sovereign had not brought to the
Department's attention. Letter from Assistant Legal Adviser
Yingling to Leo M. Drachsler, January 15, 1962, 6 Whiteman,
pra note 9, at 691-92. The Department had also refused to
ta ction on a request by a foreign sovereign that could be
mooted by a favorable court ruling on a pending motion to
dismiss based on other grounds. Letter from Assistant Legal
Adviser Yingling to Benjamin A. Matthews, May 12, 1961, id.
38. Letter from the Office of the Legal Adviser,
February 9, 1970, In 64 Aim. J. Int'l L. 650 (1970). Informal
conferences with the parties prior to State Department deter-
minations of claims to immunity were initiated by Professor
Abram Chayes during his term of office as Legal Adviser from
1961 to 1964 (Letter from John A. Boyd, Attorney-Adviser, Of-
fice of the Legal Adviser, to the author, March lli 1975),
apparently in response to criticism of the Department's
earlier practice of deciding claims on the basis of ex parte
communication by the foreign sovereign. See, ej., Cardozo,
"Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court,"
67 Harv. L. Rev. 608 (1954).
39. Letter from the Legal Adviser, quoted in Spacil v.
Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 1974).
40. Ex e Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 63 S..Ct.
793, 87 L.E-. 101_4 (1943); Miller v. Ferrocarrill Del Pacifico
de Nicaragua, 137 Me. 251, 18 A.2d 688, 691-92 (1941); United
States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d 577, 580
(1944), aff'd on rehearing, 294 N.Y. 265, 62 N.E.2d 64 (1945);
Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420
Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864, 867, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 802 (1966).
See Restatement (Second) § 72-() (MT_3
41. Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446
F.2d 1198, 1199-1220 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985
(1971); Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. M.V. Ciudad
de ]a Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 1964); Rich v.
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Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 26 C4th Cir. 1961); Miller
v. Ferrocarrill Del Pacifico de Nicaragua, 137 Me. 251, 18
A.2d 688, 692 (1941).
42. Southeastern Leasing Corp. v. Stern Dragger Belo-
gorsk, 493 F.2d 1223, 1224 (1st Cir. 1974). See Lowenfeid,
suranote 3, at 416 n.160. But see Stephen v. Zivnostenska
Ban , National Corp., 15 A.D. TTT, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128, 138
(1961), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 781, 235 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962), in which
the court tried title to attached assets prior to entertain-
ing a claim to immunity despite a State Department suggestion.
43. The Janko (The Norsktank), 54 F. Supp. 240, 241
(E.D.N.Y. 1944).
44. isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446
F.2d 1198, 1200-01 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985
(1971); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710, 724
(E.D. Va.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
45. 324--U.S. 30, 65 S.Ct. 530, 89 L.Ed. 729 (1945).
46. Renchard v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc., 381 F. Supp.
382, 384 (D.D.C. 1974); Amkor Corp. v. Bank of Korea, 298
F. Supp. 143, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Accord, French v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 51, 1- -5Y.S.2d 433, 439,
242 N.E.2d 704 (1968).
47. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); Ocean Transport Co.
v. Government of the Republic of the Ivory Coast, 269 F.. Supp.
703, 705 (E.D. La. 1967); Gonzalez v. Industrial Bank (of
Cuba), 33 Misc. 2d 283, 227 N.Y.S.2d 456, 458 (Sup. Ct. 1961),
rev'd on other grounds, 16 A.D.2d 347t 228 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1962).
Cf. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356,
30-61, 75 S.Ct. 423, 99 L.Ed. 389 (1955).
48. In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping In-
dustry, 18T--F-T-'Supp. 298, 319-20 (D.D.C. 1960).
49. Hungarian People's Republic v. Cecil Associates, 118
F. Supp. 954, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The Department of State,
in response to an inquiry from the court, stated that it would
not recognize and allow immunity of the Hungarian Republic to
a counterclaim for damages brought by the lessor of its New
York consulate to an action initiated by Hungary to recover
its security deposit after the United States ordered its New
York consulate closed in retaliation for Hungary's detention
of four U.S. servicemen. The court, however, held that the
letter was not conclusive and denied immunity only to the ex-
tent of a set-off.
50. See Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503,
504 n.l (E.T.N.Y.), aff'd, 122 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1941); The
Maliakos, 41 F. Supp.-97-, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); The loannis P.
Goulandris, 40 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
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51. Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503,
505-06 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 122 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1941). If
the State Department's acceptance of facts were not strongly
worded, however, the Court might fail to recognize it as a
formal acceptance and may make an independent finding of
facts. The loannis P. Goulandris, 39 F. Supp. 632, 632-33
(S.D.N.Y.), modified, 40 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). If
later communications from the Department established that It
was the Department's vliew that immunity should be granted,
the court might treat the Department's decision as a formally
binding recognition of the claim. Sullivan v. State of Sao
Paulo, supra, 122 F.2d at 357.
52. See The Attualita, 238 F. 909, 910 (4th Cir. 1916).
But see note58 infra.
3-3. See, e.g., Companla Espanola de Navegaclon Maritima,
S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 71, 58 S.Ct. 432, 82 L.Ed.
667 (1938); Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. M.V.
Ciudad de )a Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1964).
54. The Pesaro, 227 F. 473, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). Cf.
National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 36-61,
75 S.Ct. 423, 99 L.Ed. 389 (1955).
55. Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. M.V. Ciudad
de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1964).
56. Eg., Heaney v. Government of Spain, 445 F.2d 501
(2d Cir. 197_-9); Anaconda Co. v. Corporacion del Cobre, 55
F.R.D. 16, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
57. In the absence of recognition of the
claimed immunity by the political
branch of the government, the courts
may decide for themselves whether all
the requisites of immunity exist. That
Is to say, it is for them to decide whe-
ther the vessel when seized was that of
a foreign government and was of a charac-
ter and operated under conditions en-
titling it to the immunity in conformity
to the principles accepted by the depart-
ment of the government charged with the
conduct of our foreign relations.
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-35, 65 S.Ct.
530, 89 L.Ed. 729 (1945).
58. The State Department recently ended its practice of
relaying claims for immunity to the courts without comment be-
cause the courts made inconsistent nferences from the prac-
tice. See Lowenfeld, "Claims Against Foreign States--A Pro-
posal fo-Reform of United States Law," 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 901,
911 n.30 (1969) thereinafter cited as Lowenfeld, "Claims"];
Bilder, 'The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department
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Lawyer and Foreign Affairs," 56 Am. J. Int'l L. 633, 675 n.92
(1962) [hereinafter cited as BilderF.
59. Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 532, 41 S.Ct. 187, 65
L.Ed. 383 -T9921. A consul of the foreign sovereign "is not
competent, merely by virtue of his office," to make the claim.
The Sao Vicente, 260 U.S. 151, 43 S.Ct. 15, 67 L.Ed. 179
(1922). Nor is the master of a libeled government ship com-
petent. The "Guy Djemal," 264 U.S. 90, 95, 44 S.Ct. 244, 68
L.Ed. 574 (1924). Nor is a government corporation. Kunglig
Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, 300 F. 891, 892-94
(S.D.N.Y. 1924), rev'd in part on other grounds, 20 F.2d 307
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 497 (1927). But cf. Loomis
v. Rogers, 254 F.2d9_F, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 928 (1959), in which the court held that, where there
is no question as to the ownership of attached property, a
formal suggestion of immunity by the foreign state is not re-
quired.
60. Compania Espanola de Navegaclon Maritima, S.A. v.
The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 75-76, 58 S.Ct. 432, 82 L.Ed. 667
(1938); Pan American Tankers Corp. v. Republic of Vietnam, 291
F. Supp. 49, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). But see Puente v. Spanish
National State, 116 F.2d 43, 45 (2d-Cir-.-1940), cert. dened,
314 U.S. 627 (1941), in which the court required the plaintiff
to establish a lack of immunity where the court had not yet
obtained jurisdiction over property sought to be attached in
In rem proceedings, and In re Grand Jury Investigation of the
Shipping Industry, 186 F.Supp. 298, 319-20 (D.D.C. 1960), in
which the court required the Justice Department, as prosecu-
tor, to prove facts showing a lack of immunity from subpoenas,
despite a State Department denial of immunity.
61. Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v.
The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 75-76, 58 S.Ct. 432, 82 L.Ed. 667
(1938); Pan American Tankers Corp. v. Republic of Vietnam, 291
F. Supp. 49, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); The Ljubica Matkovic, 49
F. Supp. 936, 939-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); The loannis P. Goulandris,
39 F. Supp. 632, 633 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 40 F. Supp. 924
(S.D.N.Y. 1941). The suggestion itself was not considered
prima facie evidence of the facts represented, Ex parte Muir,
254 U.S. 522, 532, 41 S. Ct. 187, 65 L.Ed. 383 TTT-,unless
in the form of a sworn affidavit by one with knowledge, The
Frederick, 43 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
62. Sec. 4(a), 90 Stat. 2892, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
63. Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives from Richard G. Kleindienst, Attorney General, and
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, January 16, 1973, in
"Hearing," supra note 4, at 34; see also Report, supra note 4,
at 45.
63a. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
64. Sec. 4(a), 90 Stat. 2892, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-05, 1607,
[VOL.3
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
1609-11 (1976). Newly enacted 28 U.S.C. H 1604 and 1609 es-
tablish, as a general rule, immunity from suit and immunity
from attachment and execution, respectively, Newly enacted
28 U.S.C. §§ 1605 and 1610 establish exceptions to the general
rule.65. "Hearing," supra note 4, at 40.
65-1. Report, supra note 4, at 17.
65a. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 enacts
a new section of Title 28 creating original jurisdiction in
the federal district courts to hear actions against foreign
states and amends the section creating diversity jurisdiction
to exclude such actions. Secs. 2 and 3, 90 Stat. 2891, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330 and 1332(a) (1976). The new jurisdictional sec-
tion reads, in part, as follows:
(a) The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil
action against a foreign state as defined
in section 1603(a) of this title [see note
177 infra] as to any claim for relief in
personam with respect to which the foreign
state Is not entitled to immunity either
under sections 1605-1907 of this title or
under any applicable international agree-
ment.
28 U.S.C. § 1330.
65b. F.R. Civ. P. Rule 8(a); McNutt v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135
(1936); 1 Moore's Federal Practice '0.60[4] at 609. Congress
has power to alter this allocation of the burden of proving
statutory jurisdictional facts, but not facts establishing
Article III jurisdiction. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; Sheldon
v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850); Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). Be-
cause any suit brought by an American citizen against a for-
eign state, subdivision or instrumentality is within the
Article III jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, Congress
has power to impose the burden of proving immunity even in
actions brought under newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1330. How-
ever, notwithstanding the House Judiciary Committee's inter-
pretation of the legislation, Congress has not clearly done
so. See Report, supra note 4, at 17.
65c. F.R. Civ. P. Rule 12(h)(3); Mansfield, Coldwater &
Lake, Michigan Ry v. Swan, Ill U.S. 379, 4 S.Ct. 510, 28 L.Ed.
462 (1884); Louisville & Nashville Ry v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149,
29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908).
65d. 90 Stat. 2891, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2), (3)
and (4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602 et seq. (1976). The legisla-
tion is effective 90 days after enactment. See note 4 supra.
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66. In the letter of transmission accompanying the ad-
ministration's draft of an earlier version of the bill
enacted as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Secre-
tary of State Rogers noted the importance of "assuring that
the law and practice of this and other countries conform with
international law" and revealed that "[i]n the process of as-
certaining and applying the law, both the Department and the
courts rely on precedents and trends of decision in foreign
as well as United States courts." Letter from Attorney Gen-
eral Kleindienst and Secretary of State Rogers to the Speaker
of the House, January 16, 1973, In "Hearing," supra note 4, at
33-35. On other occasions the Department has made more expli-
cit its reliance on international law. See text accompanying
note 132 infra.
67. Since The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S.Ct.
290, 44 L.Ed. 320 (1900), It has been firmly established that
"[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it
are duly presented for their determination." See also
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73, 61 S.Ct. 924, 85
L.Ed. 1193, rehearing denied, 313 U.S. 599 (1941); District of
Columbia v. International Distributing Corporation, 331 F.2d
817, 820, 118 U.S. App. D.C. 71 (1964); Dickinson, "The Law of
Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States," 101
U. Pa. L. Rev. 26, 792 (1952). International law Is enforce-
able in mican courts whether based on treaty or custom.
See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; art. VI, cl. 2 (treaties);
The Paquete Habana, supra (customary law). It Is equally bind-
Ing on state courts. See Skiriotes v. Florida, supra, 313 U.S.
at 72-73 ("International law is a part of our law and as such
Is the law of all States of the Union."); Republic of Argentina
v. City of New York, 25 N.Y.2d 252, 250 N.E.2d 698, 303 N.Y.S.
2d 644, 647-48 (1969) (customary international law prohibits
real property taxes on consulate); Note, "Federal Common Law
and Article III: A Jurisdictional Approach to Erie," 74 Yale
L. J. 325, 335-37 (1964). It is well established that Con-
gress can enact legislation that is expressly contrary to inter-
national law, yet binding upon the courts, The Cherokee Tobacco,
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620-21, 20 L.Ed. 227 (1870); The Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 5 S.Ct. 247, 28 L.Ed. 798 (1884);
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 9 S.Ct. 623, 32 L.Ed.
1068 (1889); Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1959),
though by an ancient doctrine of construction "an act of con-
gress ought never to be construed to violate the law of na-
tions if any other possible construction remains." The Charm-
ing Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 65, 118 (1.804); Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578, 73 S.Ct. 921, 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1953).
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It is open to debate, however, whether executive department
policy is superior in authority to international law when de-
partment policy has not been embodied in a bilateral execu-
tive agreement made pursuant to Congressional authority, see
Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 275 F.2d 472 (3rd
Cir. 1959), although the executive department's extensive
plenary powers in matters relating to foreign relations has
been recognized, see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 30T 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936). See
generll L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
221-22 (1t972).
67a. The codification makes its standards subject only
to international agreements signed by the United States be-
fore the codification's enactment:
Subject to existing International agree-
ments to which the United States is a party
at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign
state shall be Immune from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided in sections 1605 to
1607 of this chapter.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Sec. 4(a), 90 Stat.
2892, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
Subject to existing international agree-
ments to which the United States is a party
at the time of enactment of this Act the
property in the United States of a foreign
state shall be Immune from attachment [,]
arrest and execution except as provided in
sections 1610 and 1611 of this chapter.
Id., 28 U.S.C. § 1609. Limitation of the codification's defer-
ence to international agreements which the United States has
already joined seems to prevent it from being superseded by a
future international agreement executed by the Executive alone,
but not by a future treaty, since treaties and legislation are
of equal dignity, the later in time controlling. See note 67
supra. However, an executive agreement limiting a foreign
sovereign's immunity more than the act would be effective as
a waiver. See text at notes 200-04 Infra.
68. H.R. 3496, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 1 (1973).
69. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Sec. 4 (a),
90 Stat. 2892, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
70. Unless the State Department was the forum to which
the claim was being made, current State Department policy was
usually unknown to the decision-maker under prior law. The
State Department did not compile and promulgate its standards
of decision. Most of its ad hoc determinations were made
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without an accompanying statement of reasons. The Depart-
ment did not even keep a current, publicly available file of
its determinations. Therefore, when a court was called on
to apply State Department policy without the benefit of com-
munications from the Department, it looked to the few pub-
lished statements of Department policy and to whatever re-
ports of recent ad hoc determinations it could find. This
paper examines the same sources.
71. Earlier in this century, the State Department had
consistently opposed extending sovereign immunity to the com-
mercial acts of states. See United States v. Deutsche
Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1929);
The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 479-80 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). However,
when that issue was argued before the Supreme Court in Berizzi
Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 46 S.Ct. 611, 70
L.Ed. 1088 (1926) (see note 85 infra), the Justice Department,
which is responsible for defending actions against the United
States in foreign countries, disagreed with the State Depart-
ment position and refused to transmit State Department views
to the Court. See 2 Hackworth, Digest of International Law
430 (1941); LowenITeld, "Claims," supra note 56, at 904 (1969);
Note, "The Statutory Proposal to Regulate the Jurisdictional
Immunities of Foreign States," 6 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 549,
554 n.16 (1973). After Berizzi Brothers, perhaps out of
deference to the Court, the Department made suggestions of
immunity for commercial activities. See Cardozo, "Judicial
Deference to State Department Suggesti-ons: Recognition of
Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper?," 48 Cornell L. Q. 461,
472 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Cardozo]. The decision in
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 65 S.Ct. 530, 89
L.Ed. 729 (1945) (see text accompanying notes 24 and 25 supra),
and the growth of state trading activities and world trade in
general gave the Department occasion to re-evaluate its posi-
ti on.
72. 26 Dept. State Bull. 984 (1952).
73. Id.
74. S-_e Ocean Transport Co. v. Government of the Repub-
lic of the Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703, 704 n.1 (E.D. La.
1967); Amkor Corp. v. Bank of Korea, 298 F. Supp. 143, 144
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). In Amkor the Bank of Korea, an instrumental-
ity of the Republic of Korea acting on its behalf, had solicited
and accepted a bid by the plaintiff to sell machinery and equip-
ment to a private corporation for use in a caustic soda plant.
The sale was solicited pursuant to an agreement between the
Republic of Korea and the United States. When the agreement
was cancelled by the Director of the International Cooperation
Administration, the buyer repudiated the contract. The plain-
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tiff brought suit against the Bank of Korea. In denying the
Korean Ambassador's request for State Department recognition
and allowance of the Bank's claim to immunity, the Department
discussed the restrictive theory:
In considering requests for suggestions
of sovereign immunity, the Department of
State applies the "restrictive theory" of
sovereign immunity as announced in the Tate
letter of May 19, 1952. Under that theory
the immunity of the sovereign is suggested
with respect to governmental or public acts
of a State but not with regard to private
or commercial acts.
The Republic of Korea has urged that
the Bank of Korea, as a governmentally au-
thorized agent acting without profit to it-
self on behalf of the Republic of Korea pur-
suant to an agreement between the Government
of the United States and the Republic of
Korea, was engaged in public acts within
the meaning of the Tate letter and is there-
fore immune from suit.
The Department of State regrets that it
cannot agree with this conclusion. The es-
sence of the transaction, as alleged, is a
simple contract for the purchase of commer-
cial articles on behalf of a commercial en-
terprise. The fact that the Bank of Korea
was acting pursuant to an agreement between
the Government of the United States and the
Government of the Republic of Korea, or that
it is an official arm of the Republic of
Korea, does not alter the commercial nature
of the transaction. The policy expressed in
the Tate letter focuses on the nature of the
transaction and not upon the character of
the government agency involved or upon its
reasons for engaging in a transaction. The
allegation that this agency has undertaken
a commercial activity is dispositive. The
Department of State, therefore, finds it
necessary to decline the request of the Gov--
ernment of the Republic of Korea that a sug-
gestion of sovereign immunity be made.
Id. at 144.
75. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping
Industry, T7 F. Supp. 298, 318 (D.D.C. 1960).
76. See Renchard v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc., 381
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F. Supp. 382 (D.D.C. 1974) (damage to neighboring property
inflicted during construction of the Brazilian Embassy);
Hungarian People's Republic v. Cecil Associates, 118 F. Supp.
954 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (failure to pay rent for leased consulate
after the United States ordered closing of consulate).
.77. See Mirabella v. Banco Industrial de la Republica
Argentina, 3 Misc. 2d 128, 237 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
78. See Amkor Corp. v. Bank of Korea, 298 F. Supp. 143
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (solicitation and acceptance of commercial
bids for private enterprise pursuant to an international de-
velopment agreement).
79. See French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46,
51, 242 N--.'d 701, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 439 (1968) (failure to
make payments in dollars pursuant to an investment contract
after the Cuban government Imposed foreign exchange controls
forbidding the exportation of dollars).
80. See Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, National Corp.,
15 A.D.2d ITI, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1961), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 781,
235 N.Y.S. 2d 1 (1962) (refusal of nationalized bank to pay
depositors).
81. Compare Ocean Transport Co. v. Government of the Re-
public of the Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1967);
Petrol Shipping Corporation v. Kingdom of Greece, Ministry of
Commerce, Purchase Directorate, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1966);
and New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Co. v. Republic of Korea,
132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), with Isbrandtsen Tankers,
Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.--198 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
In Ocean Transport the Ivory Coast engaged the plain-
tiff to sail a tuna and sardine fishing vessel, purchased from
the United States with A.I.D. funds to serve as a training
ship for Ivory Coast fishermen, from Louisiana to the Ivory
Coast, guaranteeing the vessel's seaworthiness and agreeing to
pay the plaintiff $215 per day for delay. When the plaintiff
had to put in to Key West because of the ship's unseaworthi-
ness, it sued on its contract. In Petrol Ship ing an agency
of the Greek government chartered the plaintiff's ship to
transport grain purchased from the United States government
from Texas to Piraeus. At Piraeus, the agency designated an
unsafe birth and the ship sustained hull damage. In New York
and Cuba Mail Steamship Co. Korea had chartered plaintiff's
vessel to transport rice to Pusan for free distribution to
civilians and soldiers during the Korean War. At Pusan, the
plaintiff's vessel sustained damage in a collision with one of
Korea's lighters. In all three cases, the State Department de-
clined to recognize the defendant's claim to immunity, ruling
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that the activities in question were private acts.
In Isbrandtsen Tankers India chartered the plaintiff's
vessels to transport grain from the United States to Calcutta.
The Indian government scheduled so many arrivals at the same
time that the lightening vessels had to wait for some time In
the Bay of Bengal before proceeding up the Hooghly River to
their destination. The plaintiff filed an action for demur-
rage. As to this charge, the Department recognized India's
claim to immunity.
82. The classic case is not entirely academic. In
Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co., 250 F. 341 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 663 (1918), the issue was whe-
ther Rumania was immune from a counterclaim for breach of a
contract to purchase shoes for its army.
83. Prior to the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976, the State Department seemed to view such
activities as private acts. See note 30 supra.
84. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
85-. A Supreme Court case to the contrary, Berizzi
Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 46 S.Ct. 611, 70
L.Ed. 1088 (1926), has never been formally overruled, however.
In that case, the issue was whether a vessel owned and oper-
ated by the Italian government for the carriage of merchandise
for hire was immune from the admiralty jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts to the same extent as a warship. The opinion in
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 3
L.Ed. 287 (1812), had expressly reserved decision on whether
"the private property of the person who happens to be a
prince" is immune from suit. Before Berizzi Brothers, the
question was "an open one and of uncertain solution." Ex parte
Hussein Lutfi Bey, 256 U.S. 616, 619, 41 S.Ct. 609, 65 L.Ed.
1122 (1921). Compare The Gul Djemal, 296 F. 567 (S.D.N.Y.
1922), aff'd, 64 U.S. 90, 44 S.Ct. 244, 68 L.Ed. 574 (1924),
and The Pesaro, 277 F. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), with The Carlo
Poma, 259 F. 369 (2d Cir. 1919), vacated, 255 U.S. 219 (1921);
The Maipo, 252 F. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); and The Pampa, 245 F.
137 (E.D.N.Y. 1917). Berizzi Brothers settled the question in
favor of immunity. The Court stated:
We think the principles are applicable alike
to all ships held and used by a government for
a public purpose, and that when, for the pur-
pose of advancing the trade of Its people or
providing revenue for its treasury, a govern-
ment acquires, mans and operates ships in the
carrying trade, they are public ships in the
same sense that warships are. We know of no
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international usage which regards the main-
tenance and advancement of the economic
welfare of a people in a time of peace as
any less a public purpose than the main-
tenance and training of a naval force.
Supra, 271 U.S. at 574.
Although Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30,
65 S.Ct. 530, 89 L.Ed. 729 (1945) (see pp. 22-24 supra), did
not formally overrule Berizzi Brothers, its reasonTing, when
added to the State Department's adoption of the restrictive
theory, made Berizzi Brothers no longer good law. Lower
courts have expressly so held. Flota Maritima Browning de
Cuba, S.A. v. M.V. Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 624
n.lO (4th Cir. 1964); Renchard v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc.,
38 F. Supp. 382, 384 (D.D.C. 1974); Pacific Molasses Co. v.
Comite de Ventas de Mieles de ]a Republica Domlnicana, 30
Misc. 2d 560, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1019 (Sup. Ct. 1961). In
National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 360-61,
75 S.Ct. 423, 99 L.Ed. 389 (1955), the court mentioned with-
out disapproval the State Department's restrictive theory In
support of its decision:
More immediately touching the evolution of
legal doctrine regarding a foreign sover-
eign's immunity is the restrictive theory
that our State Department has taken toward
the claim of such immunity. As the re-
sponsible agency for the conduct of foreign
affairs, the State Department Is the normal
means for suggesting to the courts that a
sovereign be granted immunity from a par-
ticular suit. . . . Its failure or refusal
to suggest such immunity has been accorded
great weight by this Court.
. . . And this for the reason that a major
consideration for the role enunciated in
The Schooner Exchange is the embarrassing
consequences which judicial rejection of a
claim of sovereign immunity may have on
diplomatic relations. Recently the State
Department has pronounced broadly against
recognizing sovereign immunity for the com-
mercial operations of a foreign government,
26 Dept. State Bull. 984 (1952), despite the
fact that this Court thirty years earlier
rejected the weighty opinion of Judge Mack
in The Pesaro, 277 F. 473 (see, also, his
-opinion in The Gloria, 286 F. 188), for dif-
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ferentiating between commercial and war
vessels of governments. Berizzi Bros.
Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562.
Subsequently, the Court denied a petition for certiorari in
Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965), a case which declined for-
eign state immunity on the basis of the restrictive theory.
But see the remarks of Justices Douglas and Black, dissenting
from dismissal of an appeal, in lannou v. New York, 371 U.S.
30, 31-32, 83 S.Ct. 6, 9 L.Ed. 2d 5 (1962):
[A] foreign country is immune from suit
for injuries caused in its commercial
transactions (Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The
Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562), even though this
result is not required by international
law (Restatement, Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, proposed official
draft, 1962, § 72). But, if the Executive
Department of the Federal Government indi-
cates its views on whether immunity should
be allowed, those views will control.
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30.
86. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). See Restatement
(SecondT-F69 (1965), which requires that the commercial activ-
ity occur outside the foreign sovereign's territory,however.
87. 324 U.S. 30, 65 S.Ct. 530, 89 L.Ed. 729 (1945).
88.. E.g., Heaney v. Government of Spain, 445 F.2d 501,
503 (2d Cir. 1971); Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 376
F. Supp. 1281, 1283-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); American Hawaiian Ven-
tures, Inc. v. M.V.J. Latuharhary, 257 F. Supp. 622, 626
(D.N.J. 1966).
89. Amkor Corp. v. Bank of Korea, 298 F. Supp. 143
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (solicitation and acceptance of commercial
bids for private enterprise pursuant to an international de-
velopment agreement); Pan American Tankers Corp. v. Republic
of Vietnam, 291 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (acceptance of
bids, execution of bonds and negotiations with sellers in order
to supervise expenditures of foreign currency on behalf of the
government).
90. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (charter of ship to trans-
port surplus wheat from the United States to Spanish ports, re-
sulting in delay and hull damage).
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91. ADM Milling Co. v. Republic of Bolivia, No. 75-946
(D.D.C. 1975), in 14 Int'l Legal Materials 1279 (1975) (con-
tract to sell wheat to Bo ivian ministry ; Three Stars Trading
Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 32 Misc. 2d 4, 222 NY.S.2d 675 (Sup.
Ct. 1961) (sale by Cuban Department of Fisheries of frozen
shrimp); Pacific Molasses Co, v. Comite de Ventas de Mieles de
la Republica Dominicana, 30 Misc. 2d 560, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1018
(Sup. Ct. 1961) (sale by business agency of Dominican Repub-
lican of molasses).
92. Lan-Chile Airlines, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 296 So.2d 498
(Fla. App. 1974), cert. denied, 310 So.2d 305 (1975) (beating
of plaintiff by Chilean government airline's agents in airport
lounge).
93. Republic of Iraq v. First National City Trust Co.,
207 F. Supp. 588, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), appeal dismissed, 313
F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1963).
94. American Hawaiian Ventures, Inc.. v. M.V.J. Latu-
harhary, 257 F. Supp. 622 (D.N.J. 1966) (confiscation of rub-
ber plantations by the Republic of Indonesia).
95. Compare Ocean Transport v. Government of the Repub-
lic of the Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1967) (con-
tract to transport a training vessel purchased with A.I.D.
funds is private act); Harris & Co. Advertising, Inc. v. Re-
public of Cuba, 127 So.2d 687 (Fla. App. 1961) (contract to
promote Cuban tourism through advertising campaign Is private
act); and Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. International Sales
Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 299, 204 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1960),
aff'd, 17 A.D.2d 927, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1962) (contract to
purchase mutton for use by the Turkish army); with Heaney v.
Government of Spain, 445 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 197T)Tcontract
with American lawyer to publicize British violation of the
human rights of Irish citizens in attempt to support the de-
fendant's claim to Gibraltar is a public act); Aerotrade, Inc.
v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (con-
tract for purchase of military equipment is a public act); and
In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the
Production, Transportation, Refining & Distribution of Petro-
leum, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952) (formation and operation of
a private oil company for the purpose of guaranteeing the oil
supply of the British fleet is a public act).
96. See text at notes 113 and 114 infra.
97. See note 67 supra.
98. Con-vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, adopted April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. See note 108 infra.
99. See note 67a supra.
99a. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Sec. 4(a),
90 Stat. 2892, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976)."
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100. Id., 28 U.S.C. § 1603. Under the act, if an activ-
ity is customarily conducted for profit its commercial nature
can "readily be assumed," while a single contract would be a
"particular commercial transaction" if of the same character
as a contract which might be made by a private person."
Report, supra note 4, at 16. This test is easier to state
than to apply, however. For example, according to the House
Judiciary Committee, a foreign state's contract to purchase
arms for its army is a commercial act because the public pur-
pose of that act is irrelevant, but the employment of govern-
ment personnel by the foreign state is not a commercial act
(unless the personnel are American or third country nationals
employed in the United States). Id. Because of the test's
subtleties, pre-codification precedent will be crucial in
evaluating the commercial or noncommercial nature of a foreign
state's acts.
The codification, as enacted, provides an additional
relevant definition:
For the purposes of this chapter a --
(e) A "commercial activity carried on in the
United States by a foreign state" means commer-
cial activity carried on by such state and hav-
ing substantial contact with the United States.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Sec. 4(a), 90 Stat.
2892, 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976). The House Judiciary Committee
has stated that the definition "is intended to reflect a de-
gree of contact beyond that occasioned simply by U.S. citizen-
ship or U.S. residence of the plaintiff." Report, supra note
4, at 17.
101. See Restatement (Second) §§ 7(2), 10 and 20 (1965);
but see note 131 infra.
T -2. S. Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activ-
ities in International Law 12, 19 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Sucharitkul]; J. Sweeney, The International Law of Sovereign
Immunity 20 (19-63') hereinafter cited as Sweeney]. The latter
work is a general survey of the international law of foreign
state immunity commissioned by the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the U.S. Department of State. In describing cur-
rent international law, this author has relied upon Professor
Sweeney's work for pre-1963 developments and updated it with
independent research.
103. Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice directs the I.C.J. to look to the following
sources in ascertaining international law:
a. international conventions, whether
general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting
states;
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b. international custom, as evidence
of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article
59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists
of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of
l aw.
59 Stat. 1055, T.I.A.S. No. 993. Justice Gray in The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S.Ct. 290, 44 L.Ed. 320 (1900),
suggested a similar list of sources for the search for inter-
national law. This paper examines the same sources. The con-
stant object of the examination is to determine what shared
expectations of authority are held by the effective elites of
the world community on the topic of foreign state immunity.
104. Sweeney, s note 102, at 26-41; Collision with
Foreign Government-Owned Motor Car (Austria) Case, 84 J.B. 43,
40 I.L.R. 73 (Austria, Sup. Ct. 1961) (driving car with mall
to American Embassy is not sovereign act; no Immunity);
Societe Anonyme "Dhlellemes et Masurel" v. Banque Centrale de
]a Republique de Turquie, 45 I.L.R. 85 (Belgium, Brussels Ct.
of App. 1963) (contract of state bank to pay seller of goads
to Turkish importer not sovereign act; no immunity); Chaussois
v. La Tabacoop de Bone, 13 A.F.D.1. 848 (1967), 47 Int'l L.
Rep. 152 (France, Paris Ct. of App. 1966) (employment con-
tract of state-owned agricultural cooperative Is not public
act; no immunity); Societe Bauer-Marchal et Cie v. Gouvernement
Turc, 69 R.G.D.I.P. 1161 (1965], 47 I.L.R. 155 (France, Rouen
Ct. of App. 1965) (state's guarantee of city's bonds Is
private act; no immunity); Claim against the Empire of Iran
Case, 16 Ent. Bund. 27, 45 I.L.R. 57 (Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Fed. Const. Ct. 1963) (execution of concession agreement
by state oil company is private act; no immunity); Societe
Europeene D'Etudes et D'Enterprises v. Yugoslovia (Netherlands,
High Council 1973), in 14 Int'l Legal Materials 71 (1975) (exe-
cution of contract for construction of railroad is private act;
no immunity from enforcement of international arbitration
award); Republic Arabe Unie c. Dame X, 86 Ent. Schwelz. Bund.
23 (Switzerland, Sup. Ct. 1960), in 55 Am. J. Int'l L. 167
(1961) (lease of house for diplomatic purpose is private act;
no immunity). Sucharitkul, supra note 102, at 88 adds the
countries of Scandanavia to this group on the basis of scanty
evidence.
105. Sweeney, su ranote 102, at 38-41; United Arab Re-
public v. Mirza Ali,11962] A.I.R. 389 (Calcutta High Ct., App.
Div. 1962), in 2 Int'l Legal Materials 646 (1962), 57 Am. J.
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Int'l L. 939 (1963). But cf. Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba
S.A. v. The Steamship 5anadian Conqueror, [1962] Can. Sup. Ct.
598, 34 D.L.R.2d 628, 42 I.L.R. 125 (1962) (expressing doubt
-as to absolute view); Sucharitkul, supra note 102, at 132,
181 (law of England is unsettled). Law of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics No. 526, supra note 9, enacts the absolute
rule of immunity conditioned on-reciprocal treatment by the
foreign state. The Eastern European Communist nations are ex-
pected to follow a similar rule, see, e.g., French Consulate
in Cracow Case, 3 O.S.P. 305, 26 I.L.R. 178 (Poland, Sup. Ct.
1958), though pre-Communist judicial authority in some of
these nations followed the restrictive view of immunity, see
Sucharitkul, supra note 102, at 148-50. It is instructive to
note that the nations following the absolute rule are all
present or former members of the British Commonwealth, follow-
ing English case law, or Communist nations actively engaged in
state trading.
106. See Sweeney, supra note 102, at 40-41; Nashashlbi
v. Consul-General of France in Jerusalem, 26 I.L.R. 190
(Jordan, Sup. Ct. of Cass. 1958); Ramiandrisoa v. French State,
40 I.L.R. 81 (Madagascar, Sup. Ct. 1965).
107. Adopted Apr. 10, 1926, 176 L.N.T.S. 199, 3 Hudson,
International Legislation 1837. The Convention has been signed
and ratified by Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Estonia,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Sweden, Switzerland and
Turkey. Poland has since denounced the Convention. Article 1
of the Convention subjects State-owned commercial vessels to
the prescriptions of other nations:
Seagoing vessels owned and operated by
States, cargoes owned by them, and cargoes
and passengers carried on Government ves-
sels, and the States owning or operating
such vessels, or owning such cargoes, are
subject In respect of claims relating to
the operation of such vessels or the car-
riage of such cargoes to the same rules of
liability and to the same obligation as
those applicable to private vessels, car-
goes and equipment.
176 L.N.T.S. at 205. Article 2 subjects such states, vessels
and cargoes to the jurisdiction of foreign courts for the pur-
pose of applying these prescriptions:
For the enforcement of such liabilities
and obligations there shall be the same rules
concerning the juri.sdiction of tribunals, the
same legal actions, and the same procedure as
in the case of privately owned merchant ves-
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sels and cargoes and of their owners.
Id. at 206. Article 3 of the Convention exempted from Arti-
ces I and 2 and expressly extended jurisdictional immunity to
ships of war, Government yachts, patrol
vessels, hospital ships, auxiliary ves-
sels, supply ships, and other craft owned
or operated by the State, and used at the
time a cause of action arises exclusively
on Governmental and non-commercial service.
Id. at 207.
108. Adopted Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 16o6, T.I.A.S. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. The Convention is adhered to by forty-
four states. U.S. Department of State, Treaties in Force 373
(1975). Article 20 of the Convention provides, in part:
2. The coastal State may not levy
execution against or arrest the ship for
the purpose of any civil proceedings, save
only in respect of obligations or liabili-
ties assumed or incurred by the ship it-
self in the course or for the purpose of
its voyage through the waters of the
coastal State.
3. The provisions of the previous
paragraph are without prejudice to the
eight of the coastal State, in accordance
with its laws, to levy execution against
or to arrest, for the purpose of any
civil proceedings, a foreign ship lying
in the territorial sea, or passing through
the territorial sea after leaving internal
waters.
Article 21 provides that Article 20 "shall also apply to gov-
ernment ships operated for commercial purposes." Article 22
explains the extent to which the Convention's provisions af-
fect the immunity of state vessels:
1. The rules contained In subsection
A [relating to the right of innocent passage
of all ships] and in article 18 [on charges]
shall apply to government ships operated for
non-commercial purposes.
2. With such exceptions as are contained
in the provisions referred to in the pre-
ceding paragraph, nothing in these articles
affects the immunities which such ships enjoy
under these articles or other rules of inter-
national law.
The effect of Articles 22 and 21 is to .subject ships in com-
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mercial use to the provisions of Article 20 regardless of
their state ownership.
109. Opened for signature November 29, 1969, in 64 Am.
J. Int'l L. 481 (97-0). Article IX of the Convention pro-
vides for damage actions in the forums of injured nations
against polluters of its territorial seas. Article XI pro-
vi des:
1. The provisions of this Convention
shall not apply to warships or other ships
owned or operated by a state and used, for
the time being, only on government non-
commercial service.
2. With respect to ships owned by a
Contracting State and used for commercial
purposes, each state shall be subject to
suit in the jurisdictions set forth in
Article IX and shall waive all defences
based on its status as a sovereign state.
110. Opened for signature May 16, 1972, Council of
Europe, European Treaty Series No. 74, in 11 Int'l Legal
Materials 470 (1972), 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 932 (1972). The
Convention has been signed by Austria, Belgium, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom.
111. The relevant articles provide as follows:
ARTICLE 4
1. Subject to the provisions of Article
5, a Contracting State cannot claim immunity
from the jurisdiction of the courts of another
Contracting State if the proceedings relate to
an obligation of the State, which, by virtue
of a contract falls to be discharged in the
territory of the State of the forum.
2. Paragraph I shall not apply:
(a) in the case of a contract con-
cluded between States;
(b) if the parties to the contract
have otherwise agreed in writing;
(c) if the State is party to a con-
tract concluded on its territory and the ob-
ligation of the State is governed by its ad-
ministrative law.
ARTICLE 5
1. A Contracting State cannot claim
immunity from the jurisdiction of a court
of another Contracting State if the pro-
ceedings relate to a contract of employment
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between the State and an individual where
the work has to be performed on the terri-
tory of the State of the forum.
2. Paragraph I shall not apply where:
(a) the individual Is a national
of the employing State at the time when the
proceedings are brought;
(b) at the time when the contract
was entered into the individual was neither
a national of the State of the forum nor
habitually resident in that State; or
(c) the parties to the contract have
otherwise agreed in writing, unless, in ac-
cordance with the law of the State of the
forum, the courts of that State have exclusive
jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter.
3. Where the work is done for an office,
agency or other establishment referred to in
Article 7, paragraphs 2(a) and (b) of the
present Article apply only if, at the time
the contract was entered into, the individual
had his habitual residence in the Contracting
State which employs him.
ARTICLE 6
1. A Contracting State cannot claim im-
munity from the jurisdiction of a court of
another Contracting State if it participates
with one or more private persons in a company,
association or other legal entity having its
seat, registered office or principal place
of business on the territory of the State of
the forum, and the proceedings concern the re-
lationship, in matters arising out of that
participation, between the State on the one
hand and the entity or any other participant
on the other hand.
2. Paragraph I shall not apply if it Is
otherwise agreed in writing.
ARTICLE 7
1. A Contracting State cannot claim im-
munity from the jurisdiction of a court of
another Contracting State if it has on the
territory of the State of the forum an office,
agency or other establishment through which it
engages, in the same manner as a private per-
son, in an industrial, commercial or financial
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activity, and the proceedings relate to
that activity of the office, agency or
establishment.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if all
the parties to the dispute are States, or
if the parties have otherwise agreed in
writing.
ARTICLE 8
A Contracting State cannot claim im-
munity from the jurisdiction of a court of
another Contracting State if the proceedings
relate:
(a) to a patent, industrial de-
sign, trade-mark, service mark or other
similar right which, in the State of the
forum, has been applied for, registered
or deposited or is otherwise protected,
and in respect of which the State is the
applicant or owner;
(b) to an alleged infringement
by it, in the territory of the State of the
forum, of s.uch a right belonging to a third
person and protected in that State;
(c) to an alleged infringement
by it, in the territory of the State of the
forum, of copyright belonging to a third
person and protected in- that State;
(d) to the right to use a trade
name in the State of the forum.
In addition, a signatory can, by making notification, exercise
jurisdiction for acta jure gestionis not included within the
above quoted articles if the act of the foreign state has a
substantial relationship to the forum state. See'Article 24
and Annex.
112. Sucharitkul, supra note 102, at 151-52; Note, "Sov-
ereign Immunity--Waiver and Execution: Arguments From Con-
tinental Jurisprudence," 74 Yale L. J. 887, 913 (1964) [herein-
after cited as Note].
113. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with
the Italian Republic, Feb. 2, 1948, art. XXIV, para. 6, 63
Stat. 2255 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1965; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with Uruguay, S. Exec. D., 81st Cong.,
2d Sess., art. XVIII, para. 5 (1950); Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with Ireland, Jan. 21, 1950, art. XX,
para. 3, 1 U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with Greece, Aug. 3, 1951, art. XIV,
para. 5, 5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057; Treaty of Friendship,
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Commerce and Navigation with Columbia, art. XVIII, para. 2,
S. Exec. M., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation with Israel, Aug. 23, 1951, art.
XVIII, para. 3, 5 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Denmark, art. XVIII,
para. 3, S. Exec. I., 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1951); Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Japan, April 2, 1953,
art. XVIII, para. 2, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863; Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Federal Re-
public of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, art. XVIII, para. 2, 7
U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation with Haiti, art. XVIII, para. 2, S. Exec. H.,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); Treaty of Amity, Economic Rela-
tions, and Consular Rights with Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, art. XI,
para. 4, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with Nicaragua, art. XVIII, para. 3,
S. Exec. G., 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation with the Republic of Korea,
Nov. 28, 1956, art. XVIII, para. 2, 8 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No.
3949; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with King-
dom of the Netherlands, Mar. 27, 1956, art. XVIII, para. 2, 8
U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942.
114. No enterprise of either High Contracting
Party, including corporations, associations
and government agencies and instrumentali-
ties, which is publicly owned or controlled
.shall, if it engages In commercial, manufac-
turing, processing, shipping or other busi-
ness activities within the territories of
the other High Contracting Party, claim or
enjoy, either for itself or for its property,
immunity therein from taxation, from suit, from
execution of judgment, or from any other li-
ability to which a privately owned and con-
trolled enterprise is subject therein.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Columbia,
art. XVIII, para. 2, S. Exec. M., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
In 1958, the State Department discontinued this treaty prac-
tice at the request of the Attorney General because It made
defense of suits against the United States abroad more diffi-
cult. Note, "The Statutory Proposal to Regulate the jurisdic-
tional Immunities of Foreign States," supra note 71, at 554
n.16. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with
Pakistan, Nov. 12, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. No. 4683,
which does not include a waiver of immunity.
115. Art. 6, 12. See generally Starr, "A New Legal
Framework for Trade Betweenthe United States and the Soviet
Union: the 1972 US-USSR Trade Agreement," 67 Am. J. Int'l L.
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63 (1973. The Agreement was subsequently repudiated by the
Soviet Union because of a Congressionally imposed American
reservation concerning freedom of emigration from the Soviet
Union.
116. See Sweeney, supra note 102, at 42; Sucharitkul,
supra note 102, at 152,
117. See Report, supra note 4, at 9; 42 Op. Att'y Gen.
No. 25, at _5, 8-9(19O;Memo from Department of State to
American Embassy, Manila, Sept. 15, 1961, in 6 Whiteman, supra
note 9, at 610; Sucharitkul, supra note 102, at 99 and 331;'
Schmitthoff, "The Claim of Sovereign Immunity in the Law of
International Trade," 7 Int'l & Comp. L. 1. 452 (1958) [here-
inafter cited as Schmitthoff.
118. "Harvard Research in International Law Relating to
the Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States," art.
11, in 26 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 451, 457 (1932).
119. Resolution on State Immunity, I.L.A. Rep. 45th
Conf. vii, viii (1953).
120. Resolution on Immunity of Foreign States from
Jurisdiction and Measures of Execution, Art. 5, May 30, 1954,
45-11 Annuaire 301, 302 (1954).
121. Resolution on Immunities of State-Owned Ships, 10
Int. A.B.A. Proc. 145, 146 (1957).
122. "Report on Rules Concerning the Immunity of State
Ships" (1958), in 6 Whiteman, supra note 9, at 630.
123. "Final Report of the Committee on Immunity of States
in respect of Commercial and other Transactions of a Private
Character" (1960), in 6 Whiteman, supra note 9, at 572-74.
124. See, e.g., I. Brownlie, Principles of Public Inter-
national Law-22"966) herei nafter cited as BrownlieJ whi ch
asserts that "[nleither the evidence of state practice nor the
arguments from principle justify the replacement of the wider
principle of immunity by some other principle." Rather there
is "a presumption that the immunity of a state from the local
jurisdiction stands except when there is a waiver." Soviet
scholars likewise assert that the principle pars in parem non
habet imperium, unrestricted by exceptions for commercial
activities, is "a fundamental principle of the international
ruTe of law." Lebedev, "Present Day Bourgeois Practice Re-
garding the Immunity of States from Foreign Jurisdiction," in
E. Collins, International Law in a Changing World 237, 237-38
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Collins]. See also the older
scholars listed in Sucharitkul, supra note 102, at 259-60.
125. See, e.__, I L Openheim, International Law 273-74
(2d ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955) Lhereinafter cited as Oppenheim];
J. Brierly, The Law of Nations 250-51 (6th ed. 1963) [herein-
after cited as BriflyJ; C. Amerasinghe, Studies in Interna-
tional Law 252 -(1969)[hereinafter cited as Amerasinghe];
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Sucharitkul, supra note 102, at 313. Lauterpacht asserts in
1 Oppenheim, supra, at 274, that, in view of state practice,
it is not certain whether--or to what ex-
tent--the question can be regarded as af-
firmatively regulated by International Law.
In particular, it is doubtful whether a
State would be incurring international re-
sponsibility as a result of its courts as-
suming jurisdiction--including that of
execution--over foreign States and their
property except in cases in which customary
International Law has, through uniform prac-
tice, crystallised into a generally or uni-
versally accepted rule, for instance, with
regard to diplomatic immunity and the im-
munity of Heads of State and of warships.
. . . [Tihe situation must be regarded as
governed, in particular cases, by the
Municipal Law of the country concerned.
126. See, e.g., D. O'Connell, - International Law 913
(1965) [hereinafter cited as O'ConnellJ; Collins, supra note
124, at 228; Sweeney, supra note 102, at 22. See also the
lists of scholars in Sucharitkul, spra note 102, at 265-66.
127. Some scholars question whether the existence of
treaties restrictive of Immunity support or subtract from the
view that international law permits the restrictive view of
Immunity. They believe the treaties could be evidence that
the signatories expect customary international law to pre-
scribe absolute immunity in the absence of a specific treaty
provision. See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 124, at 278. The
better view is that restrictive treaties help to establish a
custom restrictive of immunity. They are evidence that im-
munity from judicial process is relatively unimportant to the
signatory nations. Hence they create an expectation, even
among nonsignatory nations, that a signatory nation is not
likely to impose sanctions for its or other nations' subjection
to judicial process for commercial activities. Hence, they
support the restrictive view.
128. See cases cited in Sweeney, supra note 102, at 26-
38; Collision with Foreign Government-Owned Motor Car (Austria)
Case, 84 J.B. 43, 40 I.L.R. 73 (Austria, Sup: Ct. 1961) (court
looks to "the act itself . . . and not its motive or purpose"f;
driving mail to embassy is private act); Claim against the
Empire of Iran Case, 16 Ent. Bund. 27, 45 I.L.R. 57 (Fed. Rep.
Ger., Fed. Const. Ct. 1963), in 6 Whlteman, supra note 9, at
566-69 (characterization according to "the nature of the State
transaction or the resulting legal relationship, and not to
the motive or purpose"; execution of concession contract is
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private act); Societe Europeene D'Etudes et D'Enterprises v.
Yugoslovia (Neth., High Council 1973), in 14 Int'l Legal
Materials 71 (1975) (execution of agreement for construction
of railroad is private act regardless of its military or
strategic importance); Republic Arabe Unie c. Dame X, 86 Ent.
Schweiz. Bund. 23 (Switz., Sup. Ct. 1960) (lease of house for
diplomatic purposes is private act; nature of act, whether
capable of performance by private individual, is test). The
French and Italian courts apply domestic standards which do
not clearly embody either the "nature" or "purpose" test.
Compare Societe Transshipping v. Federation of Pakistan, [1966]
Bull. Civ. I 120, 47 Int'l L. Rep. 150 (Fr., Ct. of Cass. 1966)
(contract executed by army for construction of water distribu-
tion and drainage works is public act); Faure v. Italian State,
56 Rev. Crit. de Drolt Int'l Priv. 158 (1967); 45 I.L.R. 83
(Fr., Ct. of Cass. 1965) (guarantee of railroad's obligations
In reorganization is public act); Entreprise Perignon v.
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, 69 R.G.D.I.P. 532 (1965); I.L.R.
82 (Fr., Ct. of Cass. 1964) (execution of contract to build
housing for Marshall Plan officials is public act), and
Guggenheim v. State of Vietnam, 66 R.G.D.I.P. 654 (1962); 44
I.L.R. 74 (Fr., Ct. of Cass. 1961) (contract for supply of
military supplies is public act), with Societe Immobiliere des
Cites Fleuries Lafayette v. United -States of America, 42 I.L.R.
123, 89 Clunet 133 (Ct. App. Paris 1960) (U.S. guarantee of
servicemen's rents Is private act, though for public purpose);
Braden Copper Company v. Le Groupement D'Importation des
Metaux (Fr., Trib. Paris 1972), in 12 Int'l Legal Materials
187 (1973) (garnishment of third party's commercial debt per-
ml'tted In action for expropriation of copper mine), and
Societe Bauer-Marchal et Cie v. Gouvernement Turc, 69 R.G.D.I.P.
1161 (1965); 47 I.L.R. 155 (Fr., Rouen Ct. of App. 1963
(guarantee of city's bonds is private act); see also Hungarian
Papal Institute v. Hungarian Institute (Acad-my) in Rome, 44
Rivista di Dritto Internaz. 101 (1961), 40 I.L.R. 59 (It., Ct.
of Cass. United Chambers 1960) (exclusion of plaintiff from
library of cultural institute is public act); Pauer v. Hun-
garian People's Republic, 40 Rivista di Dritto Internaz. 248
(1957), [1957] I.L.R. 211 (It., Ct. of Cass. 1956) (national-
ization of bank is public act).
129. The conventions generally speak of commercial "pur-
poses," see notes 107-110 supra, but not uniformly.
130. See I 0ppenheim, supra note 125, at 274; O'Connell,
supra note 12, at -18; Amerasinghe, supra note 125, at
252; Collins, supra note 124, at 228.
131. In one sense the codification is Less restrictive
of immunity than international law. Newly enacted 28 U.S.C.
9 1605(2) denies immunity only for commercial acts connected
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in certain ways with the United States. See text at note 99a
supra. This condition is apparently designed to deny Immunity
only when the court has, aside from the sovereignty of the de-
fendant, jurisdiction to adjudicate under international law.
See note 101 supra. However, the wording fails to account for
other cases in which jurisdiction is permitted by established
practice or international agreement. See, e.g., Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, August 27, 1965, 1 U.S.T. 1270,
T.I.A.S. No. 6090. An earlier draft of the codification failed
to make provision for admiralty actions based on claims not
substantially affecting the United States, though consistent
with international law. American courts have in the past ex-
ercised admiralty jurisdiction In actions between aliens, de-
spite the absence of substantial effects on the United States
from the transaction sued upon. See H.R. 3496, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess., Sec. 1 (1973). As enacted, however, the codification
provides for-such actions if they are based on a commercial
activity of the foreign state. Foreign Sovereign Immunities.
Act of 1976, Sec. 4(a), 90 Stat. 2893, 28 U.S.C. S 1605(b)
(1976). (The present Legal Adviser may have been responsible.
for the change. See Leigh, "Sovereign Immunity--The Case of
the 'limlas,"' 68 W. J. Int'l L. 280, 287 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Leigh].) The codification's purpose In limiting the
commercial actions permitted against foreign states to those
affecting the United States--to prevent courts from exceeding
the jurisdiction permitted them by international law--would be
better achieved by permitting the courts to apply the settled
rule of statutory construction which avoids interpretation of
jurisdictional statutes contrary to International law whenever
possible. See notes 32 and 67 supra.
132. Letter from Legal Adviser Becker to Attorney Gen-
eral William Rogers, March 9, 1959, quoted in Stephen v.
Zivnostenska Banka, National Corp., 15 A.D.2d 111, 222 N.Y.S.2d
128, 133-34 (1961), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 781, 235 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962);
see also Letter from Department of State to Attorney General,
December 28, 1961, in 6 Whiteman, supra note 9, at 634-35;
Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192
N.Y.S.2d 469, 472 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Letter from Department of
State, Sept. 18, 1962, in 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 408 (1963).
133. See Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, National Corp.,
15 A.D.2d 11-1, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128, 134 (1961), affl'd, 12 N.Y.2d
781, 235 N.Y.S.2d I (196z).
. 134. See City of New Rochelle v. Republic of Ghana, 44
Misc. 2d 773-255 N.Y.S.2d 178, 180 (City Ct. 1964); Letter
from Legal Adviser Chayes to Attorney General Kennedy, Dec. 13,
1961, in 6 Whiteman, supra note 9, at 71-8, quoted in State ex
rel. National Institute of Agrarian Reform v. Dekle-, 137 So.2d
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581, 582 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 146 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1962)
(Department recognizes mm-'unit--7om execution of real proper-
ty apparently not used for a public purpose).
135. One court held that there is a "general interna-
tional understanding, recognized by civilized nations, that a
sovereign's person and property ought to be held free from
seizure or molestation at all peaceful times and under all
circumstances." Dexter & Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrel-
sen, 43 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
896 (1931), in which the Court held immune from execution to
satisfy a previously recorded judgment funds of the foreign
sovereign held in New York banks and a debt owed the sovereign
by a private shipping firm. But cf. S.T. Tringali Co. v. Tug
Pemex XV, 274 F. Supp. 227, 230 TS.D. Tex. 1967), in which the
court stated that commercial property of an instrumentality of
a foreign state is not immune from execution.
136. Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. Snobli 363
F.2d 733, 737 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 837 (1966),
an admiralty case holding that a waiver of immunity from at-
tachment by the making of a general appearance constitutes a
waiver of immunity from execution as well.
137. United States v. Harris and Company Advertising,
Inc., 149 So.2d 384, 385-86 (Fla. App. 1963).
138. Opened for signature August 27, 1965, 1 U.S.T. 1270,
T.I.A.S. No. 6090.
139. In Articles 53 and 54, the Convention provided that
signatories should give the same effect to arbitral awards made
under the Convention that they give to the judgments of their
own courts. But Article 55 preserved existing immunities of
foreign states from execution:
Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed
as derogating from the law in force in
any Contracting State relating to im-
munity of that State or any foreign State
from execution.
Congress's implementation of the Convention, Act of Aug. 11,
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-532, § 3, 80 Stat. 344, 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 1650a, equates awards with judgments of state courts:
(a) An award of an arbitral tribunal
rendered pursuant to Chapter IV of the con-
vention shall create a right arising under a
treaty of the United States, The pecuniary
obligations imposed by such an award shall
be enforced and shall be given the same full
faith and credit as if the award were a final
judgment of a court of general jurisdiction
of one of the several States.
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Under prior law, however, judgments of a state court were not
enforceable against a foreign state's property without its
consent. Moreover, the prevailing American view was that
waiver of immunity from judicial process, not initiated by
attachment of property, for a determination of legal rights
does not constitute a waiver of immunity from execution of a
resulting judgment. See note 192 infra. Thus, unless the
foreign state executed n express waiver of its immunity from
execution, either before or after the dispute had arisen, in-
ternational arbitral awards made under the Convention were
unenforceable in the United States under prior law. See Com-
ment, "A New Approach to United States Enforcement of Inter-
national Arbitration Awards," 1968 Duke L. J. 258, 277-78; cf.
W. Reisman, Nullity and Revision: The Review and Enforcement
of International Judgments and Awards 811-15 (1971); Reisman,
"The Enforcement of International Judgments," 63 Am. J. Int'l
L. 1, 11-12 (1969). The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
T976, Sec. 4(a), 90 Stat. 2892, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et se_. (1976),
modifies prior law in this regard. See text at notes 141-44
infra.
141. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Sec. 4(a),
90 Stat. 2897, 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b) (1976). The codification
provides for an additional category of assets absolutely im-
mune from execution. It includes funds designated for dis-
bursement to a foreign state and held by an international or-
ganization designated by the President pursuant to the Inter-
national Organizations Immunity Act, 59 Stat. 669, 22 U.S.C.
§ 288 (1945). Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Sec.
4(a), 90 Stat. 2897, 28 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (1976).
142. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Sec. 4(a),
90 Stat. 2895, 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976).
142a. What constitutes a "reasonable period of time" will
depend upon the internal procedures a foreign state must fol-
low to pay a judgment and representations by the state that it
is taking steps to satisfy the judgment, on the one hand, or
evidence that the state is attempting to remove assets from
the jurisdiction on the other hand. Report, supra note 4, at
30.
143. Id., 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a). The House Judiciary Com-
mittee interp-rets newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 16 10(a)(3) to per-
mit execution of a judgment establishing rights to property
taken in violation of international law only against the prop-
erty to which that judgment established rights or property ex-
changed for such property. That interpretation seems erroneous
and should not be followed, however, since a judgment establish-
ing rights in property may also grant in personam relief which
can be enforced against other commercial. property owned by the
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foreign state defendant. Thus, a corporation whose property
has been taken in violation of international law may bring an
action to claim ownership of some of the property brought in-
to the United States and to recover a monetary judgment
against the foreign state for the value of the remainder of
the property. See text accompanying notes 221-25 infra. A
resulting monetary judgment is enforceable against any of the
foreign state's commercially engaged property in the United
States. A judgment which establishes both rights in a be-
quest or realty and a monetary liability is similarly enforce-
able against any commercially engaged property of the foreign
state defendant located in the United States. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1610(a)(4).
144. Id., 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b). 28 U.S.C. § 1605(2) per-
mits actions-based on a foreign sovereign's commercial acts;
28 U.S.C. § 1605(3) permits actions to establish rights to
property, or property exchanged for such property, taken'in
violation of international law and present in the United
States; and 28 U.S.C. § 1605(5) permits actions to recover
damages for personal injury, death, or property damage caused
by a tortious act within the United States of the foreign sov-
ereign or its employees. However, the codification does not
provide for unrestricted execution against property of an agen-
cy or instrumentality of a foreign state if the judgment being
enforced was based on the foreign entity's waiver of immunity
from suit or an action concerning real property owned by the
entity.
146. The United States and France have both followed the
restrictive rule of immunity from suit and the absolute rule of
immunity from execution. See text accompanying notes 72-95 and
132-39 supra; Statni Bank v. Englander, 93 J.D.I. 846 (1966),
47 I.L.R. 157 (Fr., Aix-en-Provence Ct. of App. 1966); Societe
Bauer-Marchal et Cie v. Gouvernement Turc, [19651 R.G.D.I.P.
1161, 47 I.L.R. 155 (Fr., Rouen Ct. of App. 1965)'
147. Soviet Distillery in Austria Case, 9 VwGH 5 83 Clunet
86, [1954] I.L.R. 101 (Austria, Adm. Ct. 1954) (confiscation--T -
Soviet owned spirits for their illegal manufacture); Socobel v.
Greek State, 79 Clunet 244 (1952), [1951] I.L.R. 3 (Belgium,
Civ. Trib. Bruss-l- 51) (enforcement of arbitral award of
Belgian corporation against Greek accounts in Belgian banks);
Decision of the Supreme Court, 64 Clunet 394 (1937), 26
Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 585 (Czech. 1928) execution of arbitral
award against immovable property; rev'd because property used
by diplomatic personnel); Egyptian Delta Rice Mills v. Comisaria
General de Abastecimientos y Transportes de Madrid, 55 B.L.J.E.
114, [1943] Ann. Dig. 103 (Egypt, Com. Trib. Alexandria 1943)
(execution against funds of state commercial agency); Typaldos
v. Manicomio de Aversa, [1886] G.I. 1, 228 (It., Naples Ct. of
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App. 1882) (execution of debt against immovable property of a
foreign state); Societe Europeene D'Etudes et D'Enterprises
v. Yugoslovia (Neth., High Council 1973), in 14 Int'l Legal
Materials 71 (1975) (enforcement of international arbitration
award against Yugoslovia permitted); N.V. Cabolent v. National
Iranian Oil Company, [1969] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1329
No. 484, 47 Int'l L. Rep. 141, in 9 Int'l Legal Materials 152
(1970) (Neth., Hague Ct. of App. 196B) (garnishment of accounts
owed by Dutch oil companies to state oil corporation to en-
force international arbitral award); 55 Am. J. Int'l L. 371-75
(1970) (garnishment of debts owed branch bank of Bank of
People's Republic of China by Singapore for violation of bank-
ing laws); Republic Arabe Unie c. Dame X, 86 Ent. Schweiz.
Bund. 23 (Switz., Sup. Ct. 1960), in 55 Am. J. Int'l L. 167
(1961) (garnishment of U.A.R. commercial escrow account in
satisfaction of damages owed on lease of house).
148. See Sucharitkul, supra note 102, at 262-63; Lauter-
pacht, "The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign
States," 28 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 220, 242-43 (1951) [herein-
after cited as Lauterpachtl; Note, supra note 112, at 913-14.
149. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels, adopted April
10, 1926, 176 L.N.T.S. 199, 3 Hudson, International Legisla-
tion 1837. See note 107 supra.
150. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contigu-
ous Zone, adopted April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. See note 108 supra.
151. See note 110 supa.
152. Article 23 of the Convention exempts the assets of
foreign central governments from execution:
No measures of execution or preventive
measures against the property of a Con-
tracting State may be taken in the terri-
tory of another Contracting State except
where and to the extent that the State has
expressly consented thereto in writing in
any particular case.
Articles 27 and 28 prevent the distinct agencies, instrumental-
ities and political subdivisions of a Contracting State, other
than component states of a federation under certain circum-
stances, from being sheltered by this provision, however.
Article 27 provides, in part:
1. For the purposes of the present
Convention, the expression "Contracting
State" shall not include any legal entity
of a Contracting State which is distinct
therefrom and is capable of.suing or be-
ing sued, even if that entity has been en-
trusted with public functions.
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Article 28 provides, in part:
1. Without prejudice to the provisions
of Article 27, the constituent States of a
Federal State do not enjoy immunity.
2. However, a Federal State Party to
the present Convention, may, by notifica-
tion addressed to the Secretary General of
the Council of Europe, declare that its
constituent States may invoke the provisions
of the Convention applicable to Contracting
States, and have the same obligations.
In addition, Article 26 provides that judgments obtained under
the Convention
in proceedings relating to an industrial
or commercial activity, in which the State
is engaged in the same manner as a private
person, may be enforced In the State of
the forum against property of the State
against which judgment has been given, used
exclusively in connection with such an activ-
ity
if both states have declared their intention to restrict im-
munity in such a way. The Convention does not prevent execu-
tion of judgments obtained for activities described in Arti-
cle I of the Brussels Convention (see notes 107 and 149 supra).
Article 30. Finally, the draftsmen have interpreted the Con-
vention to permit execution against a foreign state's property
in enforcement of an arbitral award, since the Convention pre-
vents enforcement only of judgments obtained thereunder.
Council of Europe, Explanatory Reports on the European Con-
vention on State Immunity and the Additional Protocol 21, 33
( 1972).
153. Note, supra note 112, at 913.
154. See notes 113 and 114 supra.
155. See-notes 115 and 116 supra.
156. i note 118? at 459. Article 25 submits to exe-
cution a foreign state's immovable property and property used
in connection with an enterprise engaged in commercial, finan-
cial or other business activities.
157. Resolution on Immunity of Foreign States from Juris-
diction and Measures of Execution, May 30, 1954, Art. 5, 45-II
Annuaire 301, 302 (1954). The resolution extended immunity
only to the property of a foreign state employed for govern-
mental activities unconnected with economic undertakings.
158. Oslo Resolution of the Council of the International
Bar Association, March 1957, quoted in Reeves, "Good Fences
and Good Neighbors: Restraints on Immunities of Sovereigns,"
44 A.B.A.J. 521, 522-23 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Reeves].
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159. 1 Oppenheim, supra note 125, at 274; Lauterpacht,
supra note 148, at 242; Lalive, "L'limmunlte de Juridiction des
Etats et des Organisations Internationales," 84 Recueil des
Cours 205, 275 (1953); Garcia-Mora, "The Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity of Foreign States and Its Recent Modifications," 42
Va. L. Rev. 335, 359 (1956); S~rensen, "Principes de Droit
International Public," 101 Recuell des Cours 1, 172 (1960);
Sucharitkul, supra note 102, at 263 and 347; Sweeney, supra
note 102, at 23; the remarks of Monroe Leigh in 'New De-
partures," supra note 13, at 190.
160. Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, 3d Sess.
(Colombo), Final Report 67-6b l1960), quoted in 6 Whiteman,
supra note 9, at 572-74.
161. Sweeney, supra note 102, at 23.
162. 26 Dept. State Bull. 984 (1952). See text accom-
panying notes 72 and 73 supra.
163. New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Co. v. Republic of
Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). This view seemed
inconsistent with the Department's long-established policy of
permitting exercise of admiralty jurisdiction over commercial
vessels of foreign sovereigns, which is initiated by arrest
of the vessel.
164. Quoted in Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, National
Corp., 15 A.D.2d 111 222 N.Y.S.2d 128, 134, aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d
781, 235 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962); see also Ocean Transport Co. v.
Government of the Republic of the Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp.
703, 705 n.8 (E.D. La. 1967). For an application of this view,
see Mirabella v. Banco Industrial de la Republica Argentina,
TMisc. 2d 128, 237 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Since the
Department's decision to permit attachment for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction, federal courts have permitted service
of process on the foreign state by mail, care of its embassy
in Washington, to obtain in personam jurisdiction, reducing
the decision's importance. See Renchard v. Humphreys &
Harding, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 530---D.D.C. 1973); Caravel Office
Building Co. v. Peruvian Air Attache, No. 9185 (D.C. Ct. App.
1975), in 14 Int'l Legal Materials 1435 (1975).
165. Dexter & Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43
F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896
(1931); Auer v. Costa, 23 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1938). The
earlier decisions which allowed admiralty jurisdiction to be
asserted against publicly owned commercial vessels allowed ar-
rest of those vessels, however. See note 85 supra.
166. S.T. Tringali Co. v. Tug Pemex XV,27VF. Supp. 227,
230 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Harris & Co. Advertising, Inc. v. Repub-
lic of Cuba, 127 So.2d 687, 692 (Fla. App. 1961).
167. In Compania Espanol de Navegaclon Marltima, S.A. v.
The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 75, 58 S.Ct. 432, 82 L.Ed. 667 (1938),
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the Supreme Court stated that a ship owned by a foreign sov-
ereign would be entitled to immunity from arrest in an ad-
miralty case if the sovereign proved his ownership and right
to possession. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30,
65 S.Ct. 530, 89 L.Ed. 729 (1945), held that a vessel owned,
but not possessed, by a foreign sovereign was not entitled to
immunity. See Restatement (Second) § 6 8(a) (1965). Earlier
decisions had held that possession without ownership was suf-
ficient to make the property immune. Yokohama Specie Bank,.
Ltd. v. Chenting T. Wang, 113 F.2d 329 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940); The Janko (The NorsktankT,54F.
Supp. 241, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1944); The Roseric, 254 F. 154
(D.N.J. 1918). Cf. Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 122 F.2d
355, 360 (2d Cir.-1941) (L. Hand, J., concurring) ("[T]he vio-
lation of a friendly foreign state's possession is so grave an
indignity as ipso facto to embarrass the relations between
that state and the state of the forum"). The legal owner of
a bank account--attachment of-which is the simplest method of
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign--was considered
to be in possession of the funds represented by the account.
Bradford v. Chase National Bank, 24 F. Supp. 28, 38 (S.D.N.Y.
1938), aff'd sub nom. Berger v. Chase National Bank, 105 F.2d
1001 (2d Cir. 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 632 (1940).
168. Sec. 4(a), 90 Stat. 2895, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609, 1610(d)
(1976).
169. Id., 28 U.S.C. § 1608. The Hague Convention on
Service of Process Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Docu-
ments, T.I.A.S. No. 6618, 20 U.S.T. 361, will govern service
of process against any of its 17 other signatories. The codi-
fication has also substituted a form of personal service as
means for instituting an action against a foreign sovereign
ship owner to assert a maritime lien for the traditional
method of initiating a maritime claim--arrest of the vessel
or cargo. Id., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b). Arrest of the vessel or
cargo to acquire jurisdiction is now prohibited unless its im-
munity has been waived. Id., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609, 1610(d).
169-1. Report supra note 4, at 27.
170. See generally Sweeney, supra note 102, at 22-23 and
46-51.
171. Pre-judgment attachment of a defendant's property
serves two purposes in the United States: (1) it secures quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction and (2) it conserves assets available for
satisfaction of the judgment if the action is successful. Be-
cause execution was not formerly permitted against a foreign
state's property in this country, only attachment for the pur-
pose of acquiring jurisdiction was allowed. The codification
now permits execution against a foreign state's property in
limited cases, but it prohibits attachments to achieve either
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purpose. A private litigant will be able to obtain in personam
jurisdiction and will be entitled to execute against certain
property if successful in his suit, but he cannot assure that
assets of the foreign state defendant will be available for
satisfaction of his judgment. This deficiency in the proposed
statutory scheme is especially significant in view of the
scheme's limitation of the right to execute to particular
property or to property connected to a particular activity.
See text accompanying notes 141-44 supra. Thus, the right of
personal service is not a complete substitute for the right to
attach.
172. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. Netherlands East Indies Gov-
ernment, 75 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (government of the
territorial possession of a foreign sovereign); Piasclk v.
British Ministry of War Transport, 54 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y.
1943) (ministry of the central government); Hellenic Lines,
Ltd. v. Embassy of South Vietnam, 275 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (central bank owned by the foreign sovereign); Spacil
v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (shipping corporation
owned by the Cuban government); State ex rel. National Insti-
tute of Agrarian Reform v. Dekle, 137 So.2d-581 (Fla. App.),
cert. denied, 146 So.2d 753 (1962). The most recent general
statement by the Department on this subject appeared in a
letter from the Department dated January 25, 1960, quoted In
In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Industry, lD'T
F. Supp. 298, 318 (D.D.C. 1960):
[T]he Department of State follows the so-
called restrictive theory of sovereign Im-
munity. Under this theory, a foreign gov-
ernment (including its instrumentalities)
is entitled to immunity from the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of the territorial sov-
ereign only with regards to governmental
acts (jure imperil) as distinguished from
private or commercial activities (jure
gestionis). [emphasis added]
But cf. Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503, 504
n.l, 505 n.2 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 122 F.2d 355 (1941), in which
the Department took no position as to the immunity of states
of the Republic of Brazil; In re Investigation of World Ar-
rangements with Relation to-thi-Production, Transportation,
Refining & Distribution of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280, 291
(D.D.C. 1952), in which it took no position as to the immunity
of a private corporation organized and controlled by the
British government for the purpose of insuring the oil supply
of its fleet.
173. Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 122 F.2d 355 (2d
Cir. 1941); McConahy v. City of London Corp., 381 F. Supp. 728
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(D.N.J. 1974); Johns-Manville International Corp. v. Insul-Fil
Co., 41 Misc. 2d 233, 245 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup, Ct. 1963),
modified, 21 A.D.2d 764, 250 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1964). Cf. Brad-
ford v. Chase National Bank, 24 F. Supp. 28, 38 (S.rN.Y.
1938), aff'd sub nom. Berger v. Chase National Bank, 105 F.2d
1001 (2d iF.139T-aff'd, 309 U.S. 632 (1940), in which im- -
munity was granted to assets of an American protectorate, the
Philippines, on foreign sovereign Immunity grounds. But see
Schneider v. City of Rome, Italy, 193 Misc. 180, 83 N.Y.S.2d
756 (Cty. Ct. 1948).
174. Oliver American Trading Co. v. Government of the
United States of Mexico, 5 F.2d 659, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1924),
cert. denied, 267 U.S. 596 (1925).
175. Compare In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Ship-
ping Industry,7TW T Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960) (government
owned shipping line is immune from subpoena absent showing
that its activities are substantially commercial), and In re
investigation of World Arrangements with Relation t~othe Pro-
duction, Transportation, Refining & Distribution of Petroleum,
13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952) (corporation organized and con-
trolled, but not owned, by Brttlsh government to insure the
oil supply of its fleet is immune from subpoena), with
S.T. Tringall Co. v. Tug Pemex XV, 274 F. Supp. 227(S.D. Tex.
1967) (assets of government owned petroleum corporation not
Immune from execution); The Uxmal, 40 F. Supp. 258 (D. Mass.
1941) (corporation partly owned and controlled by Mexican gov-
ernment to promote the sisal industry not immune from suit);
United States v. Deutsche Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d
199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (corporation organized and controlled by
French government to administer French potash mining and act
as sales agent for state mines not immune from suit); and
Coale v. Societe Co-operative Suisse des Charbons, Base-, 21
F.2d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (assets of corporation organized by
Swiss government to regulate the importation of coal not im-
mune from execution). In Miller v. Ferrocarrill Del Pacifico
de Nicaragua, 137 Me. 251, 18 A.2d 688 (1941), Immunity was ex-
tended to a Maine corporation organized by Nicaragua to obtain
and exploit rail and shipping lines to that land on the doubt-
ful belief that the State Department had approved the claim to-
immunity. In any event, under prior law the instrumentality
had to prove its affiliation with the foreign sovereign to be
immune. Anaconda Co. v. Corporacion del Cobre, 55 F.R.D. 16,
18 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Pan American Tankers Corp. v. Republic-of
Vietnam, 291 F. Supp. 49, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
The Restatement appears to have required immunity for gov-
ernment agencies and instrumentalities performing a govern-
mental function but not for political subdivisions. Compare
Restatement (Second) 9 66 with § 67 (1965).
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176. Lamont v. Travelers Insurance Co., 281 N.Y. 362, 24
N.E.2d 81 (1940); Frazier v. Hanover Bank, 204 Misc. 922, 119
N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 281 A.D. 861, 119 N.Y.S.
2d 918 (1953), both contests of distributions of payments on a
foreign sovereign's public debt proposed by American bankers.
177. The codification defines "foreign state" to include
political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of the
state. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Sec. 4(a),
90 Stat. 2892, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). An "agency or instru-
mentality of a foreign state" is defined as an entity--
(I) which is a separate legal person,
corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state
or political subdivision thereof, or a major-
ity of whose shares or other ownership interest
is owned by a foreign state or political sub-
division thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State
of the United States as defined in section
1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created
under the laws of any third country.
Id., 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
178. See id., 28 U.S.C. § 1608.
179. Id., 8 U.S.C. § 1610(b). See text at note 144
supra.
182. See SweeneX, supra note' 102, at 52; Sucharltkul,
supra note 102, at 106; Montefiore v. Colony of the Belgian
Congo, 89 J.D.I. 687 (1962), 64 R.G.D.I.P. 656 (1960), 44
I.L.R. 72 Fr., Ct. of Cass. 1961).
183. Sweeney, supra note 102, at 54-55.
184. Societe Anonyme "Dhlellemes et Masurel" v. Banque
Centrale de ]a Republique de Turquie, 45 I.L.R. 85, 86-87
(Belgium, Brussels Ct. of App. 1963); N.Y. Cabolent v. National
Iranian Oil Company, [1969] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1329,
47 I.L.R. 141, (Neth., Hague Ct. of App. 1968), in 9 Int'l
Legal Materials 152 (1970).
185. See Sweeny, supra note 102, at 55; Sucharitkul,
supra note T2, at 10, 112.
186. See note 110 supra.
187. Article 27 of the Convention provides:
1. For the purposes of the present
Convention, the expression "Contracting
State shall not include any legal entity
of a Contracting State which is distinct
therefrom and is capable of suing or be-
ing sued, even if that entity has been
entrusted with public functions.
2. Proceedings may be instituted
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against any entity referred to in para-
graph I before the courts of another
Contracting State in the same manner as
against a private person; however, the
courts may not entertain proceedings in
respect of acts performed by the entity
in the exercise of sovereign authority
(acta jure imperii).
3. Proceedings may in any event be
instituted against any such entity before
those courts if in corresponding circum-
stances, the courts would have had juris-
diction if the proceedings had been insti-
tuted against a Contracting State.
188. Article 28 of the Convention states, in part:
1. Without prejudice to the provisions
of Article 27, the constituent States of a
Federal State do not enjoy immunity.
2. However, a Federal State Party to
the present Convention, may, by notifica-
tion addressed to the Secretary General of
the Council of Europe, declare that its
constituent States may invoke the provisions
of the Convention applicable to Contracting
States, and have the same obligations.
Otherwise, the Convention extends immunity only to "Contracting
States" and their property, not to their political subdivisions.
189. See, e.j., Brierly, supra note 125, at 246-47;
O'Connell, supra note 126, at 946; Sucharitkul, supra note 102,
at 104; Restatement (Second) § 66 Reporters' Note 2 and § 67
Reporters' Notes 1-3 (1965).
190. After the Supreme Court decided National City Bank
v. Republic of China, see text accompanying notes 26-29 supra,
the Chinese Ambassador sought the State Department's aid in
gaining immunity from the defendant's counterclaim. The De-
partment denied this request.
* . * The Chinese Government has sought the
assistance of a United States court to re-
cover its deposits with the defendant bank.
The Chinese Government is, therefore, within
the jurisdiction of the court not against its
will but on its own initiative. The immunity,
if any, which it had in the existing circum-
stances has thus been waived. Having sought
the application to the defendant of American
law, it is in no position to contend that any
defenses available under that law to the de-
fendant should be denied.
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The Department stated that the waiver applied irrespective of
whether the state act upon which the counterclaim is based
was "private" or "public." Letter from Department of State
to Ambassador of the Republic of China, Sept. 26, 1955, 23
Dept. State Bull. 750-51 (1955), 6 Whiteman, supra note 9, at663.
190a. See United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y.
264, 56 N.E-.2d 577, 579-81 (1944), aff'd on rehearing, 294
N.Y. 265, 62 N.E.2d 64 (1945).
191. Compare Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v.
M.V. Ciudad de la Habana, 218 F. Supp. 938, 943 (D. Md. 1963),
aff'd, 335 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964), with Rich v. Naviera
VaiEiia, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710, 712 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 295 F.
2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
192. Ervin v. Quintanilla,'99 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 635 (1939); Flota Maritima
Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. Snobl, 363 F.2d 733, 737 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 837 (1966); Flota Maritima Browning de
Cuba, S.A. v. M.V. Ciudad de ]a Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 624-25
(4 Cir. 1964). The last cited two cases established that im-
munity from execution could not be asserted after a waiver of
immunity from attachment. But immunity from execution could
be asserted after a waiver of immunity from suit only.
Dexter & Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705,
708 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931). See
also Restatement (Second) § 70 ( 1965).
193. Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446
F.2d 1198, 1199-1200 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985
(1971); Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. M.V. Ciudad
de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 625 (4th CIr. 1964); Rich v.
Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 26 (4th Cir. 1961); Miller
v. Ferrocarrill Del Pacifico de Nicaragua, 137 Me. 251, 18
A.2d 688, 692 (1941). But cf. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318
U.S. 578, 63 S.Ct. 793,'7- -Ed71WT-1943), in which the
Court first held that the foreign state had not waived Its im-
munity before giving effect to the State Department's recog-
nition and allowance of immunity.
194. The Mangalia, 1942 A.M.C. 35, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
195. Id.
196. Er-vin v. Quintanllla, 99 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 635 (1939); Flota Maritima
Browning de Cuba v. Snobl, 363 F.2d 733, 737 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 837 (1966); Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba v.
M.V. Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 1964);
The Sao Vicente, 295 F. 829, 831-32 (3rd Cir. 1924); The Sao
Vicente, 281 F. 111, 115 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 260 U.S.
151 (1922), petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus
dismissed, 2X -U.S. I0--(192-4). If, however, the general ap-
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pearance was accompanied by a reservation of the right to re-
assert the issue of immunity, it was not a waiver. Ex parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589, 63 S.Ct. 793, 87T-L.Ed.
1014 (1943).
197. The angalla, 1942 A.M.C. 35, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
198. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S.
356, 75 S.Ct. 423, 99 L.Ed. 389 (1955). See text accompanying
notes 26-29 supra. The courts differed on--he extent to which
filing of an action constitutes a waiver of immunity from a
related but distinct defensive action. Compare Wacker v.
Bisson, 348 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1965) (initiation of extradi-
tion proceedings constituted a waiver by the sovereign of im-
munity from a declaratory judgment action challenging the
validity of a nonappealable extradition order), with Kingdom
of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co., 250 F. 341, 3T-3T2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 246 U.S. 663 (1918) (initiation of proceedings
Is not a waiver of Immunity from an interpleader between-the
sovereign and a third party); Republic of Iraq v. First Na-
tional City Trust Co., 207 F. Supp. 588, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
appeal dismissed, 313 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1963) (removal of a
federal action by a sovereign against the administrator of
the deceased king to a state surrogate's court denied because
initiation of the federal proceedings waived defensive actions
in the federal court only); and In re Hughes & Company, 9
Misc. 2d 16, 172 N.Y.S.2d 441TSup. Ct. 1957) (plenary action
by assignee for benefit of creditors is not a waiver of im-
munity from a motion to enjoin prosecution of the action made
by the assignee in the assignment action). One court held
that the waiver made by initiation of suit permits affirmative
relief for the defendant beyond set-off if the counterclaim
arises from the same transaction. Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S.
International Sales Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 299, 204 N.Y.S.2d 971
(Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 17 A.D.2d 927, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1962).
Initiation of suit constituted a waiver of immunity to dis-
covery proceedings brought by the defendant. See Republic of
Haiti v. Plesch, 195 Misc. 219, 88 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Sup. Ct.),
modified, 275 A.D. 80A, 89 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1949).
199. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710,
719 (E.D. VaT, aff'd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (quoting
from stipulation entered by the foreign state's attorney in
connection with a consent judgment in a state proceeding waiv-
ing immunity from execution); Pacific Molasses Co. v. Comite de
Ventas de Mieles de ]a Republica Dominicana, 30 Misc. 2d 560,
219 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1020 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (clause in contract
for sale of molasses providing that "[any controversy or claim
arising out of, or relating to this contract, or for the breach
thereof, shall be referred to the courts having jurisdiction in
accordance with international law" constitutes enforceable
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waiver of immunity); but see Delaume, "Public Debt and Sover-
eign Immunity: Some Considerations Pertinent to S.566," 67
Am. J. Int'l L. 745, 746 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Delaume],
which states that contractual waivers of immunity are Ineffec-
tive in the United States. The courts seemed reluctant to
find a prior irrevocable contractual waiver of immunity, how-
ever. See Southeastern Leasing Corp. v. Stern Dragger
Belogorsk-Etc., 493 F.2d 1223, 1224 (ist Cir. 1974) (U.S.SR.
treaty obligation to make its vessels "subject to the appli-
cable laws and regulations of the United States" is not a
waiver of immunity from suit by a private party); Loomis v.
Rogers, 254 F.2d 941, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 928 (1959) (Treaty of Peace with Italy providing that
property of Italy within the United States may be applied to
the claims of American nationals against Italy was not a
waiver of immunity from suits by private parties); but see
Basner v. Andrews, 72 Misc. 2d 228, 339 N.Y.S.2d 67"Tcity Ct.
1972) (purchase of automobile liability insurance is a waiver
of immunity from suit within policy coverage). Nevertheless,
in some instances a foreign state may wish to make a voluntary
waiver.of its immunity. Chief Judge Bazelon has speculated
about motives for such a waiver:
[A] sovereign sued in the United States
might waive its immunity defense because
it could more easily present its witnesses
and evidence here or because the law would
be more favorable here than In courts of
alternative forums where it would have no
immunity defense. The sovereign might also
decide that an airing of the dispute in an
independent judicial tribunal would favor its
domestic policies or its foreign relations.
Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978, 979 n.] (D.C. Cir.
1965).
200. Sec. 4 (a), 90 Stat. 2892, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(I),
1610(a)(1) and (b)(1) (1976).
201. Id., Report, supra note 4, at 18.
202. Fo-reign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Sec. 4(a),
90 Stat. 2892, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1), 1610(a)(1) and (b)(1)
(1976); Report, supra note 4, at 18. Under the act, a con-
tractual agreement to submit disputes to arbitration outside
the foreign state or a clause providing that the contract
should be governed by the United States' or a third country's
laws would constitute an implicit waiver of Immunity, partially
overruling case law. Report, supra at 18. However, a foreign
state's courtroom appearance in an action does not constitute a
waiver of immunity from unrelated claims. Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976, Sec. 4(a), 90 Stat. 2891, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1330(c) (1976); Report, supra, at 14.
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204. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Sec. 4(a),
90 Stat. 2894, 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1976).
205. Sweeney, supra note 102, at 55; Limbin Hteik Tin
Lat v. Union of Burma, 5 Kakyu. Minji. Saib. 836, 32 I.L.R.
124, 125 (Japan, Tokyo Dist. Ct. 1954); Ramiandrisoa v. French
State, 40 I.L.R. 81 (Madagascar, Sup. Ct. 1965); Mahe v. Agent
Judiciaire du Tresor Francais, 40 I.L.R. 80 (Madagascar, Ct.
of App. 1965). The European Convention on State Immunity,
note 110 supra, contains several provisions which give effect
to waivers. Article 2 provides:
A Contracting State cannot claim im-
munity from the jurisdiction of a court
of another Contracting State if it has
undertaken to submit to the jurisdiction
of that court either:
(a) by international agreement;
(b) by an express term contained
in a contract in writing; or
(c) by an express consent given
after a dispute between the parties has
arisen.
Article 33 expressly permits international agreements to cur-
tail Immunities recognized by the Convention. Article 12 con-
strues an agreement to arbitrate a nonpublic matter to be a
waiver of immunity from proceedings to enforce that agreement
(but not the award, which is not treated by the Convention).
Finally, Article 26 permits a foreign state to waive im-
munity from execution in a forum state which has executed a
similar waiver. See note 152 supra. Numerous other conven-
tions and bilateral agreements include waivers of the signa-
tories' immunity from judicial proceedings. See text accom-
panying notes 107-17, 149-55 supra.
206. Sweeney, supra note 102, at 55-56; Sucharitkul,
supra note 102, at 354; Government of Peru v. S.A; Sociedad
Industrial Financiera Argentina S.I.F.A.R., 26 I.L.R. 195
(Argentina, Sup. Ct. 1958) (consent to suit constitutes con-
sent to execution of judgment); Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart,
N.V. v. Union Banking Corporation (Neth., Rotterdam Dist. Ct.
1964), in 4 Int'l Legal Materials 257, 273 (1965) (interven-
tion to claim immunity for attached property constitutes waiver
from counterclaim of noncommercial nature because immunity
could have been sought without intervention); but see
Ramiandrisoa v. French State, 40 I.L.R. 81 (Madagascar, Sup. Ct.
1965) (defense on merits does not constitute waiver, which must
be express). Some courts construe a foreign state's Initiation
of suit to constitute a waiver of immunity only from counter-
claims and set-offs arising out of the same transaction; some
states limit counterclaims to set-offs. The states which fol-
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low an absolute rule of immunity from execution do not con-
sider a waiver of immunity from suit to include a waiver of
immunity from execution. See Sweeney, supra, at 56.
The European Convention on State Immunity, note 110
supra, treats as a waiver institution of judicial proceedings,
defending an action on the merits, or Incorporating or lo-
cating an enterprise in conjunction with private persons with-
in the jurisdiction of the forum state:
ARTICLE 1
I. A Contracting State which insti-
tutes or intervenes in proceedings before a
court of another Contracting State submits,
for the purpose of those proceedings, to the
jurisdiction of the courts of that State.
2. Such a Contracting State cannot
claim immunity from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the other Contracting State In re-
spect of any counterclaim:
(a) arising out of the legal rela-
tionship or the facts on which the principal
claim is based;
(b) If, according to the provisions
of this Convention, It would not have been en-
titled to invoke immunity in respect of that
counterclaim had separate proceedings been
brought against it in those courts.
3. A Contracting State which makes a
counterclaim in proceedings before a court
of another Contracting State submits to the
jurisdiction of the courts of that State with
respect not only to the counterclaim but also
to the principal claim.
ARTICLE 3
1. A Contracting State cannot claim im-
munity from the jurisdiction of a court of
another Contracting State if, before claiming
immunity, it takes any step in the proceedings
relating to the merits. However, if the State
satisfies the court that it could not have ac-
quired knowledge of facts on which a claim to
immunity can be based until after it has taken
such a step, it can claim immunity based on
these facts if it does so at the earliest possi-
ble moment.
2. A Contracting State is not deemed to
have waived immunity if it appears before a
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court of another Contracting State in order
to assert immunity.
ARTICLE 6
1. A Contracting State cannot claim im-
munity from the jurisdiction of a court of
another Contracting State if it participates
with one or more private persons in a company,
association or other legal entity having its
seal, registered office or principle place of
business on the territory of the State of the
forum, and the proceedings concern the rela-
tionship, in matters arising out of that parti-
cipation, between the State on the one hand and
the entity or any other participant on the other
hand.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if it is
otherwise agreed In writing.
207. See Sucharitkul, supra note 102, at 276-77.
208. See Brownlie, supra note 124, at 283; C. Fenwick,
International Law 370 (4th ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as
Fenwick].
201a. Sullivan v. State of Sao Paolo, 122 F.2d 355, 358-59
(2d Cir. 1941).
208b. 26 Dept. State Bull. 984 (1952). See text accom-
panying notes 72 and 73 supra.
208c. In Sullivan v. State of Sao Paolo, 122 F.2d 355
(2d Cir. 1941), the State Department was careful to base its
recommendation that immunity be granted on the interests of
the Republic of Brazil In funds attached to initiate an action
on the debts of two Brazilian states rather than on any immu-
nity of the states themselves.
209. See H.R. 3493, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 1,
§ 1606(a) (-973).
209a. Id., § 1606(b).
210. See H.R. 11315, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 4 (a),
§ 1606 (19735.
211. See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra. The House
Judiciary Committee has interpreted the sale of a foreign
state's bonds to the public and its borrowings from a commer-
cial bank to be commercial activities for which the act grants
no immunity. Report, supra note 4, at 10.
212. See G. Delaume, Legal Aspects of International Lend-
ing and Ecoinoic Development Pinancing 156-159 (1967); Delaume,
supra note 199, at 746.
213. Eg., Royaume de Grece v. Banque Julius Bar et Cie,
82(l) R.O. 75,23 I.L.R. 195 (Trib. fed. 1956); Etat Yougoslave
v. S.A. Sogerfin (Trib. fed. 1938), in 61 La Semaine Judicaire
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327 (1939); Republique Mellinique v. Walder, 56(I) R.O. 237
(Trib. fed. 1930); K.K. Oesterreichisches Finanzministerium
v. Dreyfus, 44(1) R.O. 49 (Trib. fed. 1918). The Swiss courts
require that the debt obligation be connected with Switzerland
in some way. France has permitted suit on a foreign state's
guarantee of a municipality's obligations, Societe Bauer-
Marchal et Cie v. Gouvernement Turc, 69 R.G.D.I.P. 1161 (1965),
47 I.L.R. 155 (Rouen Ct. of App. 1965), but seemed to have
made suit on bonds of the Congo conditional on the absence of
a Belgian state obligation on the bonds, Montefiore v. Colony
of the Belgian Congo, 64 R.G.D.I.P. 656 (1960), 89 R.D.l. 687
(1962), 44 I.L.R. 72 (Ct. of Cass. 1961); see also Faure v.
Italian State, 56 Rev. Crit. de Droit Int'T-Pr'-.159 (1967),
45 I.L.R. 83 (Fr., Ct. of Cass. 1965) (foreign state's guaran-
tee of railroad company's bonds merits immunity). Belgium has
permitted suit on a foreign state's assumption of a railroad
company's obligations. Brasseur v. La Republique Hellenique,
[1933-11] Pas. 197 (Brussels Ct. of App. 1933).
214. See Montefiore v. Colony of the Belgian Congo, note
213 supra; Gouvernement du Land de Hesse v. Neger (Fr., Paris
Cour d'appel 1969), in 59 Rev. Critique de Droit Int'l Prive
703 (1970); Delaume, s-upra note 199, at 747.
215. See note 110 supra.
216. Article 4 of the Convention provides:
1. Subject to the provisions of Article
5 [relating to employment contracts], a Con-
tracting State cannot claim immunity from
the jurisdiction of the courts of another
Contracting State if the proceedings relate
to an obligation of the State, which, by vir-
tue of a contract, fails to be discharged in
the territory of the State of the forum.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply:
(a) in the case of a contract con-
cluded between States;
(b) if the parties to the contract
have otherwise agreed in writing;
(c) if the State is a party to a con-
tract concluded on its territory and the ob-
ligation of the State is governed by its ad-
ministrative law.
Typically foreign public debt instruments provide for payment
of principal and interest upon presentation of coupons or the
bond itself to a bank, known as the paying agent, located In
the market area in which the bonds are sold. Therefore, the
payment obligation falls due within the country where the
bonds were sold and may, under the Convention, be enforced
there In municipal courts notwithstanding the sovereign charac-
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ter of the issuer, It is believed that private loans also
generally provide for repayment at the main office of the
lender, or the agent of the lenders, so would likewise be
judicially enforceable under the Convention. The issue is
less pressing for private loans because of the frequency with
which they contain waivers of immunity. See text accompanying
note 217 infra.
217.- Deaume, supra note 199, at 748; Note, supra note
112, at 896.
218. Delaume, supra note 199, at 752; see also Report,
supra note 4, at 10.
219. Delaume, supra note 199, at 753.
220. E.g., Claim against the Empire of Iran Case, 16 Ent.
Bund. 27, 45 I.L.R. 56 (FDR, Fed. Const. Ct. 1963), in 6
Whiteman, supra note 9, at 566-69; 1 0ppenheim, supra note 125,
at 274; Lauterpacht, s note 148, at 237-36. Contra, Vic-
tory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abasticimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 934 (1965).
221. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Sec. 4(a),
90 Stat. 2892, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1976). This provision
,by its terms denies immunity from all claims to relief united
in a "case" in which one of the claims is to title to particu-
lar property. Thus, a corporation bringing suit to establish
title to oil expropriated by a foreign state, part of which is
present in the United States, may bring an action for title to
the oil present in the United States and for a monetary relief
equal to the value of the remaining oil. The entire judgment
would then be enforceable against the foreign state's commer-
cial assets. See note 143,supra. The claims which could be
united in such a "case" are limited only by the rules of join-
der.
222. 78 Stat. 1013, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1964).
223. The "act of state doctrine" recognized in American
courts is an outgrowth of principles of the conflicts of law,
also known as private international law. Those principles are
that the legality of a public act of a foreign state performed
within its territory is governed by the law of that state, and
that an adjudication of its legality by the foreign state will
be given effect. Since commission of the act constitutes an
ad hoc determination of its legality according to the laws of
the foreign state, it follows that "the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another, done within its own territory." Underhill v. Hernan-
dez, 168 U.S. 250, 252, 18 S.Ct. 83, 42 L.Ed. 456 (1897). This
rule has been labeled the "act of state doctrine."
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed. 2d 804 (1964), the Supreme Court ex-
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tended the "act of state doctrine" to prevent examination of
a nationalization of property alleged to be in violation of
international law. The nationalized property was sugar that
had belonged to a Cuban corporation owned principally by
American investors. After nationalization, the sugar was de-
livered to an American purchaser by the Cuban state bank. The
purchaser, however, delivered payment for the sugar to Sabba-
tino, the New York receiver for the nationalized corporation's
American assets, the latter agreeing to indemnify the pur-
chaser for any loss. The Cuban bank brought suit, alleging
diversity jurisdiction, against the purchaser to compel pay-
ment and against Sabbatino to enjoin him from making use of
the payment made to him. The defendants claimed that the
sugar had remained the property of the Cuban corporation, be-
cause the nationalization decree was invalid under interna-
tional law, and that therefore payment had been properly made.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision to the
same effect, declaring that American courts could not examine
the validity of the nationalization decree because it was an
"act of state." In a carefully restricted sentence, the
court held
that the Judicial Branch will not examine
the validity of a taking of property with-
in its own territory by a foreign sover-
eign government, extant ,and recognized by
this country at the time of suit, in the
absence of a treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal prin-
ciples, even if the complaint alleges that
the taking violates customary international
law.
376 U.S. at 428.
Reacting to pressure from American international law-
yers and businessmen, Congress quickly limited the effect of
Sabbatino by adding Section 620(e)(2), commonly referred to as
the Sabbatino Amendment, to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964,
78 Stat. 1013, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1964), as amended by
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-171, 79 Stat.
653. Section 620(e)(2) provides;
Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no court in the United States shall de-
cline on the ground of the federal act of
state doctrine to make a determination on
the merits giving effect to the principles
of international law in a case in which a
claim of title or other right to property
is asserted by any party including a foreign
state (or a party claiming through such state)
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based upon (or traced through) a confis-
cation or other taking after January 1,
1959, by an act of that state in violation
of the principles of international law, in-
cluding the principles of compensation and
the other standards set out In this sub-
section:
Provided: That this subparagraph shall not
be applicable (1) in any case in which an
act of a foreign state is not contrary to
international law . . . or (2) in any case
with respect to which the. President de-
termines that application of the act of
state doctrine is required in that particu-
lar case by the foreign policy interests of
the United States and a suggestion to this
effect is filed on his behalf in that case
with the court.
The Amendment has been construed to apply only to cases deal-
ing with rights to property located within the United States
previously taken in violation of international law, French v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 70A, 295
N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968), and not to affect any foreign state im-
munity a defendant may claim, American Hawaiiap Ventures, Inc.
v. M.V.J. Latuharhary, 257 F. Supp. 622 (D.N.J. 1966).
A subsequent Supreme Court case added a second excep-
tion to the "act of state doctrine" announced in Sabbatino.
In First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406
U.S. 759, 92 S.Ct. 1808, 32 L.Ed.2d 466 (1972), the Cuban
state bank had sued a New York bank to recover the excess from
a sale of collateral held by the New York bank to secure a de-
faulted loan to the Cuban bank and certain deposits made by
nationalized Cuban banks with the New York bank. The New York
bank claimed it was entitled to keep the sums in question as a
set-off of its claim for Cuba's confiscation of its eleven
Cuban branches in violation of international law. The Sabba-
tino Amendment was inapplicable because funds of the national-
ized branches were not brought into the United States, but the
State Department announced that it had no objection to adjudi-
cation of the international law claim underlying the set-off.
In these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the "act of
state doctrine" should not prevent an examination of the con-
fiscation. Because of a split among the justices, however,
First National City is precedent for only a limited exception
to the "act of state doctrine": The courts will not apply the
doctrine when the executive department has determined that the
doctrine should not apply, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (opinion of
Rehnquist, J.; Burger, C.J.; and White, J., concurring), the
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international law claim is raised as a set-off to an action
initiated by the foreign state, 406 U.S. 770, 772-73 (opinion
of Douglas, J.), and the court is independently satisfied that
"an exercise of jurisdiction would not interfere with deli-
cate foreign relations conducted by the political branches,"
406 U.S. 773, 776 (opinion of Powell, J.).
In both Sabbatino and First National City, the inter-
national law claims against a foreign state entity were raised
as set-offs to an action initiated by the foreign state en-
tity, so sovereign immunity was foreclosed by National City
Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 75 S.Ct. 423, 99 L.Ed.
389 (1955). See text at notes 26-29 supra. In a recent case,
the Supreme Court invited reconsideration of Sabbatino, but
was unable to assemble a majority of justices to either limit
or reaffirm It. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. The Republic
of Cuba, 425 U.S. 96 S.Ct. , 48 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976).
See text accompanying notes 4a an--71 ,- supra.
224. See text at notes 141-44 supra.
225. Compare The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.)
283, 354, 5 L.Ed. 454 (1822) (per Story, J.) (property taken
by a foreign state in American waters in violation of inter-
national law is not immune), with The Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) T16, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812), discussed
in text at notes 16-18 supra.
226. See the cases cited In Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 37T U.S. 398, 440 n.], 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804
(1964) (White, J., dissenting); Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law § 41, Reporters' Note 4; and Domke, "Indonesian
Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts," 54 Am. J.
Int'l L. 305 (1960).
227. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 421-22--74 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964); 1 Oppenheim,
supra note 125, at 267-68; Restatement (Second) § 41, Comment a.
227a. But see Lauterpacht, supra note lih, at 237 (for-
eign state immune for legislative act, though in violation of
international law).
228. The absence of Immunity from suits alleging viola-
tions of international law could also be analogized to the
established proposition that a state may, in imposing sanctions
on another state for violation of International law, engage in
conduct that would otherwise be proscribed by International
law. This basis is too narrow, though, because It cannot sup-
port exercises of jurisdiction which exonerate foreign states
from the violation claimed or enforcements by third party for-
um states of international arbitral awards obtained by a for-
eign citizen against a foreign state for such a violation.
229. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Sec. 4 (a),
90 Stat. 2893, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)( 4) (976).
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230. 26 Dept. State Bull. 984 (1952). See Restatement
(Second) § 68(tb) (1965).
231. But see Republic of Iraq v. First National City
Trust Co., 20-7 F.-Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), appeal dismissed,
313 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1963) (foreign sovereign suing to suc-
ceed to its deceased king's property located in New York is
immune from removal of the action to a state court); N.Y.
World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Republic of Guinea, 159
N.Y.L.J. 15, 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 343 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (State
Department refusal of immunity from action for rents and dam-
age to property by lessor of pavilion of sovereign on world's
fair grounds); Knocklong Corp. v. Kingdom of Afghanistan, 6
Misc. 2d 700, 167 N.Y.S.2d 285 (County Ct. 1957) (State De-
partment allowance of immunity from action to try title to the
residence of Afghanistan's chief representative to the United
Nations).
232. See the cases cited in Sweeney, s note 102, at
24-25, and Restatement (Second) § 6W, Reporters' Note 1;
Limbim Hteik Tin Lat v. Union of Burma, 5 Kakyu. Minji. Saib.
836, 32 I.L.R. 124 (Japan, Dist. Ct. Tokyo 1954); European
Convention on State Immunity, art. 9, note 110 supra:
A Contracting State cannot claim im-
munity from the jurisdiction of a court
of another Contracting State if the pro-
ceedings relate to:
(a) Its rights or interests in, or
its use or possession of, immovable prop-
erty; or
(b) its obligations arising out of
its rights or interests in, or use or
possession of, immovable property and the
property is situated in the territory of
the State of the forum.
See also Brownlie, supra note 124, at 284; Sweeney, supra, at
27.. Contra, Mahe v. Agent Judiclaire du Tresor Francais, 40
I.L.R1T8TMadagascar, Ct. App. 1965); Fenwick, supra note
208, at 370.
233. See the cases cited in Sweeney, s note 102, at
25, and Restatement (Second) § 68, Reporters Note 2; Euro-
pean Convention on State Immunity, art. 10, note 110 supra:
A Contracting State cannot claim im-
munity from the jurisdiction of a court
of another Contracting State if the pro-
ceedings relate to a right in movable or
immovable property arising by way of suc-
cession, gift or bona vacantia.
See also Brownlie, supra note 21,t 4.
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234. Art. 22, done April 8, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, in 55 Am. J. Int'l L. 1064 (1961).
The Convention is adhered to by 114 states. U.S. Department
of State, Treaties in Force 336 (1975). See also Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations, art. 31, done Apr. 24, 1963,
21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
235. See, e.g., Caisse Industrielle D'Assurance Mutuelle
v. Consul General de ]a Republique Argentine, 68 R.G.D.I.P.
1011 (1964); 45 I.L.R. 381 (Trib. gr. inst. of SeTinie19 .
236. The codification permits execution against or
seizure of the property of the central government of a foreign
state or of its political subdivisions only if it Is used for
a commercial activity. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, Sec. 4(a), 90 Stat. 2896, 28 U.S.C. § 16 10(a) and (d)
(1976).
237. Id., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). State Department com-
ments explaining its addition to an earlier draft of the ex-
ceptions dealing with discretionary functions, malicious
prosecution, and the like state that the purpose of the re-
vision is to provide for immunity only in those cases In which
the United States Government would itself be immune from suit
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) and (h).
However, a recent amendment to the Act makes the United States
liable for claims arising out of such acts if they are com-
mitted by federal investigative or law enforcement officers
after March 16, 1974. Pub. L. 93-253 9 2, 88 Stat. 50.
238. See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
238a. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Sec. 4(a),
90 Stat. 2894, 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976).
238b. Id., sec. 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). Actions brought
in state courts but removed by the foreign state to federal
court will be tried to the court even though there exists a
basis for federal jurisdiction other than 28 U.S.C. § 1330.
Id., sec. 6, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d).
239. See Report, su ra note 4, at 20-21. The codifica-
tion permits subsequently obtained judgments to be enforced by
garnishing the foreign state's insurer. Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976, Sec. 4(a), 90 Stat. 2896, 28 U.S.C.
§ 16 10(a)(5) (1976).
240. See Office for Mutual Aid v. Van Antwerpen, [1955-1]
Pas. 88, [195-] I.L.R. 121 (Belgium, Sup. Ct. 1954); Societe
Anonyme "Eau, Gaz, Electricite et Applications" v. Office for
Mutual Aid, [1957-11] Pas. 88, [1956] I.L.R. 205 (Belgium, Ct.
App. Brussels 1956); Procureur du Roi v. Toebinte, [1920-11]
Pas. 122 (Belgium, Ct. App. Brussels 1920); Greek Government
v. Joseph Aboutebout, 39 G.T.M.E. 83 (Egypt, Trib. Alexandria
1948); cf. Papaevangelon v. Gouvernment of the United States
(Greece,-Ct. of First Inst. Athens 1960)', in Sweeney, supra
note 102, at 30.
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211. See Collision with Foreign Government-Owned Motor
Car (Austria--Case, 84 J.B. 43, 40 I.L.R. 73 (Austria, Sup.
Ct. 1961) (collision with U.S. Embassy car carrying mail to
American Embassy from airport was result of "private" act of
driving car, not "publict' act of bringing mail to Embassy);
Basner v. Andrews, 72 Misc. 2d 228, 339 NYS.2d 67 (City
Ct. 1972) (purchase of liability insurance policy constitutes
waiver of immunity from suit within coverage).
242. See note 110 supra.
243. rticle 11 of the Convention provides:
A Contracting State cannot claim im-
munity from the jurisdiction of a court
of another Contracting State in proceed-
ings which relate to redress for injury
to the person or damage to tangible prop-
erty, if the facts which occasioned the
injury or damage occurred in the territory
of the State of the forum, and if the au-
thor of the injury or damage was present
in that territory at the time when those
facts occurred.
244. Art. 43, done Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S.
No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S-261. The Convention is adhered to by
sixty-eight states. U.S. Department of State, Treaties in
Force 327 (1975).
245. See H. Steiner & D. Vagts, Transnational Legal
Problems 383-98 (2d ed. 1976).
"26. The purpose of tort law is not only to compensate
the victim, but also to prevent future accidents. See gen-
erally G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970) .- See also
Sucharitkul, s note 102, at 302.
24a.Legh, sura note 131, at 281, and his remarks in
"New Departures," supra note 13, at 192; Note, "Jurisdictional
Immunities of Foreign States," 23 DePaul L. Rev. 1225, 1245
(1974); Note, "International Law--Sovereign Immunity--The Last
Straw in Judicial Abdication," 46 Tulane L. Rev. 841, 845 (1972);
Comment, "International Law--Sovereign Immunity--The First
Decade of the Tate Letter Policy," 60 Mich. L. Rev. 1142, 1144-
45 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Commentl.
247. The plaintiff in Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 616
(5th Cir. 1974), received from the Legal Adviser the following
explanation of the State Department's decision to recognize a
claim of immunity on behalf of Cuba;
The Department's decision to recognize
and allow immunity in this case was made
on the basis of the most careful consider-
ation of all the circumstances and after
appropriate consultation by the Office of
19761
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the Legal Adviser with the other in-
terested bureaus and officials in the
Department. . . . The Department's de-
cision has been taken, and, it is the
Department's view that the public in-
terest and United States foreign rela-
tions are best served by the prompt re-
lease of the vessel.
In Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710, 714 (E.D.
Va.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961), the United States
Attorney submitted to the court in his suggestion of immunity
the following portion of a letter from the Secretary of State
to the Attorney General:
In response to your inquiry to the De-
partment of State concerning the Cuban
motor vessel Bahia De Nipe, now at anchor
at Norfolk, this is to inform you that it
has been determined that the release of
this vessel would avoid further disturbance
to our international relations in the
premises.
248. 318 U.S. 578, 589, 63 S.Ct. 793, 87 L.Ed. 1014
(1943). The Court equated State Department recognition of a
claim of immunity to "a conclusive determination by the politi-
cal arm of the Government that the continued retention of the
vessel interferes with the proper conduct of our foreign re-
lations." Id.
249. *iW9 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
250. Id. at 619.
251. In Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. M.V.
Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1964), the
court refused to inquire into the basis of a State Department
determination of immunity "because the Executive decision to
recognize sovereign immunity in a particular case may depend
upon Intimate knowledge of matters affecting foreign affairs
which are not public information and which are not fit sub-
jects of judicial inquiry." For the same reason, it stated
that a sovereign's waiver of immunity would be ineffective in
the face of State Department recognition of its claim to im-
munity. Id. at 625. In Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. Presi-
dent of Inia, 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 985 (1971), the court stated that the State Depart-
ment should make its determination "in light of the poten-
tial consequences to our international position." Cf. Banco
National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 468, 84-S.Ct. 923,
11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (in making a
sovereign immunity determination the State Department con-
siders "whether adjudication would 'vex the peace of nations.'").
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252. Lowenfeld, supa note 3, at 392.
253, 489 F,2d 614(95th Cir. 1974).
254, In February, 1973, less than a year before at-
tachment of the vessels, the United States and Cuba had entered
into an agreement to prosecute hijackers in their own courts or
to return them for prosecution. This agreement was a long-
term objective of United States foreign policy and the De-
partment presumably did not wish to jeopardize it, especially
when the plaintiffs were not American citizens but rather Chi-
lean corporations owned by the Chilean government. It is be-
lieved that Cuba exerted strong political pressure to obtain
the Imias' release. In addition, Panama delivered notes to
the Department protesting attachment of the Imias in the Canal
Zone. Leigh, supra note 131, at 288-89.
255. 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 24
(4th Cir. 1961).
256. Two days before the Bahia de Nipe arrived in Vir-
ginia waters, Cuba released a hijacked Eastern Airlines Electra
and the United States released Cuban naval vessels brought to
Florida by anti-Castro Cubans. In a note exchanged during the
negotiations preceding these releases, the Cuban government
said
if the Government of the United States guaran-
tees the right of immunity and sovereignty of
the boats and airplanes belonging to the Cuban
people that are seized in our country and taken
to United States territory . . . the Government
of Cuba will accord reciprocal treatment to Amer-
ican boats and airplanes that are In a similar
situation.
45 Dept. State Bull. 407-08 (1961). The Note delivered by the
Cuban Ambassador to Switzerland to the American Ambassador on
August 21 to request immunity for the Bahia de Nipe made in-
direct reference to this exchange. It requested immunity on
behalf of Cuba "in consonance with the principles of interna-
tional law, and in accordance with the reciprocal treatment
which it is willing to grant in similar circumstances." 6
Whiteman, supra note 9, at 703. The United States Government's
memorandum to the Supreme Court in opposition to a stay of the
appellate decision in this case revealed that the Department's
decision was a political one:
In this case the Secretary of State, in separate
letters, has informed the Attorney General that
"the release of the vessel would avoid further
disturbance of our international relations in
the premises," and that "the prompt release of
the vessel is necessary to secure the observance
19761
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
of the rights and obligations of the United
States."
These Executive determinations involve
delicate and complex policy considerations at
a critical time. They were made by the high
official responsible for the formation of the
Nation's foreign policy and the conduct of
foreign relations, Upon their decision the
national safety and welfare depend. As Ex
parte Peru and Mexico v. Hoffman teach, under
our system the courts do not go behind such
political determinations when they have been
formally made and presented, as in the present
case.
If it were not for the barratry of
the master and crew, the vessel would not have
come within the American jurisdiction at all;
and the status of the vessel is obviously not
unrelated to the airplanes illegally taken to
Cuba and later returned by that Government.
These were all elements to be considered by the
State Department.
1 Int'l Legal Materials 280, 287-89 (1962). For a detailed
account of the case's political background, see IA. Chayes,
T. Ehrlich, & A. Lowenfeld, International Legal Process 87-
144 (1968).
257. The State Department's decision to recognize immu-
nity in Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446
F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971), Is
often cited as an example of a politically motivated deter-
mination. The decision more probably resulted from a debatable
application of the Department's restrictive theory, however.
As part of a program to avoid starvation threatened by a
drought-created food shortage, the Government of India entered
into a charter party with the plaintiff to transport grain to
Calcutta. The plaintiff's lighters had to wait off the mouth
of the Hooghly River before proceeding to Calcutta because the
Indian Government had scheduled too many ships to arrive at the
same time. The plaintiff's action in the Southern District of
New York alleged three counts: (1) demurrage and (2) unpaid
freight under the charter party, and (3) delay and detention,
an admiralty action sounding in tort. The charter party had
provided that "[a]ny and all disputes arising under this Charter
Party are to be determined by the U.S. Courts for the Southern
District of New York." The Government of India requested im-
munity only from the last count, i.e., the noncontractual one.
The Department recognized this claim, apparently believing that
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the contract waived immunity from contract actions only and
that organization of a relief mission is a governmental activ-
ity. See Note, 13 Harv. Int'l L. J. 527, 528-33 (1972); Recent
Decisions, 12 Va. J. Int'l L. 140, 140 n.3 (1971).
258. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 385 (2d Cir. 1964Y,
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
259. Compare Dale Drydock Corp. v. The M/T Mar Caribe,
199 F. Supp. 871, 874 (S.D. Tex. 1961) (Cuba may not claim
sovereign immunity because its diplomatic relations with th6
United States had been severed), and The Gul Djemal, 296 F.
567 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), aff'd, 264 U.-S. 90, 44 S.Ct. 244, 68
L.Ed. 574 (1924) (Turkey may not claim immunity because it had
severed diplomatic relations with the United States), with
Hungarian People's Republic v. Cecil Associates, 118 F.-Supp.
954, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (recognition by and diplomatic rela-
tions with the United States entitles Hungary to immunity*,
though the State Department had forced-It to close the consul-
ate under litigation because of unfriendly acts), and Banque
de France v. Equitable Trust Co. of N.Y., 33 F.2d 20-2, 207
(S.D.N.Y. 1929) (U.S.S.R. may claim immunity though not recog-
nized by the United States). Cf. Ex parte Hussein Lutfi Bey,
256 U.S. 616, 41 S.Ct. 609, 65-L.Etd. 1122 (1921) (leave for
appeal denied because whether Immunity can be granted to a
sovereign which has severed relations with the United States
is an open question of uncertain solution).
260. Comment, supra note 246a, at 1144.
261. 318 U.S. 578 , 63 S.Ct. 793, 87 L.Ed. 1014 (1943).
262. See note 21 sup. See also Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34, 65 S.Ct. 530, 89 L.Ed. 729 (1945)
(binding effect given State Department determination of im-
munity "is founded upon the policy recognized both by the De-
partment of State and the courts that the national interests
will best be served when controversies growing out of the ju-
dicial seizure of vessels of friendly foreign governments are
adjusted through diplomatic channels rather than by the com-
pulsion of judicial proceedings.").
263. Comment, 'The Fifth Amendment in International Re-
lations: Protection for or from Government Overreaching," 17
U. Kansas L. Rev. 91, 93 (1968).
264. Bilder, supra note 58, at 661-62.
265. Id. at 662-.
266. T-. at 666; Leigh & Atkeson, "Due Process in the
Emerging Foreign Relations Law of the United States, ' 21 Bus.
Lawyer 853, 870-71, 22 Bus. Lawyer 3 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Leigh & Atkeson]; Christenson, "International Claims Pro-
cedure Before the Department of State," 13 Syracuse L. Rev.
527 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Christenson]. But see note
316 infra.
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267. Christenson, supra note 266, at 534.
268. Id. at 537; Bilder, supra note 58, at 666; Leigh
Atkeson, supra note 266, 21 Bus. Laer at 870-71.
269. In the settlement of clatms it is usually
the case that a broad variety of con-
siderations enter into the agreement.
There are a variety of concessions the
State Department can offer a country seek-
ing to improve its relations with the
United States, and it is often true that
the settlement received on claims repre-
sents the outcome of the bargaining on a
variety of issues in which the claims are
not of primary interest to the negotiations.
Leigh £ Atkeson, supra note 266, 21 Bus. Lawyer at 872,
270. Leigh & Atkeson, supra note 266, 22 Bus. Lawyer
at 22.
271. It is well established that the courts will give
effect to determinations of Congress, and possibly the execu-
tive, within their respective fields of competence, notwith-
standing their violation of international law. See note 67
supra Congress has the authority to extend the jurisdiction
of federal district courts over foreign states to the full
limit of Art. [i1 cases. U.S. Const., art. III, § 1. The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, ri U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146,
3 L.Ed. 287 (1812).
271-1. Thus, the State Department has asserted that execu-
tion of state-owned commercial property is prohibited by in-
ternational law, though state practice and scholarly opinion
clearly indicate the contrary. See text accompanying notes
132-34 and 146-61 s . State Department policy on execu-
tion seems to have been motivated by an exaggerated fear of
adverse foreign relations consequences. See the remarks of
Deputy Legal Adviser Belman in "New Departures," supra note 13,
at 186-87.
271a. Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 423-24.
271a-1. Congress recognized this as a flaw of prior law.Report sura note 4, at 7.
272. 26 Dept. State Bull. 984 (1952). See text accom-
panying notes 72-74 supra.
273. A suspicious mind would attribute the Department's
failure to publicize detailed standards of decision to an at-
tempt to mask Its occasional departure from those standards in
cases with unusual political circumstances.
274. A second alternative would have been to direct the
courts to apply international law in deciding claims to im-
munity, but that alternative would not have resulted in the
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publication of detailed standards accessible to all necessary
to provide for consistent decisions and promote foreseeability.
275. j., Remarks of Belman, Leigh & Lillich in "New
Departures, supra note 13; Dickinson, "The Law of Nations as
National Law: Political Questions," 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 451
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Dickinson]; Jessup, "Has the Su-
preme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?," 40 Am. J. Int'l
L. 168 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Jessup]; Leigh, supra
note 131; Lillich, "The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the
International Legal Order," 11 Va. J. Int'l L. 9 (1970);
Lowenfeld, "Claims," supra note 58; Lowenfed, supra note 3;
Reeves, "The Foreign Sovereign Before United States Courts,"
38 Fordham L. Rev. 455 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Reeves,
"The Foreign Sovereign"]; Timberg, supra note 14; Note, "Juris-
dictional Immunities of Foreign States)" sgra note 246a;
"Proposed Draft Legislation," supra note 13; Note, "Interna-
tional Law--Sovereign Immunity--The Last Straw in Judicial
Abdication," supra note 246a; Comment, "Restrictive Sovereign
Immunity, the State Department, and the Courts," 62 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 397 (1967); Comment, supra note 246 a; Note, 13 Harv. Int'l
L.-J.527 (1972).
275a. Report, supra note 4, at 7-9; Moore, "The Role of
the State Department in Judicial Proceedings," 31 Fordham L.
Rev. 277, 281 (1962); "Proposed Draft Legislation," supra
n-ote 13, at 325; Note, 13 Harv. Int'l L. J. 527, 535 1972).
See also Jessup, supra note 275, at 170.
275b. Report, supra note 4, at 9.
i history of judicial deference to
the Executive and of administrative
application of the Tate letter princi-
ples reveals extreme unpredictability
of result in sovereign immunity cases.
Needless to say, one of the purposes of
the Tate letter was to produce certainty
in the international law of state immunity.
In practice almost the opposite has occurred.
Leigh, supra note 131, at 281.
277. "Inevitably, there is pressure on the State Depart-
ment to determine legal Issues on the basis of diplomatic re-
lations and temporal political expediency." Timberg, supra
note 4, at 128. See also the remarks of a member of the Of-
fice of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs:
Because of the special. responsibilities
of the government attorney the conflict
between his role as advocate for his
client and his role as judge as to the
legality of his client's proposed actions
is typically more acute than is this con-
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flict for the private practitioner.
Thus, he is frequently faced with dif-
ficult questions as to whether he should
permit policy considerations to influ-
ence his legal opinions on particular
questions.
Bilder, supra note 58, at 655 n.42.
278. See Note, 13 Harv. Intl] L. J. 527, 535 (1972).
279. A State Department official has noted that some
foreign governments, because they do not comprehend the Amer-
ican system of separation of powers, "tend to view American
court action as if it were executive action." Bilder, supra
note 58, at 672 n.81. All mature foreign governments should
be cognizant of the American structure of government, however,
and would be less' likely to draw political inferences from
judicial than executive action.
280. Report, supra note 4, at 7. Referring to the claim
for immunity in Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974)
(see pp. 89-90 supra), Monroe Leigh, now the State Department
Legal Adviser, speculated as to why the Department granted
Cuba immunity:
There is much truth to the contention
made by counsel for the Chilean plain-
tiff that this dispute became political
because the Government of Cuba chose to
make it political. . . . There is every
reason to suppose that the Cuban Govern-
ment exerted strong political pressure in
this case through the Czech Ambassador.
It seems probable that the Cuban Govern-
ment took steps to create apprehension as
to the continued effectiveness of [a
February, 1973, agreement with the United
States to prosecute or extradite hijack-
ers] if its demand for immunity should be
denied.
Leigh, supra note 131, at 288-89. To this can be contrasted
the small number of protests lodged following execution of
judgments against the property of foreign sovereigns on the
Continent, where the executive plays no part in the grant or
denial of immunity. See Sucharitkul, supra note 102, at 262-
63; Lauterpacht, supra note 14, at227,242.
. 281. Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 390. Some commentators
have disagreed that American foreign relations would be im-
proved by removing the State Department from the decision-
making process. Cardozo, supra note 71., at 473, 498; Recent
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Developments, "Doctrines of Sovereign Immunity and Act of
State--Conflicting Consequences of State Department Interven-
tion," 25 Vand. L. Rev. 167, 178 (1972). If the State Depart-
ment had performed its duties following a grant of immunity by
espousing the plaintiff's claim, however, serious foreign pol-
icy disruptions could have been expected. See Lauterpacht,
supra note 148, at 240.
.282. In a letter to the Speaker of the House dated
January 16, 1973, Secretary of State William P. Rogers and
Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst urged that removal of
decision-making power from the State Department by enactment
of H.R. 3493 would
free the Department from pressures by
foreign states to suggest immunity and
from any adverse consequences resulting
from the unwillingness of the Department
to suggest immunity. The Department would
be In a position to assert that the ques-
tion of immunity is entirely one for the
courts.
"Hearing," supra note 4, at 34.
283. Report, supra note 4, at 8; Jessup, supra note 275
at 168, 169; Timberg, supra note 14, at 115-16. Contra, Car-
dozo, supra note 71, which notes that the Legal Adviser's Of-
fice performs similar functions quite often in making inter-
national claims settlements.
284. Leigh, s note 131, at 282; Lowenfeld, supra note
3, at 391; Lowenfeid "Claims," supra note 58, at 912. Pro-
fessor Lowenfeld notes that some foreign states refuse to par-
ticipate In the State Department's hearings, finding them offen-
sive. Id. It is possible that a Judicial fact-finding hearing
with com-pulsory process will be even more offensive to foreign
sovereigns. See Cardozo, supra note 71, at 474.
285. Timberg, supra note 14, at 115; Note, 13 Harv. Int'I
L. J. 527, 535-36 (967Y.
286. 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938).
.2.87. The new legislation may leave room for exercise of
the President's inherent foreign policy powers to prevent ad-
Judication of an action against a foreign state or its property
in extraordinary circumstances, however. John Boyd, an Attor-
ney-Adviser with the State Department's Office of the Legal
Adviser who worked on a draft of the proposed codification, has
pointed out that the bill does not prohibit the State Depart-
ment from making representations to the courts and that, if
serious disruption of relations would result from an exercise
of jurisdiction, the Department could represent that fact to
the courts, who would likely gi've the representation great
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weight or treat it as determinative. Comment, "The Impact of
S.566 on the Law of Sovereign Immunity," 6 L. & Policy Int'l
Bus. 179, 203 (1974) [hereinafter cited as "lmpact"J. But see
Statement of Legal Adviser Brower in "Hearing," supra note li,
at 15; Rort, supra note 4, at 12.
28- See Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.Zd 614 (5th Cir. 1974),
discussed in the text at notes 253 and 254 supra.
289. Sec. 4 (a), 90 Stat. 2892, 28 U.S-C. § 1605(a)(2)
(1976). See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra and note 131
supra.290. Rather, the prescription comes dangerously close to
violating bilateral treaties entered into by the United States
which assure to-nationals of the other signatories the same
access to American courts enjoyed by American nationals. See
Reeves, supra note 275, at 487.
291. See note 131 sp.
292. Se Reeves, 'The Foreign Sovereign," supra note 275,
at 487.
293. See text accompanying notes 132-39 supra.
294. See text accompanying notes 141-43 supra.
295. Se Report, supra note 4, at 31; "New Departures,"
supra note 13, at 19&.
296. The State Department's comments accompanying an
earlier draft of the codification suggest that lnternationcl
traders would benefit from the restriction of execution to
commercially related assets because such a policy would pre-
vent retaliation in the form execution against one American
corporation's overseas property of a separate but related cor-
poration's obligations. See "Hearing," supra note 4, at 24
and 45. It seems unlikely that the possibility of retaliation,
especially in view of the existence of state practice permitting
Indiscriminate execution against commercial assets, could off-
set the tangible benefit to international traders of being
able to enforce their claims against foreign states. Retali-
ation would weigh heavy in the balance only if, as has been sug-
gested, the possibility of execution caused foreign states to
reduce their investments in the United States to a level which
could not satisfy its obligations to American traders. See
Lowenfeld, "Claims," supra note 58, at 928-29. In view o-Amer-
ican investment opportunities, this seems unlikely.
297. The deposit of American dollars in American banks by
foreign banks has been important not only because of its ef-
fects on the American balance of payments, see "Hearing," supra
note 4, at 46, but also because it can offse-t-dlsintermediatlon
occurring in periods of high interest rates. See DePamphilis,
"The Short-Term Commercial Bank Adjustment Process and Federal
Reserve Regulation," N.E. Econ. Rev. (1974) 1, 17-19. It has
also been suggested that the comercial or public nature of
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money is difficult to determine. Lowenfeld, "Claims," supra
note 58, at 909; Collins, "The Effectiveness of the Restric-
tive Theory of Sovereign Immunity," 4 Colum. J. Transnat'l L.
119, 150 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Collins.
298. Note, supra note 112, at 890. To be sure, there
are practical forces which compel a state to honor its obli-
gations voluntarily. A state which makes a practice of dis-
honoring judgments returned against itself will find that
private parties are less eager to deal with it at reasonable
prices in future transactions. Moreover, most states will
voluntarily satisfy their judgments in order to avoid diplo-
matic pressure and moral stigma. Some commentators have sug-
gested that these forces make execution unnecessary. Comment,
"Sovereign Immunity from Judicial Enforcement: The Impact of
the European Convention on State Immunity," 12 Colum. J. Trans-
mat'l L. 130, 149 (1973); Comment, supra note 246a, at 1151.
Deputy Legal Adviser Belman, in "New Departures," supra note
13, at 186-87, has observed that "[l]n practice, . . . the im-
munity from execution we now accord foreign sovereigns has not
resulted in their refusing to pay judgments against them."
However, though a study made in 1960 could find few cases in
which judicial decisions and arbitral awards against foreign
states went unsatisfied, see Schachter, "The Enforcement of
International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions," 54 Am. J. Int'l
L. 1 (1960), "the situation Is now such that obligation avoid-
ance by states has generated no small amount of litigation."
Comment, "Sovereign Immunity from Judicial Enforcement: The
Impact of the European Convention on State Immunity," supra,
at 131. It is reported that the judgment against Sweden whose
execution Sweden successfully avoided in Dexter & Carpenter v.
Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931), the case that firmly established
execution immunity in the United States, was settled three
years later for one-third the amount of the judgment. Collins,
supra note 297, at 136. Thus, it is likely that some avoid-
ance of foreign states' international obligations will result
from their immunity from execution.
299. Leigh, supra note 131, at 285; Schmitthoff, supra
note 117, at 453.
300. E.g., Collins, supra note 297, at 149; Leigh and
Lillich in "New Departures," supra note 13, at 190-192 and 195;
Reeves, "The Foreign Sovereign, supra note 275, at 496; Reeves,
supra note 158, at 522-23; Comment, "Sovereign Immunity from
Judicial Enforcement: The Impact of the European Convention on
State Immunity," supra note 298, at 154; Comment, "Sovereign
Immunity vs. Execution of Judgment: A Need to Reappraise Our
National Policy," 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.. Rev. 369, 381-82
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(1971); Note, supra note 112, at 918; Comment, supra note
246a, at 1152. Contra, Belman in "New Departures," supra, at
186; "Impact," supra note 287, at 204.
301. See text at notes 162-69 supra.
302. Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 429; Belman In "New De-
partures," supra note 13, at 184, 186.
303. See text accompanying notes 172-79 supra.
304. " the State Department's comments accompanying an
earlier draftof the codification in "Hearing," supra note 4,
at 39.
305. See text accompanying notes 190-204 supra,307. See text accompanying notes 208a-1l supra.
308. State Department "Section-by-Section Analysis," In
"Hearing," supra note 4, at 42.
309. Statement of Legal Adviser Brower, In id. at 22.
One commentator, an attorney with the Internatinal Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, has doubted that the American
capital market would be injured by a withdrawal of immunity
in cases dealing with public debt, citing the Swiss experience
and the willingness of most sovereigns to waive their immunity.
Delaume, supra note 199. But cf. Reeves, "The Foreign Sover-
eign," supra note 275, at T.
310. See text accompanying notes 221-25 supra.
311. See note 223 and text accompanying notes 4a and 4b
supra.
312. See text accompanying notes 246a-57 supra.
313. Contra, Lowenfeld, "Claims," supra note 58, at
919-21.
314. Eg, T. Giuttarl, The American Law of Sovereign
Immunity 365T1970) [hereinafter cited as Giuttari]; Goodman,
"Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns: A Political or Legal Question--
Victory Transport Revisited," 38 Brooklyn L. Rev. 885, 906
(1972); Moore, supra note 275a, at 300-01; Note, The Statu-
tory Proposal to Regulate the Jurisdictional Immunities of
Foreign States, supra note 71, at 587-92; Note, "is the Cur-
rent Disposition of the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in the
United States Appropriate in Light of Prevailing Governmental
Policy?," I Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 133, 178 (1970); Comment,
"Restrictive Sovereign Immunity, the State Department, and the
Courts," supra note 275, at 424; Comment, "Judicial Adoption
of Restrictive Immunity for Foreign Sovereigns," 51 Va. L. Rev.
316, 362 (1965); Comment, supra note 24 6a, at 1152. One
scholar would not have made the Department's politically in-
fluenced suggestion determinative, but only persuasive.
Dickinson, s note 275, at 479. Two commentators would
have to continue the Department's broad authority to determine
immunity claims in both political and nonpolitical contexts.
Cardozo, supra note 71, at 473 and 498, and his remarks in
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"New Departures," supra note 13, at 193-94; Franck, "The Courts,
the State Department and National Policy: A Criterion for Ju-
dicial Abdication," 44 Minn. L. Rev. 1101, 1117 (1960).
315. E., Giuttari, supra note 314, at 365; Leigh &
Atkeson, supr note 26C, at 22 and 26; Recent Developments,
supra note 2W1, at 178-79; Comment, The Fifth Amendment in In-
ternational Relations: Protection for or from Government Over-
reaching, supra note 263, at 103; Note, supra note 112, at 917.
316. The only court ruling directly on the question has
held that dismissal of an attachment on the basis of State De-
partment recognition of the property's immunity for political
reasons is not a taking of property without compensation or
a deprivation of property without due process within the Fifth
Amendment. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 26 (4th
Cir. 1961). However, there is some authority in the Court of
Claims to the effect that negligent or willful failure by the
State Department to espouse a valid international claim of a
U.S. citizen against a foreign sovereign or the government's
release of that claim gives rise to a right to compensation
under the Fifth Amendment. See The Brigs "Fanny" and "Hope,"
46 Ct. Cl. 214 (1911) (dictum Gray v. United States, 21 Ct.
Cl. 340 (1886); Meade v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 224, aff'd,
76 U.S. (9 Wail.) 691 (1869); Owners of the Brig Armstrong v.
United States, digested in J. Devereaux, Court of Claims 38-41
(1856).
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